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The (Not So) Poor Knights of the T em ple 
Scott .r. JJeem. 
Sco11 Beem graduated with a Master in Arts in l11slory 
ji-0111 Eastern111/nafs in Spring 1997. Ti11s a11a!ysis of the 
7'cmp!ars in I/le Holy L.1nd and in Europe was wrrcren for 
Professor Boifoy Young's me1/icvo! history semin<rr in 
Spring J 996. 
The Knights Tcmplar presem historians with on interesting if mu..-ly· subjccl. The litcrnturc dc,·oted to this militar•-reli&>ious order, though usually quite we!l.rcscnrch~d. 
rcmnins steeped in folklore. These legends include nil monncr of 
bizarre prnctices, nnd links Lo such divers &'Toups as the infamous 
Cult of Assassins, the Mcrovingi~n d)'113Sly, and the Frccmosons.' 
Ho"e,·cr if we foous our al!cntion on the his:orical Tcmp!ars, we 
find a unique milicnry order which nchiC\·cd remarkable successes 
during its existence. These accomplisluuents included not onlv 
militnry vie.torics, buL the creation of an international supply 
network linking Latin Europe ~with the lauds of Outrcmcr. It 
all?'~·ed tl1e Templars to take advru11agc of ccrlain political, 
rchgious and especially economic rcnlitics created by the success 
or the First Cru..~ade. The fonnation ru1d evolution of this 
nclwork, its function, ~nd its makeup nrc the focus of 1his stud~·. 
The Poor Knights of tlte Temple of Solomon rose quickly to 
power. Jn 1119, Hugh de Paycns nnd eight other kni£:hts began 
protc.::ting pilgrims on the treacherous roads of the Holy Land.' 
King Bald\\in of Jerusalem welcomed these pious warrior-monks 
and granted them la\'ish quaners on the site of the Tcmpk of 
Solomon.' Despite this splendor, the new Order lived by the Rule 
of St. Augustine, binding them lo the Church instead of scculal' 
authorities. The Templars toiled rmd fought in relati,·c obscurit\' 
during 1heir first years before rco:i\"ing enthusiaslic support fro~ 
1Rcadcrs inlcr~slt:d in lhis tl:Spc.:t o[ the subject sho1J!d COr'IS'Jh nnv of ttie 
11c:r.:011J111y \vcrks ci1ed hcrc\!l f\cr. • 




tlie gn:;1t religious leader, Bernard of Clrur\'au.--. On-~ or Bernard's 
grcmest pntrons was Hugh, Counr of Champagne, a Templ nr who 
had granted the monk the land for his monnstcry.4 
In 11 28, afier some corrcspondenc() witl1 Bernard and other 
church dii,'llitarics, a council met in Troyes to give the Tcmplars 
o11icial sta\us.' Bernard himself helped draw up the original 
Tcmplar Ruic, based on that of the Cislercian Order.~ This Ruic 
combined '"those who pray", the !irst medieval estate with "those 
who fight", the second, lo produce a religious order dedicated to 
prccccting the faithful nnd righting the infidel. Ideally it would 
confer on its followers honuony between sword and nliar. The 
T emplors would be<:ome .. Knights of Christ." 
Establishing the Mcm1s 
The Council of Troyes coincided with an cxl·~nsi,·c charitable 
campnisn in Western Europe. The Tcmplnrs were well-placed to 
ta.\;c :xl,·anlnge of the oulflow of donations to the Church which 
occurred in the twcl Clh century. Witl1in twenty years the 
Tcmplors had estnblishcd estates tliroughout Europe, o.nd were 
funneling supplies, fw1ds, and men to the Holy Land. 
The success of this eompai!,'ll is more casilr understood when 
one recognizes 1hc ch:mi;ing mentality of cmsading Europe. 
Economically, Europe wos in a stage of transition from gift to 
prolit economy.' Attitudes, especially among the nobility, lcnded 
to fnvor n system of reciprocal exchange similar to tl1ose 
documcn1cd by anlhropologists among traditional sociclics.• 
Kings, dukes, nnd counts showed tlieir appreciation for a cause or 
person ruid dernonstrotcd 1heir onn generosi•y by bestowing 
donotions end presems. William Marshall, in the years when he 
lived by his sword (l 160-1180), showered gifts frocly upon 
fellow knights n fler successful tournaments, even though he was 
S1rphc:n I fO\Vl'lrJ\~ 71,, Kulgl1ts Te1:1plJri)lc"' Yor~ 1982). 49. 
1P~nni::1. Tl:e .t.:n;g!rts T.:111piar ~r.d their ,\!)tit, S. 
'Ibid .. 6. 
'Lester K. Lillie, Religl<>:t1 Pol-·erty ana r/11t P~lit Ecano111y ht i\·fqdi~t.·al 
E:11rope (ltlt:!;l.:.3, Nc\v l'ork, 1978). ch. l . 
'il>id. 
or1en in debt 10 O!hers.9 Thus, lhc oris1ocra1ic c1hos d~111 011ded 
frcqucnl donation of c~laies and money withoul regard of 
economic relum. 
The Tcmplors reputation nnd lhc cause lhcy defended 
designntcd thern as a prime targcL for such giCt-gi\'ing. They were 
initial!'• pcrcei,·cd as '"poor knights" engaged in a \'Cl)' noble and 
holy endeavor, which helped co build their patrimony. Bernard 
embraced the Tcmplars because 1mlike other knigllls, thcv were 
not barbarous pilloscrs living in excess, who would !mer seek 
absolution from the Church. High rnnking nobles and churchmen 
responded i=-0siti1·cly to lhc Templar image as well, e1·en if there 
wns some apprehension about '·fighting oonb." Wmiors saw 
the Order as a new and better path lo sn!Yntion. rncy could toke 
up the sword for Christ imd continue as knights, instead of 
singing ond 111-iring in Lhc monostcry. 
'11ie \'cry !irst grams preceded the Council of Tro:'cs. 
Theobald, Cowil of Blois (also nephew ~nd successor to the 
Templor Hugh, former Count of Champagn~) gr:i:itcd lhc Order 
"a house, grange, and mer,dow, together with one lcncmcm of one 
carueate, al Barbonnc ... , as well as conceding to his own \'ossals 
the right to make gifls from their 01111 fonds."' 0 Hugh de Paycns, 
Grnnd :Master, gave up hls own holdings to Ilic Order, and 
campaigned for more granls. He rca:ived lands almost 
immediately from \\iilliam Clito, Count o[ Flanders, ns well as 
holdings in Anjou and Poitou. 11 Hugh campaigned in England as 
well, receiving sc\'eral grnnts, including the originnl London 
Temple." All of these initial gifts came in 1127-28 as Bcrnnrd 
and Hugh were seeking official recognition. 
Early donors co the Order included some of lh~ greatest lord~ 
in Christendom. Henry I and Stephen, Kings of England, r.1ade 
substamial giils to the order, as did Eleanor of Aquitaine." 
Lesser European nobles embraced the Templars, and the Order 
soon established prcccptories throushout the West. l'crhnps the 
'Gc:crges Duty. Jl'UHara A./ars.110/l· 1110 Fl~r~r ufChiRJlry f.'le~\· 'tor~, 
1985), I t0-1. 
lt-f\.1':~kolm Barb~, 11u: ,V .. ·•v K11igh1hood: ;I His/Ory ~l' J/,e Ora\:r o_{ Jh~ 
1'.:Jup!c (Ca1nbrid~c~ 19911), 13. 
''li>id .• 13. 
1:1 lo\\'3r1h, The .':nithL• Te1nph:,., 64. 
"S.rb=r. The ,V.rw KntgJ;1!iaod, ~4-6. 
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most fomous grant was that of Alfonso I of Aragon, "ho left 
them one-third of his kingdom." Though the gesture impossible 
to in1plcme11t, it strongly illustrates this initial cntlmsiasm :1mong 
the nobility. 
Poorer la,·nten expressed generosity towards the Templ~rs 
also. Donations from the former included smns as low as one 
d;:nier, as well a.s sm:ill estates, horses, annor, and weaponry." 
Go·cal church dignitaries also made generous gifts. The 
Archbishop of Reims, and Bishops or Soissons and Angers <1ll 
made early contributions comprising coin and certain prolitnble 
burial rislns. 1~ In the 1130s, Pope Innocent ll donated a mark of 
~old (a subslantial sum) annually, while his Chancellor gaYe two 
~unccs of gold. Archbishops, bishops, and abbots were 
encouraged to given rnark or sil\•er. J't 
Perhaps neatly as importam as granls of land and monC)' were 
the many pri,·ilegcs and exemptions extended to the Templars. 
In England, King Ste(lhcn exempted lhc OrdeT from all lllxes. 
This l>Olicy w;is further strengthened by a charter granted by 
Richard the lion-Heart in 1189, later renewed by John Lackland, 
by Herny Jlf, imd by Edward 1.1s These privileges included 
freedom of warren, waste, and regard, as well as the right to 
impose lines and punishments within their holdings.'9 In Wales 
these rights led to entire' illages coming wider the control of the 
Tcmplnrs. a process "11ich surely had p<'.rnllels throughout the 
West. ' 0 
The Church \\'OS noL to be ouLdone by the secular magnates in 
the granting of privileges. lnJ!ocent H not only confirmed the 
Ruic of the warrior-monks, he codified their extensive privileges 
"ith the papal bulls, Omne a'a111m optimum. Milites r empli, aud 
,'..fi!itla lkf." These granted collection righcs to Tcmplars, 
pcnnission to 1~kc tithes, obligations, and burial righlS in pl:ices 
1~Purl11\!1', T/,e K':igl!J.<: 1'.:111p/,1r u.nd their Al)'t/J, JO. 
15Bar~r, 111~ i\'e-w ,r:11Fglrt/inr;:l, 24-5. 
'%:d .. 23. 
'"lt"1 .. S6. 
1*1 (O\\'arlh, The j«:nighl.i 1"n11pldr, 2.31-8. 
"~oid , 23R. 
1''~illi:11n Rd.'.s, A Histol')• nf 1/u; OrJe.r of!•il. Jc>'"'' of JtJr1t.aalent Ir: n1tn'e.r 
•l1rd <»11/u, il'elsh Sorder(C.lrdi«. l 9·17).48·51. 
:iaarbcr, Tho! Jt.:e1Af J:uil('1tl:<>nd, ~s. 
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" ·h<re they had ornlorics, the power lo arroinl their 0\111 
chaplains, and exemption from the controls of locnl bishops.u 
Generous grnnls of land and coin, lax c.~emptions, and 
ecclcsias1ic.1l pri\'ileges were the foundation of a vast economic 
nel\\'O:k which would supply the Templars i11 the Holy Land. 
Pro\'iding for a permanent lighting presence in the Enst was nn 
im::1ense nncl costly enterprise. But this largesse carried a 
ncgali,·c cost as well. It lead lo some tarnishing of the Tcmplar 
image, the result of jealous ~ccusations and rescno11cn1, gn-ci1 
unfortunate credence by cases of abuse within the order. These 
problems long remained secondary·, offset by the srcat wsk 
widcnnkcn b)' the Templars. By the middle of the twc lfi.h 
century, the situation of lhe crusader states was becoming more 
and more critical. 
Needs in the East 
The Templar presence in lh~ Ouircmcr grew aficr 1130. 
They quickly became a prominent fo.."tUJ"e on the lnndscopc of the 
crusader kingdoms. assuming larger ;md more complc." roles. By 
the close of the twelfth century the Templus were no longer 
mostly concerned with prolecting pil;,'Tims; they were now 
building custlcs, mounting campaigns against the Muslims, and 
advising the King and his barons as well. One csumate of 
Tcmplar numbers counts "600 knights and 2,000 scrtcants on 
ncti\'c service in the cast"·· nn enormous standing force al thal 
lime." The expenses of such an army were diverse and 
fom1idablc 
Knights were by definition mounted warriors, and calvnry 
maintcnnnc.: was a prime concern. This alone must have been a 
difficult task in the semi-arid crusader kingdoms. In Burgundy, 
a friendlier region for breeding lhe kind ofhea"y destricrs n.:Wed 
by heavily annorcd Western warriors, lite cost of equipping and 
mamtaining a knight wns about 30 manses (750 acres) in 1180, 
and nbout 150 manses in 1260." InOa1ion proved nearly us great 
" Ibid., SS-9; Howorth. The KnightsTemplar, SO. 
na.irbcr, 1'11 11. t\'Ch/ K11igJuhood.2. 
H1bid., 230· 1. One 11'111.nsc n1ca:c;ored the. am<) Unl or land 0 single household 
li.:nncd for the local lotd. 
;i foe ns the infidel. The Order mighl have begun with second· 
bvnd equipment nnd donated clolliing, but as it gained 
prominence, its need for "stale of the art" equipment increased. 
Tcn1pbrs were not c."travasant (indeed their Rule forbade costly 
ornament), but their list of equipment was "splendid and 
compklc, their lhfog quarters [kept I dean".0' The Rule of the 
Ter.iplars proYidcd strict guidelines, includ ing U\) to four horses, 
iron hose, a hclmcl or c/1apecm de fer, a sword, a shield, 
a lance, a Turkish mace, n surcoat, am1ing jacket, mnil 
shoes, and lhr~ knh·cs: a dagger, a bread knife, nm\ n 
pocketknife. They may have two caparisons, two shi11s, 
two pnirs of brc~chcs and lwo pairs of hose; and a small 
b: ll. ::6 
Other slalutcs within the Ruic detailed eve.rything from 
horseshoes and saddles to 1cn1s. 
Equipping each knight was only one expense; the Tcmplars 
also buih nHlll\" ~tone castles. Some, like 'Atlit and Safod were 
c;uile C.'>"tcnsiv~ The Tcmplars maintained and garrisoned thirty· 
rwo cnstlcs in Outrcmcr!' Rulers in the West appreciated the 
e:-:ocnsc of castles, and recognized the necessity of these great 
st~1cl11rcs in mnintaining control over a hostile population. The 
Tcmplnrs took cnrc lo publicize their achievements." 
The Tcmolrirs were no longer jusl protecting pilgrims, nnd 
their expense. accounts rc nectcd the variety and complexity or 
the ir expanded mission in the East. EYcn though they lived in 
rcktiYe humililv as their Rule demanded, their remoteness from 
the Wcsl incrc.Jscd the cost of upkeep. The annual cost for 
nrnintaining a knight in Acre was ninety !ivres toumois in 1267.2? 
Th~ expense of 600 knights was 54,000 livres 1011rnoi.r, abouL 
lm~nly·IWO p~rccnt or the annual income of the Royal Dynasty of 
~T1nrr, Th~ .(11igl11.s T'111plar 0•1d lhe.lr !.·fyr11. 14. 
''No. 1:;8. Tli< Rul• of1h• 7•n•pluu, l;Rnslo1"1 b~ J.M. Uptcn-Ward (Bury 
S:. Edttlur~d$, 1 ~2), 53. 
?"llarb~r, 1/u.·/'t/11w K•tlgl:JJuxxi. 18. 
!') Iden Nichelson. T ll•Jt{'lllnr. Hospft,1l!ers .  and 1(:u/onic J;1!ig,~t:r: lrnng~.f 
of the Mi/i1<1ry Order.r. 112~·/ 291 {1.ondo1t 1993), l 06. 
;-:;Uarbi:r, T/11: /\'t1w K11;g/1rhood, 232 
l Ct 
France-250,000." And l11is did not include castle maintenance. 
Defonding the faith was indeed an ex-pensive cndea\'or, yet the 
Ternplars never wanted for proper equipment. They were cvcr-
rcady to battle the enemies of Christianity, and prospered in doing 
so. 
The Network in the West 
The expansion of the Templar's activities requi1·ed a complex 
net\\'ork of funding and supply, more advanced than any kno\\n 
in the West since the days of Rome. These needs were initiolly 
met by spontaneous donations and grants, but. in[rnstructure 
quickly dcwlopcd lo administer Templar holdings and look after 
their interests. 
The extcnsi"c, diversified, and sometimes isolated estates of 
the Order in \'.'eslcm Europe required skillful management. 
Initially, this system was inspired by the model developed in 
Cisterciun monasteries, wil.h a "mother" house keeping oversight 
on its "daughter" foundations. This method, however, proved too 
inefficient fbr Templar nccds.31 They instead mirrored the efforts 
of llteir riq1ls; the Hospitalers, focusing on gco-political 
rcalities.>Z At the base of this system \\'ere individual estates 
awarded to prcceptorics, local commw1ities living tmdcr the 
authority of a ccmmander. Lines of authority bccnmc c()\(ilied, 
as each preceptory laid claim to particular parcels of land. The 
minister or bt1illi of a preceptory saw to its needs, aml answered 
to the Mast.er of the region (such as England or Frnnce). 
The specific functions of individual bailli varied from region 
to region. Enghmd was a prime source of agricultural wealth for 
the Tcmplars. They profited from f,'Tain, fish, and especially 
wooI.33 The Templar's development of the wool trnde mi1rnrcd 
that of their Cistcrcian cousins, as they were able to capitalize en 
the profits generated when English wool was made into Flemish 
cloth. Land acquisitions by the Order in England following the 
'"ltiid., 232-]. 
"Ibid., t9-20. 
" Ibid., 20. 
nHt>\\'ur1h, Tiu: ;~,1ig/,1s T~111p!ar, "239. 
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<lri!!ina\ grnnts illustratcs a policy of c~ploiting this industry." 
Th~v purchased properties along continental land routes 
\':hc.ne\'cr possible, as bai/lies sought to "consolidate ~nd 
. . d r. l ' L"" r~1t ionaltSc through land lransacucns an care1u managcmcn 
The house in Proving for example, took advantage of the 
Champagne fairs, the regional center of economic dyn~mism at 
that time. The hail!i quickly established a powerful presence 
-.•:ithin the tO\\"lt.% Tcmplars e\'cntually ran some cf these 
profitable fa irs. 
Specific functions of a prcccptcry may have depended on 
geography, but certain activities were practiced in every house. 
The Western houses rccrnited for the Templar headquarters m 
Acre. Sometimes this process became fairly complex. The Order 
oft.en attempted to acquire the lands of a particular recruit, and 
sometimes that knight wished lo leave his lnnds lo his family. 
The Tcmplars were usually willing to negotiate. In on·~ instance 
1.hc vou112cr son of a noble m;s promised to the Order, with the 
und~rsta;ding that if his older brol11ers all died within six years, 
he would return to his family Ciel's and provide the Tcmplars with 
a pa'1l1ent or l ,000 sois instead?' 
The Temolar houses also commonly collected additional 
rc,·cnuc through privileges and rights. Templars ·could fine law· 
breakers, and impose taxes which followed the tenets of local 
ma~natcs. In one example, the Templars received permission 
frn~1 the Cro"11 to raise taxes in Wales. This area, wmscd to a 
hc.wy fiscal hand, resisted, embroiling all panies in a morass of 
manctl\'ering and litigation." The Order could also eam income 
from their ecclesiastical exemptions. Templnrs might perfom1 
burial rights, and through th~ir O\\TI pricsl5, administer the 
sacrnmcnls al ce;tain times or the year. They used these rights to 
form confraternities.:'' These groups sought salvation (and 
c1tjoycd cc11ain tax-breaks) through providing small annual 
donations. 
Jllbid., 239. 
;.~B~u bt..'T, i'1oc llew Kn;gJ;t/Joud, 2 50. 
)t,lbi<l,. 262-3. 
"Ibid., 261. 
;\;H.<:cS, A .'-ffstory q.f tlie Order, 4S. 
'1>PJ.!11ltt, J7u.: KNigh1s Ternphrr trod :ludr A.f,,vJh, 11-2. 
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The Templar network c.'11ibitcd a propensity for ,·crtical 
expansion, excmpliii<:<l by 1heir activiti~s in the wool-cloth \rude, 
local fairs, and overland irade routes. It should not he surprising 
that they soon de\·e!oped na,·al capabilities as well. ·111e Order 
poss:sscd houses in the major Allantic ports of Do,·cr, Names, La 
Rochelle, nnd Bordcnux. Their presence in the Meditcrrancnn 
centered on Marseille, with other key holdings in l1:i1}".> 
Esrnblishing a fleet was not only vital for supply and 
communications with Am:, but allowed burgeoning Tcmplar 
trading enterprises as well. 
As \\'ilh their other nctivities, the Templars enjoyed certain 
privileges in mnritime commerce. In La Rochelle for example, 
Eleanor of Aquitaine allowed them Lo Lrnnsport "freely and 
sc.curely, without all customs and all exactions, ci1hcr by lund or 
by ,,·ntcr."" In Marseille, Lhe Tempbrs enjoyed similar 
privileges: the freedom to transport pil&'Tims and mcrchanls with 
few if any restrictions." In I.he early days, the Order conlractcd 
out mnri1ime affairs to mdi,•iduals (chiefly ltahnns). but by 1207 
they O\\ncd their O\\TI ships0 The benefits oftrnnsporting for the 
Templnrs--guarantced payment, busin~ss, fiscal advantagcs--must 
have been tcmpling LO pri,·ate entrepreneurs. Later, \\1t~n thev 
owned their O\\TI ships, 01~ Order cenainly hod no problem~ 
fmding worthy cnpwins. The Tcmplar flcec became so successful 
that records mention an official of llie Order in Mnrscille called 
"Master of f'11ssages "" 
Pcrhnps the most famous (or infamous} piece of Templnr 
infras1ruc1ure ll'DS 01e banking network. The development of 
effective finru1cinl institutions was the final link in the chain 
\\·hich supplied Acre, and shows that the Templars were quick to 
embrace the realities of the profil economy. Tcmp!ar banking 
e\'oh•ed rapidly, dJi,•en by a need to deal with lhc initial gilts of 
coin and property ll1e Order received. TI1e fact that the TcmplarS 
were recognized os lhc bankers of the French kings by 1147 (a 
;~Uorbct, Tiu: ·""·~w Kniglrtlrood: 250· l. 
''lhid .. 26. 
AJlbid .• :'!37. 
O(hicJ,. 237, 
M(bid .. 238, 
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mere nineteen year$ afier the Cotmcil of Troyes} illuslralcs this 
"<:. • .:.~ proi;; ... _~. 
Tl~ Templ:rrs n~dcd banking, and with the gro\\1h of the 
rrofit economy, so did many c!Mrs. It should noi be surprising 
thal th-:> Bro1hers became so adept at fmancc. \\iho belier to trust 
1hM the knights of Christ? The Orders Rule sp~eifically 
prohibited Brothers from pladng "a fund of money r:n~whcrc 
except in the trcnSut)"," to which only 11te Treasurer or Master hnd 
access:•• They swore fcnlly to no one, and were objc-cti\'e enough 
to broker to hoth the Capetians and Angevins simultaneously. 
The kings, nobility, Ol\d merchants o[ Europe [cit secure enough 
ill the Order 1.0 deposit jewelry, g<>ld, and silver within 1he 
• 41 
preccptoncs. . . . . 
The Orders function ns " depository was JtiSl Lhe bcg1nnmg. 
Ti:eir m::ul\' localions throughout Christendom allowed for the 
transfer or" funds in a primitive c~it or checking system." The 
Tcmpl:tr network began financing loans for both kings and the 
Church. The cnisadc of Louis \Ill is an early example. The king 
had spent n=ly all of his money by the time he rc:iched Antioch 
in March of I 148. 111c Templars oITered hom assistance and 
borrowed from locnl merchants on lhe security of their 
possessions.'> Lalcr, Louis ordered his regents in France lO settle 
pymcnt \\~th the Temple in Paris. The Capctians continued their 
financiJI link with them umil King Philip IV brutally suppressed 
theOrdcr in 1307. 
The papncy olso found Templar banking useful. Houses of 
the Order were depositories for imponant docwncnL5, treasures or 
relics, and funds. A fier the schism of 1167, the popes tumcd LO 
the Tcmp!Jrs 10 help linnncc activities.so The expertise of the 
Order led to Tcmpl~r Cllbfcularii adininistcring to papJl banking 
from 1163 011wnrds, illcluding the tabulation of revenues and 
Gnancing of lolns.s• The importance of this relationship is best 
':P~nn::r, 11ir: K11ise_l1IJ r~1'1plM e1.11d tlrt:ir .•11)ti1~ 11 . 
"'No. 335, T/r~ flu!.: of Ilic: Ten1plors, 9-1 
"'Ho\\':lnh, Th~ 1:111glr1s T.:111pf:J,., 240· l. 
"ibid.,~ I . 
4'Barbcr, Tlr'"· .l\rqw K11tg/J1J:wd. 67. 
!1bid.,277·8. 
" lO:c!,, 21a. 
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illustrated by 1hc foct that Tcmplar c11/Jic!l!arit were left alone 
during the Orders persecution nnd expulsion." 
The Tcmplor financial in~titutions continued to grow 
(hrougholll the Order's existence. By Lhc middle or the thinc·:nlh 
century, they numbered the growing merchant class among their 
dicntclc. These merchants \\Crc more concerned with the 
Tcmplars as finnncicrs, than wi1h their no\\· obsolete claim as 
"poor knights of Christ.'" Banking had bcco:l\e a ncccssnry 
adjuv:mt to the e.xercise of power i11 Europe, and the Tcmplars lcd 
the way. Many still cherished the volues associated with the old 
system of gift exchange, however, and sco:ncd profit as ignoble. 
The Order's success in finance was vital to their support of the 
continuing Cru~nde in the East, yet it :ilso sowed t.hc seeds of 
their eventual destruction by wc:ikcning their old, knightly 
virtues. 
The finnncinl network asswncd such an important role in 
Europe, it is not surp:ising thal Tcmplars becam; 1nrsted ad;~sors 
to the greatest lords. The aforementioned rcb1ionships "ith the 
papacy offer an ecclesiastical example. King Louis VII o[ France 
not only looked lo the Tcniplars for financial oid during his 
Crusade, they were his military ndvisors in the Holy Land as well. 
They also advised Richard the Lion Heart during the Third 
Crusade, and acted as his honor guard.s.i He e,•cn tra\•ebl 
disguised as n Tcmplar on his way back Lo England (but was 
recognized i11 Austria)." ln Lo~.don, the King's Council orten 
met at the Temple. lt wa;; here the Templar Master ancmpted to 
reconcile Henry I! and Thomas Bccket.56 William :-1nrshnll. Earl 
of Pembroke was close friend to the Master of Engl:ind, Aimcry 
de Sainte-Maure, and as:.-umed the Templar mnn1lc before his 
dcath.s' The Templnrs profited by such relationships, \\i1ich 
helped to further strengthen all aspects of their network. Bt:t the 
Brothers came to discover that the fo,·or of kings Md popes was 
nw1.:d«i1m Ba:rl.lct, 711e Trial of1hc ·1~1nplun (Cam':Jrid£C, 1978). ?2. 
)iNi<t:hCl$On, T~lilf'lars, /fo.~pUoller.f and7'eu.'ou.:e K11ig/ifJ, 1:S. 
)JHO\ .. ·arth, r;,., K1Jighl:J Te.wpf(Jr, l 7t.1-7. 
nlbid .• 1 77~$. 
"Ibid .• 241. 
):[),,1by. IVil/in1t1,\(a,..sJ1all~ 14-S. 
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a fickle and dangerous business, when Philip IV offr:lllce mmcd 
on them and Clement V subsequently abandoned U1em. 
Despite its cfficicnc)', the Templnr network in its heyday hnd 
both problems and critics. Dignitaries were somctinics accused 
or being greed:' or com1pt, o[ c.xploiting their privileges. Local 
clcrg_v olicn complained thnt. Tcmplars intruded on their territory, 
offering discount burials and other holy services.'" Some 
Weishmcn compl~ined that Templars let too many burgesses into 
their frntcmal order, thus exempting them from local laxcs.5~ The 
realities of banking also presented problems. Jenn Sire de 
Join.,.ille, chronicler of St. Louis threatened a Templar treasurer 
"~th an nxc to ri;cci\'e cosh foc a !c:on promised to his lo:d.6> II 
seems the lvfos1er had died in combat., nnd the Marshal and 
Commander citing a statute requiring lhe Mi1stcrs consent on such 
transactions, were rcluclnnl to act. The tcmplmion presented by 
large sums o[ ready coin must have \YCighed heavily even on the 
m~l pious brothers. TI1c notion o[ knights dirtying their hands 
with monC\· nrouscd hostility, and Europeans found many aspects 
of banking un·Christian or nmornL They were not ready ior all 
the implications or a profit economy-" Tcmplars were ollcn 
represented as too greed)', too rich, and LOO proud; in reality they 
had adapted Loo quickly to changing economic conditions. 
Ho"· successful was the Templar network, this great medieval 
corporation? The Brothers in Acre never lacked equipment and 
rccniits, despite some devastating losses over U1e yc~rs. They 
built "at least 870 castles, prcccptories, ond subsidiary houses" 
and Look care of pens ioners chroughout Europe.6' They were 
\\·cnhhy enough to buy the island of Cyprus from King Rfolrnrd 
(although were unable to hold on co it) . .s A final, if ironic 
~ample of the effcctivcrn:ss of the network occurred after the 
Tcmplar's demise. Tiie French crown ordered the Hospirnllcrs, 
who inherited most Templar properties and wealth to pay n sum 
~;Pulln1.-r1 77J~ tj:iglrls 7(..,npl.va11d !luWAlyzlt, 12. 
';Rccs.A ififr~.;o/1!1e Ortltr. SO. 
'°"Jean Sire de Jo:llvillt, Tlr1 History o.fSt. Lo1t!s, tr~nsfal~ by Jo.to Evans 
(loodon, l 93Rl, 113-4. 
"
1Liulc:, Religiou:sPover1y, 35-46. 
6?lJ.:'.l1bc:r. Tire Trial of t11r 1 <r11plnrs: 1 ·2. 
"'H0\\"311h. 7 ,',.: K11fgl1u Tf'JJl/•lar. i 73. 
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of 310,000 bvrcs 10,,rr.ois from 1313 10 1318." O'·cr 1hc course 
ofnooul 200 years, lhc Tcmplar ncl\\Ofk con~,olidatcd i1s holdings 
to exploit supply and demand "hilc taking advantage of d istinct 
pri\'ileges. It prO\·idcd shipping and c,·cn built its own Ot-ct and 
it dc,•elopcd and h~rnesscd an ad\':10ccd array of banking 
institutions, and provided ad\'icc nnd guidance 10 the first two 
cslntcs. 
T he Men nr the Network 
Who were the men who created and facilitated this \'ast 
nct\\ork? They certaiPJy were 11ot the same sort of 1!lneratc, 
crude and undoui>tedly fonalienl men who went off to light in the 
Enst. Y cl th;y cor.1rihu!cd to this perception themselves, 
describing 1hcmselves as "simple nnd ignorant" right up lo the 
time of their suppression."' Tcmplars in lhe Wcsl were often 
older, cslablishcd in their region, and skilled at pnrticul ar 
fwictioas. Their talcnls might include literacy, financial 
knowledge. agrjcultural e.xpertise, or seamruiship. An inlri!,'Uing 
dichotomy deYeloped bctwocn the fierce warriCt·monks \\hO 
lra\'cllcd 10 Acre an-0 the brethr~n supplying them iu Europe. 
Hugh de Payens, first ~foster of the T cm pie, p::csents nn 
interesting portrnil of the effce1ivc administrator. Alihough the 
fi rst years or the Order were spent iu relative pO\·eny nnd 
obscurity, the /\faster hnd n plnn. His tics to Counl Htigh o( 
Champagne as a fom1cr vassal, and Bernard o f Clain·aux helped 
to (,'Uantnlcc his ambitions for the Temple. Hugh's inilinl 
campaigns in the West around the lime of the cotmcil of Troves 
illustrate a good understanding of 1he realities of cstablishini;. an 
Ord:r such as the T cmplars. He appears to have been well ,·crscd 
in secular and ecclesiastical politics; he was acmely aw~re of 
m~ny of the criticisms of the knightly c lass, and seemed to 
undcrslnnd some of the prC\'Jiling economic trends. ft is perhaps 
a Stretch lo state Oiat Hugh and his colleagues completely 
understood the transition Crom girt lo profit economy, but they 
were qui le aware of certain changes. 
~38:rbcr, The TritJi ~f:he T~1'1plars, 2)1 .. 2. 
UJ>lrtncr~ T1re !01ightsTnnplar af/J thti r ... fyc/,, 15-. 
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In ccnccption :md structure the Templnrs responded well to 
the 11;:w realities of Crusading Europe. tlugh de Paye~ .h.ad 
prcdicled at the onset that, gwen Church appro~al, the nooility 
wo·J!d cnthu~iastically support the Tcmplnrs. He proved to be 
rioht mid the Order profited Crom the still potent girt economy, 
b:t Hugh also unders tood the inherent dang~r~ . Several slatutes 
within the original Tcmplar Ruic prolub11cd the pcrsoMl 
cxchan~c o r gins, for cx:imple.6' Hugh's vision nnd pmdcnt 
Jc<tdcrship set the precedent for effective administration of 
Tcmplar p~cccptorics in the West. . 
·11ie rapidlv • rowino network wns closcl~· tted to the by 
. ~ b # 
!vtighthoo~." TI1e T cmplars undoubted!~ offer~d avenues ~I 
111>w~d soci:1I mobilily to small l:indo\\1ung knights. As tls 
prcsli!:~ quickly mounted, the Order accorded talented lesser 
knit'.hts nc\\' p:11hs to power and inOuencc. In Europe there was 
ort~;, Jin lc distinction between the knights proper, who took 
rnonnsue ,·ows, and fraternities of 'married brothers', who helped 
adminis1cr cstntes.68 These men could continue in a similar 
JifosLdc, while enjoying the benefits of the Order. Sergeants or 
b:-oti;crs in scf\ ice could occupy multiple positions in the 
nclwork. In England, where the Order was chiefly collO!med 
\\ith agriwliurc, they were smiths, tanners, shepherds, g::mlncrs, 
:md cowherds." Such members arc comparJblc to the conw:rsi·-
working Inv brothers of 1hc Cistercion monaslaries. In the 
Mcdilc;ran~an, 1hc mariner Roger of Flor, designated a sergeant 
by the Order, captnincd a Templar ship for years.'0 The rest of 
Lhc fictt \\'aS probably commanded by similar men. The 
mb1c:ilai1i who assisted the papacy tu1doubtedly trained in 
monasteries. As time passed, the Order lhus crune to engage in 
diverse and complex activities; to allrnct members from a varicly 
of social backi,'l"ounds. 
At its upper echelons, the Order displayed an impressive 
knack for acquiring land and engaging in cffecti,•c commerce. IL 
is unfortunalc that there arc not more demi led records of the men 
~.Jes, tlc1 . 82. RS. 12$, The }~ult! o.f tlrr. Ten1p!t1tt, 30, 40, 51. 
~~licholoon, T.:Hipl!Jrs., f{ospi!aNi·rs. oud Te11t<n1ic K11ig!1rs. 56-9. 
!.t[larbcr, T/111 Trfal of th~ Te;nplars, 261. 
~"I fo-.\11rth, n1-. K11i1>..Jrts T'1~1plar. 235 
"~B:uher, Titt Trial of tit~ Tw1plar.t, 240-1. 
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who enac[cd lhcse policies. We know uboul the Grand Masters, 
who were sometimes illiterate and usually concerned with 
mililary opcrnlions in Acre. We know somc(hing of pnrticular 
]l.foslcrs, such as Aimcl)' of Engbnd, ns well. 
The loss of Acre in 129 1, the last Christian port of Outrcm:::r, signified a new and noxious moment in Tcmplnr h!stOI)" 
Their rniso11 ci'erre was compromised al a time when the 
crusading ideal itself had become corrup1cd. During the 
Thirteenth Century, kings and popes had used crusades 10 achic,·c 
political and e\·en persona.I ends. Perhaps the foremost of these 
was the Albigensi~n Crusade, in which the barons of ::-lorthcrn 
France plundered the bnrons of the South, ostensibly to combat 
hm:sy. In tl1is climate, the Templars, now a wealthy, wcll-rumcd, 
independent institution, with a presence throughout Euro1>c, 
aroused suspicion and jealousy. Were they really dangerous 
to Europe 's rulers? Scholars debate this point and ccm·; to 
d ifferclll conclusions. Many org11c lhal the Templars were 
relatively weak militari ly by this time, but d id commanded vasl 
economic pom,T. Perhaps they could have cnn·cd oul their O\\TI 
stale somewhere, given the time and moli \·ation. 13ut Jacques de 
Molav, the Inst Grnnd Maslcr, was still co:1cemed with mo1mlin!! . .. 
a return c:<pcdition to the Moly L:md when the Order was 
suddenly suppressed.' ' 
In 1307, Philip IV of France chnrgcd the Tcmplars with a 
sinister nrray of crimes, including heresy, worship of idols ond 
demons, and sodomy. Wilh the rcluctanl assent of 1hc papacy 1he 
King arrested every Templ01 he could find. To1ture was used lo 
extort confessions, and the Grand 1'.foster, proclaiming his 
innocence was bumed al the !he stnkc. The initiJI reaction to 1his 
throughout Europe was shock and disbelief. Various kmgs, 
princes, and dukes were happy lo devour t.IJe remains of Tcmplnr 
holdings, however, once guilty verdicts were followed by Pope 
Clcn1em V's agreement to ban 1hc Order and diwibutc its assets. 
Perhaps the most intrii.'lllns question concems the true aims 
and goals of lhe Order. Did some Knights of the Temple indeed 
lose faith in !he Crusade, and become ~i1ic<1J about their 
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mission'' Considerable c\·idence shows lhal t.hcir activit.i.c.<, 
iuitially, were centered with supplying nnd .rinnncmg an ongom.g 
-ru>~dnH! cff::>:t Outrcmer. Bui by the tlurtccnth cc11lu1y, their 
: ,.0 r)d " ;s changing. Jenious enemies whiSpcred these nm ·, 
wc;ilth-.· knights were the milil:l!)' orm of a myslcrious esoteric 
n-dcr ~a lied the /'11urre de Sien, with sinister plans in\'olving t11c ,,_. ~ .,. I , 
Hoh· La:!d nnd the rightful kings of Fra11cc. ' Al thous 1 sucn 
dai~is remain suspect and unpro,·cn, the rumors weakened 
support for tlic Orccr at a time when tl1e Cru~adcs all sc:::med to 
fail Philip )V's need for money coupled with Tempfor wealth 
made them a tempting target. 
The Order of the Temple was conceived \\ith an imprcssh·e 
unccrstandmg of politics, economics. and religion. As it c\'olvcd, 
it ;rrcw into a ,·ast mcdie,•al corporntion c:;ipable of profiling 
white sustaining an expensive wnr effort in a distant land. The 
administrators of th·~ TcmplM economic nclwork were able to 
!J.:ncfit from the lingering nspccts of the older gift economy, 
whik Jdapting ~nd contributing to the growing profit economy. 
By the beginning of the Fourteenth Century, \\ith the Holy Lnnds 
lost. the great and mighty Order of the Temple was suddenly 
cxp~scd in a glaring, unfriendly, nnd dangerous light. They hnd 
lost Outrcmcr, but continued to generate large profi ts. A 
powerfi.il inslitution of "warrior-monks" \\ hose l,>TCalest 
accomplishm:!nl '"ns ftna.nci:il gain, \\'ilS too slurtling n paradox 
to survh·e in medieval Europe. 
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Pastors And Pestilence: 
lVIartin Luther's Views on the Church, 
Christians and the Black Death 
Chris Swul!teim 
G;ris S1mdhi!im, en.editor of insr year's /li.~1orio and 
H.wrond writing award winner for 1996. completed his 
Afosrcr'.; of Arts in History in 1996. He is cttrremlv a 
rejJOrter J0r j'lie l'rbcrna-(:han11.talgn J\leu1s-GCtzettc. ihis 
.oapr:r. 1Jir1uen jOr J>rofessor Jo): Kt111111U'!t'ling's sc111inar 
0'1 the Jlenaissance and the Rcf1Jr11iation. anal)'Zcs 
l.i1thcr 's n·ritings on the b ubonic plague. 
I n ihe lote twentieth ccmury, it is difiicult or impossible to comprehend folly the.intense horror and consuming fair that musl hJ\'C accompanied outbreaks of the bubonic plague in 
Europe. Nothing in todny's world compares with the threat this 
contagion posed in the Middle Ages and the earlv modern cm. 
With no pmiculru- warning or explanation, the bla~k de~tb swept 
in successi\'e wa,·es across the continent from the mid-fourteenth 
centmy until well into tl1e 1700s. Most historians agree th~ 
plague cnmc to Europe from East Asi3 aboard trading ships. But 
no mancr ils origin, ihe plague left behind <>hastlv deslniction. 
Entire cities were pnralyzed by epidemic~ Some villages 
disappeared altogether. In the end, between one-third and o~e­
half of Europe's population died from this rclcnllcss killer 
The \'cry worst of the plague's molly outbreaks occurred in 
the 1340s, but the disease continued to resurface in the sixteenth 
century, while Marrin Luther and the Rcfomrnlion sought to 
change many of the Christian church's fundamental tc:ichings. 
Ccnainly few . C\'Cnts in this period would so likely p~o\'Ok~ 
rchg1ous qucstrons as a bout with the plague. The plni,'l1c touched 
Luther's life most closely when it su11ck Wittenberg in August 
1527. He mcnlioncd the disc"sc regularly in his sermons and 
other \\Titings, partic.ularly in discussions of Genr?sis. 
The unum~lic experience of nn cruplion of plague took a 
deep emotiona l mll on the lives of believers, shaping-and no 
doubt shaking-their mornl and religious outlooks, as well us their 
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supcrs 1i1ions. Appcnmnce of the plague confronted Europeans 
with sudden, incxplicnlllc d·~ath. The mere suggestion of a plague 
infection, not surprisingly, could send a village into near hysteria. 
This study \\ill argue, through Lutl1er's own words, that he 
b:lie,·cd one's response to the pl~guc was :m imponant 
d·:monstmtio11 of Christian compassion. An ouibrcak of plague 
mnrkcd a time of heightened responsibilities for commwuty and 
church lc.1dcrs. Luther knew the black death called on Christians 
to show tl1;ir lo\'C and faith as few otlicr c,·cnts could. 
There is a wealth of academic literature on the bubonic 
pllguc in the Middl: Ages, exploring in-dcplh the disease ;;ml its 
histmv. Medical demits are of little importance to this paper, but 
we should firs! brieny place the plo!ruc's signilic:mcc in historical 
1:crspccti,·c. To most Europeans, tlie plague represented more 
t!rnn uu occ~sio:1nl nnlural disnsicr. The disease wns a part of 
Europe's late m~dic\'nl and corly Rcnnissance cullurc, ns re ficclcd 
in the period's art, litcrntw·e, worship and folk customs. An 
ubiquitous threat when the plngue struck, it touched every part of 
one's life.' 
Mortnlity rates Cor plague outbreaks ranged fro:n 30 lo 90 
percent or c\•en higher.= At least as frightening ns tl1c disease's 
sheer deadliness wns i1s wiprcdictability. The plague could 
swe<:p inlo a city or village overnight ruid kill its first round of 
victims in Jess than 3 da'" It might remain for months or v;;nish 
as quickly ns it 3ppcnrcd. The plague could spread by the bric[cst 
louch, and yet some people who cared Cor victims were constantly 
exposed but never infected. Furthermore, infection with the 
pb!,'tlC "as not alwnvs a death sentence. Some strains of 
infection could be bcat~n. 
But most who were un fortunntc enough to cntch the black 
death died from it. Theories abounded. as lo what brought the 
plagu: :ind how to defend oneself agninsl its deadly work. Some 
were pseudo-s~i~ntilic. others pure superstition by modern-day 
1
<11J$lO\' K. \'.'i:.-r1~kc 4tld Hcbnut T. Li:hn1nna. cd3., Tiu: C"J/;.·c·wd IJ'orl.:,, 
01 .'1 / fl,./111 lutlu:r (Phil1delphi:lt 1955). vol. 43, -1 l~-R. Cit~ berear.cr !IS 
L.,th~r~  lt'orl:s. 
:Ibid Set: also Philip z.t~glcr. Thr Blirck Dcta:h G'lt::\V York, 1969), 2>-J\~ 
~b .. "'ft ~. Ooufricrl, Tb~ fl.'11ck O;,:tr!h: ]\'oturn/ ar:d f/ruJrtu1 Di.s~:t.:r bi }.-ledft: ..,,1/ 
!:,',,,.()pe (Nc:\Y '{ ork, 1983)~ 1.S. 
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standards. But the \lest way to escnpc the plngue wns to ficc from 
it lly leaving the afflicted area quickly. 
Luther knew this, nnd his fullest commcnturics on the disease 
arc found in the essay "Vv11ethcr One hfay flee From a Deadly 
Plague," \\Tinen in 1527.3 The fourtoci1-page pamphlet was 
reprinted in nineteen subscquco1 editions rmd enjoyed "idc 
readership, cspccinlly when plague lhrcatencd. Luther's 
composition of the booklet se1vcd a dual purpose: 10 comfort 
followers who li\'ed with the pestilence nnd 10 di scuss Christians' 
moral obligatiotlS if their communities should become infested. 
The black dcnth struck Wiucnbcrg en August 2, 1527. 
Concerned for the safety of faculty and students, Elector John 
ordered pco fessors and others lo lcnvc for Jena. Luther was net 
persuaded by the Elector's request. or the appcnls of his friends. 
He decided to stny to minister to the sick and those" ho could not 
lca\'c. Luther also helped the city council and lectured lo a small 
group of smdcnts who, for unkn0\\1t reasons. remained. 13v 
August 19, eighteen people had died, including several who wer~ 
close lo Luther's family. The wiCc of the mayor died nearly in 
L\lthcr's arms. Mnny o( Luthci"s friends lost loved ones, and 
others moved far away to escape the pl~gue. Luther's son John, 
then a toddler, likely suITcrcd from tl1e plague in September and 
rcco,·ered. Luther's daughter Eli7.:ibeth. born in December, died 
in less than eight months, probnbly weakened by her mother's 
~-xposurc to the bbck death while pregnanL • 
Luther's bcha\'ior during these months of plague, along with 
his thoughtful treatise on fleeing the disease, offer compelling 
evidence of his dedication to God and his undcrstandine of a 
Christian's responsillilities to his brethren. Some schola(s note 
that in this period, which marked the tenth anni,·ersarv of the 
posting of the Nine1y-Fiw Theses, Luther composed the now-
famous hymn "A Mighty Fo1iress is Our God." The song may 
ha\'e been based on Luther's o"n experience in Wittenberg.' 
"\Vhclhcr one ma>• flee" was a response lo quesuons raised 
by Johann Mess, a Reformation leader in Sibsia, where the plague 
'Lur;'1er's fl '01·k.c, vol. 113, I J 5-38. 
'Jbid; l,Jtther'.t rf."ork.r \'(11. 48~ 173; l..-11/Jrcr 's JVo-rks \°CL 49, 203. 
'Luther's fi'm-1:.r, \.~. 35~ 281. Soc also no1c no1nber ~6 in l11ther's ff'orks 
"Cl.~~. 17$. 
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d so appcar~d in August 1527. Hess had. asked Luther whether 
Christians could !lee from the plague with a clear conscience. 
Luther " as further prompted lo write after hearing how u 
j)()niinican in Leipzig had mocked the way residents or 
Willenbcrg ran from the peril. The pamphlet blended Christian 
charit)' ~nrl co1nmon sen.c;e. 
Abo,·c all. Luther appealed lo pastors not to abandon their 
flocks. Al I good Christians should resist giving into panic, but 
pastors carry " higher obligation. The pastor, Luther wrote, is nol 
merch' n hired teacher but a committed shepherd whose l1clp is 
csscniial ''hen the plague infects a region: 
Those 11 ho arc engaged in a spiritual ministry such as 
preachers and pastors mu.5t likewise remain steadfast 
before the peril of death. We ha\•e a plain co1llilmnd 
from Chri~t. "A good shepherd lays down his life for the 
sheep but lhc hireling sees the wolf coming and flees." 
[Jchn I 0: 11 f. For when pooplc are dying, they mos! need 
a spiritua I ministry which Strengthens and comforts their 
conscicnc~s bv word and sacrament and in faith 
overcomes dcaih.6 
Still, Luther recognized that if c00<1gll religious leaders stayed LO 
take ca.re of sick Christians, additional preachers need not e"-pose 
lhcmsclvcs to danger. "I do not consider such conduct sinCol 
because spiritual services arc provided for and because they 
would ha\'C been ready and willing to stay if il had been 
ncccs-S-:11)'. '1 ~ 
A sunil:u- moral code bound civic officials. Secular 
authorities must sta)' to sec that law and order arc presen·cd in 
prevention of ''fires, murders, riots and every inmgi11able 
disaster.. .. On the other hand, if in great weakness they flee but 
provide capabk sul>stimtes ... all that would be proper." Servnnls 
should not lc~\'e ll1eir masters, and p~rcnts may not abandon their 
children. No o::e shO'~ld le:t\'C "ithout first checking on tlie wcll-
bcmg of llh'lSC "ho cannot move. 
!!.a;rll~r's ll'CN·k.1'. vot 43. J 21 . 
'Ibid. 
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Lulh-~r recognized that the luunnn instinct for sclf-
pr~scn·ation O\'erridcs most oth;:r concerns in cris~s such as the 
plague. 
IC someone is weak and fearful, let him lk c in God's 
name as long as he does not neglect his dul)' lO\\'ard his 
neighbor but has made ad·:quatc pro\'iSion for others to 
provide mm;ing care. To Occ from death and sa, ·e one ·s 
life is a natural tendency, implanted by God.• 
But. he wrote, an outbreak of the bbck death is no different from 
any other thrc~t. According to Scripture, God sent four scourges: 
famine, sword, wild beasts, and pestilence. The Bible tcnches 
tl1at in each of the first three cases. de\'oted believers mav save 
tl1emselves only after they ha,·e sec~ to the c:ire of ou~ers. Just as 
Abraham, J:ieob and Dadd did tlicmsel\·es. Luth;:r exoccted that 
some Christians would doubt whether the plague. could be 
eompt1rcd to scourges described in the Bible. Biblical figures, 
after all, neYer faced the black death. "Death is death, no m atter 
how it occurs," Luther insisted. Rcgm llcss o f whether the threat 
is persecution or plague, Christians are bow1d by God's law first 
to meet obligations to their Ccllow men. Onlv aflcrwa:ds may 
they think o f their 0\\11 escape. Those who pru;ic a nd ignore thi.s 
holy directiYc "ill be j udged harshly in the eyes o f God "Christ, 
there fore, will condemn tl1c111 as murderers on the Last Day when 
he will say, "! l\'3S sick ond you did not \'isit me (Matt. 25:43 J."9 
Luther thought that God sent the plai,'l1c, either ns a 
punishment, a demonstration of his power or ns nn exercise to test 
mnn's faith and love. Or perhaps tl1e illness could ha\•c 
reprc.<ented all three simultaneously. God sent th:: plague :is "a 
fatherly game," Luther said, "for the purpose of melting nnd 
purg ing." Although God nppcars to be angry, he is not. The 
anger is "simulated. " Naturol disasters are sent ''tl1ar you mnv be 
led to a knowledge oi your sin.. .. Indeed, 11c mu;t fall ~ost 
horribly, in order that we may recognize our wretchedness ru1d 
''-eakness ... 10 
1lbld, l22·3. 
'Jbtd, t26. 
10lbid, vol. i, 23 J, :?34, :?2$. 
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The dcdl entered the picture because his evil sought to create 
pJnic ;111d scllishncss among people in conununities 3ffiicted with 
the pbguc. Lulher told pious Christi;ms lo defy the Prince of 
D;irkn~ss in times of plague by showing more compassion, more 
courage, nol lcss. '1 Interestingly, Luther years later suggested 
fcor os a main c;iusc of the plng11:. In October 1539. more than 
a dcc.idc 3!\cr the Wittenberg outbreak, Lutl1cr helped bury 
5c,·crnl friends who died of plague in Nuremb~rg. Jn a lecture he 
told lis:cncrs that the panic-s tricken should flee ' 'ilhout Sh3me 
rrom the threm of plague because "fear itscl( is the chief cause of 
this calamity," although he did not elaborntcn 
Luther shared the opinion of his comemporarics who believed 
that the block death "spread among the people by e\·il spirits "·ho 
poison the air or exhale a pestilential breath wh:ch puts a dcadl>' 
poison into the !ksJi.•11 I lowe\•cr, he seemed to believe that God 
would impln " m::isure of di\'inc immunity to those Chrisiians 
who nursed plogue \'ictims. "It is pro\'cd by experience that tbose 
\\he nurse the sick with lo\'C, del'otion, and sinceri ty arc 
generally protected. Though they are poisoned, they are not 
hanncd." Luther added a warning that "a person who attends a 
p~licnt bccnusc of greed, or with the expectation of an inhcrit:mce. 
or some personal ad\·antagc in such scn•ices, should not be 
surpri;ed if C\'Cntually he is infected, disfigured, or C\'Cll dies."" 
Luther ;1dviscd against going too for the other direction, 
disregarding minor precautions thnt might prc,·cnt one from 
becoming ill. i1pparcnll)', some Europeans tried to demonstrate 
superior foi th by rejecting medicines and making no e!Tort to 
m·oid pince.~ and persons infected with plague. They were "much 
too r.i~h and reckless," Luther said. "This is net trusting God but 
tempting hi111. God has created medicines and prO\ idcd us \\ith 
intdl igcncc to guard and take good care of the body so that we 
can live in good her.Ith." In the same way, anyone who ca relessly 
acquired the 1>lague and infected others was considered a 
murderer, as was the person who, ha\'iog apparently rcco,•cred 
111bid, 1~7. 
l!(;td, "·t1I 4. 9!, nocc 1. 
11
!.11thfr'.t fJ'tJtks. vcl. ~3. 127. Sec 1&1¥0 vol. 42. 9 I. 
1 1 l11.1h«r<~ tl'o1'~'.~'. vol43, 129. 
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from plague, passed the disease lo otl1ers before he "as 
completely free of the gc.-ms-" 
Luther sa,·ed his harshest condcmnalion for people with the 
black death who kept their infection secret eitl1er in the belief thm 
they would rid themselves of the sickness by contaminati ns 
others or were simply "incredibly vicious." He suggested that 
such "deliberate murderers" promptly be sent 10 the hangman. 
Luther suggested that communities seek ways to isolmc 
victims of plague, just as God in the Old Testament ordered 
lepers to be banished from the cily. Isolation is beller for 
c\"Cf\-Onc. The ill m 3v still be cartd for, and the infection \\ill not . ' 
s;irc.ld. "Our plague here in Wiucnbcrg hc.• been cnuscd by 
nothing but filth. ·n1e air, thank God, is still clean aml pure, but 
some few have been ccntarninntcd be;;ause of the laziness or 
reek Jcssness of som•'!.11ts 
Luther thought mo,·ing cerncteries outside the city mii;ht 
stem the spread of th; black demh. Many popular beliefs about 
the dead held that poison vapors nnd mists rise out of !,'Tn\'CS. 
Luther suggested graveyards be moved for the conunon hcnhh of 
cities and because burial grounds should be s2crcd, hallowed 
places, not small plois in alleys or outside market?laccs. "A 
cemetery rightfully ought to be a Cine quiet pkce. removed from 
all localities, to which one cnn go and reverently meditate upon 
dcnth, the Last Judgement, the resurrection, and sny one's 
prayers.11 1" 
Luther ndded a lew words on how to prepare for death to the 
end of his essay "Whether One May Flee From a Deadly Plngue." 
lie reminded readers that Lhe best way to prepare for the end of 
life was through regular worship and taking the sacrarnenL But 
when the plague stn:ck a family, Christians should call for a 
pastor before the victi:n became delirious or unconscious. If a 
pastor arrived too late, he could not counsel the sick person or 
administer conmmnion because the patient would noc understand. 
Chaplnins \\"Ottld not "tcJch them the gospel at the lnsl minute and 
administer the sacrament lo them us they were nccustorncd to it 
under the papacy when nobody :isked whether they believed or 
"Ibid, 13 1-2. 
"1hiJ. 132-1. 
"!bid. 136-7. 
und:rstcod the jlOSpcl but just stuITed the sacram<:nt dO\m their 
·r· b db .,. thro::ts as 1. mto a rca ag. . 
Philip ZicQlcr :i scholar o( the black death m the l;,tc . ~ ' 
mcdici·~l period, argues that the plague helped create doubt and 
skepticism about Cmholic authorities. Christians were strnck by 
scv~w! phrnomena. First, they saw the Church treated the plague 
os a punishment sent from God. Yet 1•illagc priests died at le;;st 
as oficn as commoners when the disease surfaced. This 
grop'iically dcmonstrJtcd that the clergy's supp~sedly. close 
relationship with God did not prO\·idc escape from his pcsulencc. 
<:ccond, evidence suggests that some priests would not s=·c in 
;;'~£'rc-s1rickcn areas \\ithout exceptionally hish salaries. Sue~ 
bcha•:ior rnised ob,·ious questions about the Church s 
co:m11'.tmcnt 10 its nock and the priests' mnteri:ilism. Add to this 
~ few notorious stories of priests abandoning lheir infcc.1ed 
communities and one secs why the Church's credibility w~s so 
d;irnagcd. 1 ;i 
Ironically, ample data ind:cates that the Church suffered 
greater human losses from the bla:l death than almost any other 
~ial in~titulion. High mortality rates among the clergy may 
ha»e cul the number of priests almost in half. The plague took a 
disproportio:1:i;clv high number of the most dedicated men of 
God. Rushing ·to fi ll the gap, the Church ignored its O\\TI 
standaccls and nµpoin ted m~ny unsuitable candidates to the 
priesthood. Thus, Ziegler writes, in the ycnrs :ifier the worst of 
the pla~uc, \\hen European society should hnvc pulled back 
togcthe;, Ilic church was miserably unprcpnrcd lo deal with 
protest movcmcnlS or rc,·olts. Ziegler and G.G. Coullon both 
;rrgue that the plague, though it did nol lead inc.xorably to the 
R:fonnatioo, contributed to the wc.Jkcnin!; of the Cm .. 'lolic 
church."' Thus it seems =sonablc to believe that the plague, 
cvm bcfo'c Luther's time. had already plnycd a significant role in 
laying lhe groundwork fo~ the Rcfomrntion. 
And yet, throus hout the early sixt~enth century, rcfonners 
such as Lmher and Zwingli (himself almosL killed by the µJ3guc) 
had to respond to the same problems with the pcrsistelll disease. 
"ibid. B6-7. 
0 lieg:er. Thi ntack lkl:lh, 260-l. 
~.G. CoullC>a. n1~ 8/cick D~.th {}!C\V y'"'"· 1930), 7~. 
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Their bmtlcs ,~·ith the black dcmh shaped their rdigious outlooks 
ond pcrsonol hfe-nnd-dearh c.xpcricnccs. Luther 's \\Ti iings on th~ 
bl~ck <kn1h suggest that he understood th~ plague 10 be both a 
spL'llual and a p::rsonnl lcsl_of character. Although the source or 
purpose of 1hc disease rcmamcd a mystery, conunilled Christ ians 
had sc,'C4"al clear directi\'es: preserve order, lend to the sick and 
avoid spreading ll1e co~tagion. Amid the terror of a plague 
outbreak, Luther urged his followers to display courage, common 
sense, and compassion. 
D:irwinian Racism 
Doug 0 1•ermyer 
[)(mg Ot-ermyer wrore rhis source analysis as a s~nior at 
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l1·fns1er of Arrs Jn History JJrogranr. 
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I
n J 8SG, Churlcs D;1rwi1\ revolutionized the biological sciences 
\\ith hi~ mo11w11cntal Origin of Species, in which he described 
ti1c c\'oluucn of species as a product of natural selection. He 
argu:d c0n,·111cingiy thaL 1•:1rious species engage in a v;isl struggle 
for cx'.slCJ,cC in the battle!icld of Nature . As species contested 
o\'cr scarce resources, D:tmin insisted, the stronger species 
511n' i1·cd and the weaker perished. In essence, Nature selects 
certain \'a;ict1es as unfit to carry oo, while allo"ing others to 
survh'C. These latter vnrieties would ll1en ad:tpt co their ever· 
ch~nging surrou:tdings and the competition would continue. By 
this process, nnimals progress, or evolve, from inferior to 
superior species. 
Tlt~ough his i~tcr work, specifically The Descent o/Man, he 
;:pplicd his theory of Natural Selection to humans. Thenceforth, 
a struggle raged in public circles after his theory became widely 
knol'n. Some nccepted his new interpretation of old dntn, while 
ethers rejected iL In the latter qunrtcr of the nineteenth century 
and !he bzgirn1ing dcc:ides of Lhe twentieth, many politicians in 
industrialized n;1tions came 10 ~cccpt Darwin's thCOI)', and besan 
formulating laws lo apply this scientific lhco;y to society in 
gcn~rai. ThJS c.xtrnpolation of scientific thought to social thousht 
was oothing nc": the American Declaration of Independence lllld 
Constitution applied Enlightenment thought or the cigliteenth 
tcntu1y (so::1e of which deri\'cd from U1e Scier.tilic Revolution of 
thz sc,·cme~mh) 10 the American public domain. Ho"e,·er, 
~pplying Darnin's new scien!ific lhought 10 social policy had 
ara.stic co11scq11cnccs. These Socia! Darwinisrs, o\'e1whdmingly 
\\l111e Europeans, believed their own race wns the superior of an)' 
nt~c ~1n1ong hwnanity. Oincsh D'Souz~ has rightly nrgucd ll1t1l 
tins hnc of thou~hl culminated with the idea of "might makes 
28 
Their balllcs 1~ilh thll black death shap~d their religious outlooks 
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I
n ! ~5G, Churlcs Darwin revolutionized the biological sciences 
" ill1 his monumental Origin of Species, in which he dcscrib<Xl 
1hc ernlution of species ns a product of notural selection. I le 
argued condncingly thm various species cngnge in a 1·ast struggle 
fer c~islcnc·: in 01 ; balllclicld of l\alure. As spedes contested 
over scare; resources. Darwin insisted, the stronger species 
survi\'cd ~nd lh! weaker perished. In essence, Nalurc selects 
certain varic1ies as unfit to carry on, while aTI011ing others LO 
suJVivc. TI1c:;c falter varielics would then adapt 10 their c1·er-
changi11g surroundings and the compclition would continue. By 
this procc~s. animals progress, or evolve, from inferior 10 
£upcrtcr species. 
Through his later \\'Ork, specilically 11ie Descent cifMan, he 
applied his theory of Nolural Selection to humans. Thenceforth, 
a struggle raged in public circles after his theory became ll'idcly 
kno\\~t. Some accepted his new interpretation of old data, while 
others rejcclcd it. ln the lnttcr quarter of the ninctccn01 century 
~nd llie beginning decades of Lhe twcnlicth, many politicians in 
industrialized natious crunc to accept Darwin's theory, and began 
formulating la"s to apply 01is scientific theory to society in 
general. TI:is c.-..;lrapolation of scientific thought 10 social thought 
was noth:ng m:w: the AmcriC<in Declaration of Independence and 
Con.5tituuon applied Enlightenment thought of the eightcenlh 
ci:111u1y (some of which deriYcd from the Scientific Re\'olution of 
ti~~ s.:1·c:1tccn1h) to the American public domain. However, 
ap.pl::ing Darnin's n~·w scientific thought to social policy had 
drasuc consequences. These Social Danvinis1s, overwhelmingly 
wlutc Europeans, bclic"cd 01cir own race was the superior of any 
race ~mong humanity. Dincsh D'Souza bas rightly argued tltnt 
lh1s hnc of thought culmin:itcd with the idea of " might mukes 
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right" nnd lo "oppose it was to stigmatii.c yourself a religious 
fanatic or on ignornmus."1 He nlso notes that many \\Tiler~ 1odny 
.. make a strenuous cfTon lo distance Dan' in from racism, 
cite[ingJ hi s record as an opponent of slal'ery, and blame the 
racism that subsequently took his name on the unscientific 'social 
Darwinism' ll'hich is generally branded as a dis1onio11 of the 
lhcoiy of evolution."' This paper analy7.es Dnl'\\in's O\\ll \\Tilings 
to show he endorsed both racism nnd socinl Dnr\\'inism. 
Darwinism is inherently racist; and f1111J1crmorc, Charles 
Dnrnin hi mself spawned the racist slunL in this social mo"cment 
which b~rs hjs nnmc. Indeed, ihc \\'()rl;s of Dnl'\\in ~re blatantly 
racis!, both on the intemntionnl ond the domestic level. Charles 
Darwb, of course, did not icl\'Cnt racism. In fa~t. the idc;c of 
soci;il Darwinism found its roots in ccr!ain Enlightenment ideals. 
Charles Darnin, especially in nu! Desccm of Ma11, merely 
ofTered racists his scientific slamp of approvnl.> 
Social Darwinists can use the works of Danvin himsel f to 
justify imperialism. Consider briel1y his Lheo1y of natural 
selection and irs applicaLion to humankind. Througholll The 
Origin n/Species, Dmwin suggests tb~t humankind is not a part 
of Nature, that the rules which nominlly a?ply in pms of Nnturc 
untouched by hwnanity do not apply to humam nnd human 
de\•elopment.' Howc\'cr, in The Descenr of Man, h~ applies his 
theory of natural selection to human soci~ty. The di fferent races 
of man, he \\TOie, nre "sub-species" in hun1anity. s One or lhcse 
sut-specics, or rnccs, will e\·cntuully prove lo be supreme and 
will subjugate the others. In a M;?.rxist-like C)·cle, he predicted 
that different races of man would clash >?.nd struggle fer the scarce 
resources found in l\ature to survi"e; after the struggle, the 
'D:..Csh l)'SooJ.a, Tile £11d ojRadsm (l\cw YOO<, 1995), 132. 
' Ibid., t2S. 
llbitl., 13 1. for the purpusc:. of this study, n1;:~s1n \\i lJ t-c co:u id<:rl"d the 
t>piniOJl lll!Lt CIOC: £l'(IUp of individu.'lli:t \\'hich S)Ulrc similttt physjt;at 
char.!ctcris1ics1 scx:i<lJ nonns. ~'11d s<lciet)' is su;ircme t.<t an:th,::r group oj 
indf.idus's \\, th different criccria. 
'His ch4Jll=:ts. 5<C~rttlc n!t:ur:ll sckclion Crom tn'l!ll· i1lS?.K'd ini!ici::il 
$cle.;li<111. lf n1an \ver¢ 11 purl of nature, ~::cording to D111'\vin, th;:n rio di:;11nccio11-
bcnvcc:n these. rartilicfol t'l1td naLur2J, \\'Ould be ncc.::!)s:iry. 
~Chsik$ Oaf'\-\~11, 17io Origin o_{Sp<"c1'u r1nd D~sC'cnl uf/1!<111 (~C\V York. 
19/lj, 537 
3l 
c]cfe,.tcd rnce "·otdd whither into extinction, while the superior 
Cc would advance inlo the next struggle.~ He wrote " when ~ . 'h : ,ilizcd nations fi.c. white Europ::•ms] come mto cont net \\'ll 
~·~bnric (nations) the struggle is short'"and alicr the ','struggle," 
ihc defeated "barbaric" rncc ··will surely decrease 111 number 
<ooncr or later (leading) lO extinction; the end ... being promptly 
d~;crniin:d by the inroads (ol) the conquering (rnce).''8 
E"tinc1io11 of th·; conquered, he "rote in Origin of Species, was 
essential for the progress of the superior onimal in the stnigglc. 
To further iJJu;;tratc, he 1•.Tote tlrnt "extinction follows chielly 
from comp:;tition of' ... race Yersus race.'" If a certain rnce could 
not ad;ipt to the new ccnciitions imposed on it by the conquering 
rnce, it would necessarily be cxtem1inated, and Dnrnin concluded 
1hnt "civilized races can certainly resist clrnnges of all kinds far 
"-· ti •· h ' S " 10 vu.tcr t«n sa . il~"'- . 
Darwm funhcr believed these inferior races "of n:eu resemble 
domesticated animals' ' and even compared the lowest savages to 
the highc~t apc.11 He claimed that 
the reduced size of !lie jaws from lessened use ... with 
increased $ize of the brain from 1,'l'Cater intel!ectuo l 
octivity ... nnd increased body stature ... have together 
producctl a considerable effect on their [civilized men) 
d . h 1-gl!!lcrol opp-zarnnce when compare· mt savages. • 
Furthermore. he cites C\•idcnce that the brnin of the " Bushman 
race ... (is) c~nsidcrnbly less complicated and more symn1eu·ical 
tl1ln in th; Eu:'Opean brain."11 Since DaJ'\'in bclic\'ed Ihm 
"cndurnnce and success on Earth ... could be attributed to the 
ability or ruccs lo adapt themselves to the threats ru1d challenges 
•,\s rirnphr.i.sc.i b;· Nicolas B~dyacv~ 77;t R"uia11 Rn v."u:icn (Ar:..0 
i\rbor, 1931: reprinted Tcrcnto, 1966). 21. Bcrdye.cv goes i:lto m>Jrc dcl3il 
linking lhc irnpor1an...:e bCf\\'(tn t ... larxism 11nd 0$r.~ 1ni3m in his \\'Ork. 
1
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of the natural cn" ironmcnt.~1 'and, according lO Peter Bowler, 
citing more evidence that "whiles hiwc a larger crnnimn c~p~city 
Ll1:m other rnces,"'s he felt confident in insisting tlmt eventually, 
civilized people would exterminate the world of the inferior races 
of man. Herc, Darwin clearly sounds the imperialistic trumpet 
blasted by c..-cry colony-hungiy Europc:Jn and Nonh American 
power. 
Of course Ch:1rlcs Darwin did not pioneer th is scientifically 
snnclioncd racism alone. Thomas H. Huxley, an avid supporter 
of Dam'ini~011, m·ote that "no rational mJn cogni1..'.lnt of the facts, 
belie\•cs the a\·crngc )legro is the equal, still less Ll1c superior of 
the average white man."16 In addition, Ernst Heinrich Pi1ilip 
August Hr:cckcl, who became knO\m as "Danvin's Bulldog on 
the conlin~nt'' introduced a form of social Darwinism to Germany 
which c,·entunlly bocame a principle idcoloi,•y in Germany's 
\'isio11 of racism, unpcrialism, and nationalism. " Finally, 
Darni:iists C\'CI) wh~rc claimed according to some conm1cnlators, 
that "some races had fallen so for behind ... they could nc,·cr catch 
up with the triumphant ,,·hiles,"11 and "as the resources of the 
world became scarce .. . the stronger onimals would prcvnil and the 
weaker would die out,"'~ therefore implying the justness of the 
cxtennination of those Jailer we:i.'-!ings. 
Daf\\in and his supporters c~sily took these general scientific 
.. foc!s" and d.:rivcd social p-0licies not only 10 exterminate other 
races, but 10 further enhance their own. Indeed, social Darn~nisL~ 
were scient ifically justified, for i f the weak in their own race were 
allowed to survi\'C1 the race would deteriorate in quality and some 
other ra~ would consequently pass iL For instance, J. B. 
Haycraft wrote that 
111) 'Souza,£11d o./Nacistt:, 1~9. 
t!>pc.'h:r J. HO\\'lt r, Biology aud Socfal Thought: J8S0·191../ (Berkeley. 
1993). 70. 
"41'horr.a$ I luxky. ""Ent3Jlci1Mtio:t ·Black and \\.litc/'clllp. 1n Sci.:J!ce n11d 
Ed11cc/ian (Nc'v YUtk, J90tj, 64-7. 
1-V:tniel Oas1n"n• The Sci;:ut[Jjc Ori"zin.r a,,f }hrticnut! Soc-/1t!i:..,11: Sc ..ci•rl 
Dn.rw:'r:i~n in Enut ll<Jvt:kei and !hrt Gcrrn<ul tllonfsl L.r:ngut. (Ni:\\' York, L 921). 
xvi. xvU, cilt:d in RUS$:1l Gri21l, «Ernsl H1eckel: EvanQi!li:n t"or evolution aud 
llros:tle of dcce~r." <:rratio11: ::X.._nihi!o 18 (lv1a.rch·1"~Y 1996)~ :lJ./, 
isHO\\ 'kf, [1!0!01:r-' 011d Social Th{Jug/11, G9. 
17l>'SotO..s,, HJ rd Qf P.o~fs;11, 130. 
r3 ciol ch~nr;c. improvement, or deterioration, is brought 
nbou1..., by what is termed selection, l11at is, by the death 
or non-productiveness of certain individuals of a race 
whercb'' others alone remain. lf this remnant is 
or2~nic.all~' superior, l11e next generation inhcriti:lg only 
rr.;m 1hcm \\ill be thcmsch·es superior, (and] racial 
i111pro,·c111cnt is b:oughl about..,. 
N•'··r·ollv those or a race who ore weak should die off quickly, ,, I(,, ' ' 
hence k;cping lhe next generation from inheriting the fonncr·s 
wcakn-:sses. 
To allow the biologically weak to survi,·c in modem society 
pose$ o thrc~l to thnt society. Indeed, Darwin despaired nt 
nwnkind · s O\\'n charity to the weak ar.d dom1trodden: 
we civilized men do our utmost lO check the proc·~ss of 
eliminltion. \\C build asvlums for the imbecile, the 
rn3imcd, the sick, \\C instiiute poor (wclforcj laws; and 
our medica l men exert their utmost skill to save the life 
of every one to the Inst moment ... [all) highlv injurious to 
the rnce of man. : i • 
l:nfortun~telv D3min wrote, that all of this aid "we feel impelled . ' 
to give 10 th: hdpkss is mainly an incidental result of the instinct 
o( si·mp3tlty.": ' In contrast, l11e social Darwinist believes, 
disci1ses such as "tuberculosis is the friend or the r;1ce. for il 
' bl n"l ~llacks no healthy man or woman, but only the ice c. ' 
Because, Ll1e Darwinist cnnnot lcl the feeble sun·i, e if the race is 
to advance, he commends also leprosy, typh<lid fever, measles, 
syphilis, hemophilia, diabetes, and cancer, for these kill arr the 
weak, lcnving only the strong to survive." Today, the Dam·inisl 
woulJ not h~lp 1he HIV carrier, for "it is probnble ll1al, as a race, 
we shall thcrcbv suffer, for ll1e banishment of the disease will 
enable ll1c fcciJlc members of the commwlit)' to li\•e and 
:i..Ja~,n B(tl'\ l l:ivi.:rn.il, D:1r n•1itisu1 aud Rec~ ProsrtJs (J.,andon .. I S9S), l 7. 
n0til'Vill, 0 1·igl;1, 501. 
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... contribute to !he progcn:-· of the future."::; Funhcnuorc, the 
social Darwinist praises the "popular and \\idcsprcod feeling 
agamst the marriage of those with a distinct fun1ily history of 
insnnity,"" which in his period included those \\ilh mcntnl 
rernrdation, depression, and those with physical disabilities such 
as a hearing impnirmcm. These inferior people nrc not to be 
allowc<I to reproduce, lest those defective charnctcristics be 
preserved in the race regardless of the "incidental result of the 
instinct of sympathy," which is "highly injurious to the race of 
man."' ' Howe\•cr, biological defects ;done do not constitute what 
may result in the decline of a rate. 
Indeed, proper morality in a society is also sel~led by nature 
co survh·c with superior race as Darwin poses this example: 
a sa\'agc will risk his O\\TI life 10 save thm o( a member 
of the same community, but will be wholly indifferent 
abour a stranger ... (while] many 3 ei,~lized man, or c\·ei1 
boy, who never before risked his life for anolher, but full 
of courage and sympathy, has disregarded the instinct of 
scl f-prcscrvJlion, and plunged al once into 11 torrent to 
s-nve a dro11ning m~n, though a slranger:' 
Hence, those societies ,,;th supreme morals "ill subjugate those 
societies with poor morals. Funhem10rc, immoral trails in a 
superior society will be eliminated: "a timid man ... fwhoscJ 
instinct of self-preservation might be so strong," mny be unable 
to bring himself to "nm any such risk [which may impair his li fo], 
~~-= fur~~~i~~ Th~~=~-~ 
loses his weak ch:iracteristies if the child dies. :s 
Ac.;;ording to Dnrninisl ~1inking, a race should stri,·e to 
multiply from those which are fitter (i.e. physically, mentally, and 
morally stronger) and extenninalc the unfit, or at lease. limit their 
abilities to propagate. Among "the intellcccually superior and 
" ibid., 51. 
1'ibi:L 
1:Ih:s issue is stiU one or COntfO\'\:tsy today. Do tho~..: \\ith ruc11111I 
rcl:ud!ltio11 forfeit lhc right to have chihlr..:n sirnply bec.iusc they h;1\'C :i 
"oogcnil.:!I def::ct? The Dl'lr.vini!.1 v.:ould say. ''Yes!" 
='0:an\-:n, Origin, 48 )-2. 
' 1 tid.482. 
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th·: inrcrior, there can be liclle doubt that 1.he fom1er would 
.. uccecd best in all occupuc.ions, and rear n greater number of 
~hildrcn.""' Furthenuorc, the intellectually superior person, who 
is niorc successful, achie.\'CS wealtli, and "bequeaths it to his 
children. so clrnl the children of the rich ha\·e an advantage over 
the poor in the ra:e for success. ~>1 I low.wcr, occasionally grcnl 
wcalch " tends to con,·ert men into useless drones, but !heir 
number is never b.rgc; nnd some deb'TCC of elimination here 
occurs, for we daily sec rich men, who happen to be fools or 
proP.igatc, squandering away chcir wealth."" Therefore., Ilic 
\\Clllhy, having the useful morals and skills to succeed, are 
0., :ra!I much more suited to contribute 10 tlie continued existence 
of the rncc: since the poor are therefore the wcokcr and not suited 
to co:11ributc to tlrnt race's proccny, they arc immornl and hence 
11nrit. This line of reasoning is tl1c basis for much of socinl 
Darwinisr thought. 
The poor, nonctheless, m empl to o,·crwhelm soci~ty with 
offspring to that society's detriment. Darwin complains that the 
poor and reckless ... almosl invariably marry c11rly, whilst 
the careful and frugal, who arc generally otherwise 
\'i11uous, m;ury late in life, so that they may be able to 
suppon themselves and their children in comfort. Those 
who many early ... produce many mere children.... Tims 
1hc reckless, degraded, and often vicious members of 
society lend lo increase al •t quicker rote tlrnn the 
provident and generally virtuous members. u 
O;c \I in, ever the objective English scientist, ciles e\•ide:~cc that 
the 
carelc~s. squalid, unaspmng Irishman multiplies like 
rabbits: chc frugal, foreseeing, se.Jf-rcspccting, ambitious 
Scot, seem iu his morality, spiritual in his faith, sagacious 
md disciplined in his intelligence, passes his bc:;l years 
" tbid., 50). 




in struggle :u1d in celibacy, marries lale, nml ka\'eS few 
behind him.'' 
Indeed, says Darwin passionately, "In the e:emal 'strusgle for 
ex istence,' it would be the inferior and l~.~s fovorcd race lhm had 
prcYailed-and preva iled by virtue not of ils i;ood qualities but of 
its faults."·" Luckily, Darwin concludes, there are "some checks 
to this do\\11ward tendency" of pocr children ovcn,helming 
society.15 
lndccd, Nature is noi so blind as to let immorality stnin its 
superior races, and circumstances ensure lhe surviv~I and 
advancement of these cullures. While, Darwin not·:s, " the poorest 
clilSSCS crowd into lo\\ns," the consequent "dcalh·r~te is higher 
in towns thnn in rural districts."" Furth:nnorc, even if some of 
the rich li1·e in towns, "no dou bt more tlrnn twice the number of 
bi rths would be requisite to keep up the number of lhe 1·e1y poor 
inhabitants in the l0\\11s," or in other words, more poor, rnlhcahhy 
children die than rich children." Nature imposes yet another 
check on the l,'Ill\\1h of the poor nnd immornl (in the eyes of all 
governing Natural Selection) by Lhe high monali ty rntc of those 
who arc poor and wasteful: immornl peorle will not take the 
time to achieve success; only inlmoral r eoplc mar~' yoLuig, and 
hence remain poor. Darwin insists that women who marry wider 
twenty ha,·e twice lhe chance of dying in any given year as "the 
same number O( the wunnrried. The mortality, also, o( husbands 
under t'vcnty is (excessively high. »~3!> Ho\\'C\'Cr, if a mnn, rich or 
poor, nc\·er marries, then he is certainly a waste to Nature since 
his qualities do not ha\'C a chance to be passed on: Om' inist 
thought claims he is immoral aiid Nature will eliminmc hiro. 
Also, insisLs Damin, men weak of hcnrt and spirit ha,·e littls 
chance of finding a male.'0 Nature insures they will remain 





"'°'"· l1Jt:id., S06. Dar\\'in is quotina a sc)Ciof.cglst here. 
' 111bid. 09.r.vin ol.:;o deals <'It length .. ..,\lh this co~!c und::r th~ hl!tldina ScX\1JI 
Sc:leclion, lbid.1 11h:r1ing c~ 567- 94, and 867-894. 
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d 0 111cd to die a young death. Indeed, Damin quotes ~ 
,~ciolngist, tliat, " [b]achelorhood is more destructive to life th~n 
• d '"' C I . '' . the 010 st un\\'holcson1e tr" cs. ons~\lcnt y since, murnagc 
in itself is the main cause of prolonged life .... We may, therefore, 
inf.:r th al sound and good men who out of pnrdcnce rcmam for a 
tinic l11unnrricd, do no! S\1Cfcr a high rntc of mortality."" To 
conclude, Nalllrc favors those who wail for a time lo acquire 
success before ma~·ing, and then blesses these ever so wise 
p<!Cp:c with long life. '.\1e:mwhile, !\~lure eliminates the weak 
and impmdcnl who marry early, wlulc poor. and breed like 
rodents, lo !lie detriment of society. 
Therefore, Darwin concludes that an)' action outside of nature 
to proli:d the poor, such as welfare laws, is "wrongly directed."" 
Most of the rich arc so by ,·irtu~ of being ll1e most n:oral in a 
soci~ty. ~nd any laws restricting them also seems misdirected. 
Social Da1winists, however, assume thm perhaps J\alurc rn~y 
not be effective enough in its efforts in eliminating the poor and 
weak from a race; and consequently, many of these scientists an 
phi~osophcr~. anncd \\~th The Origin of Species and De.rcem of 
Afan, ll<!go11 developing dangerous social theories to help it To 
further cnh~ncc the superior ruce, scGinl Darwinists decided to do 
aw~v with nil inferiors: those weaklin~s of their own rnce nnd all 
olh~r inferior races. According 10 Sir Francis Gallon who coined 
the term. 1he scie;:cc of eugenics, which dcnls \\ith cxtem1innting 
the unwonted mental or physical qualities in a r~ce to "protect" 
future g~ncrntions and had its roms in racism:'" The Breeder' s 
Arn)ciation, a Dan .. inist !,'l'Oup founded at the tum ofll1e century, 
w~ntcd to slcril i1.e Ilic lower (enth (dctcnninetl by their O\m 
ddiniticn) of the American people from gencr<ltion to generation 
in order to hove <loae awuv with the unfit by l 9RO. Indeed, 
"Margaret Si\nger, 1he founder of Planned Parenthood, coined U1c 
slog:ui, " More children fro:n the lit, less from the unCiL'"~ She 
furth<.T described African-Amcrica:IS and East-European 
inimigron:s to the United States as " 3 !llcoace to ei1·ilizntion» nnd 
tlibid,, ~06. 
' ' Ibid. 
"ftid .• SO!. 
""O'St! llZ:~. /:'na' of Jtucl:'"· 25 7. 
" Ib;<l .. l 1 ~. . 
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"hum~n \\'Ceds."46 She bclic,•ed the best wny to kill \\'ccds is LO 
kill their roots, \\ilile adn11tting that Plann<."(I ?aren!hood docs 
" not w:ml "ord to get out that we want 10 c:-:1ermin~tc the Ncsro 
population. "0 ' Clci\rly, according to the soc ial Daminist, "the 
stnigglc of race with race (culminutes in) t.hc sur\'ival of the 
physicolly and mentally litter race.'" 
Clearly Darwin was a racist, as The Origin of Species and 'l'lie Descent of Man show, and l>clic,•cd in the superiority of his 
race o,·cr those he called "sa\'agcs." His works are full of 
rcrcxnces bcliuline ~inferior" races :md inferior people in his 
0\\1l race, and he ;ppro\·ed of their subjugation and extinction. 
These references and bciicfs were more than enough for his 
followers lo Iced upon, and the parasitic disease of socinl 
Darwinism spread like the cancer they strove to protect. In the 
name of progress, people were conquered and subjugated, and 
schemes were spewed fortli to prcser\'e and advance their O\\n 
•·superior" race. Clearly, the theory of evolutioa needs to be 
rec~nmined. Irrefutably, scicntilically endorsed racism is 
founded upon Charles Darwin. 
"Ibid. 
''Ibid. 
' 'Ibid .• 215 
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Patrick Pearse and the Triumph of Failure 
1Hatthew E. Thrun 
1
1.-falthew Timm complered his B..4. m Jfls1ory in Spring 
1997 and will be working on his JD. ."' L~yola 
L!J-liversity Sc/roo f <f Law. T71is essa)' 11'(/S wr111en ;or <ill 
Advanced Composition dass for Eng/isl! Professor 
Richard Sylvia during Spring 1996. 
On1'· CU(hulaiim, the Hound of l..1stcr, remained, fat:ill\' wounded, his side and stomach gaping with 
wounds. 
0
Hc bound hims·elf with his sword-~ll to _a 
pilla:-stonc, Carrig-an-Con;pa.ri, so thnt . he 1111ght d1~ 
strinding, facing his enemies. And so he did, mlh drnwn 
sword i11 hnnd, a rnvcn perched on his shoulder, the rays 
of the setting sun bright on his bronze helmet, a terror 
• . I 
even in Jcalh to lus enemies. 
P
atrick Pcarsc·s idealistic "-ays were set ,d1en he fow1dcd 
St. fndn's College in 1908 ~nd cmblnoncd a quote of 
Cuchulainn's upon a wall so that all his students would see 
it. "!care nol t!'.ough l were to live but one day and one mght: if 
only my fame :ind my deeds live after me." This w~s Patnck 
Pearse speaking Lhrough Cuclmlainn; he too saw lmnsclf as 
fighii:ig a11 unbeatable foe and he also knew that one day he 
would be killed in this fi2ht. It was with this mi11d sci and with 
1his Irish hero in his 1ho~~hts that Pearse set out on Lhat foicful 
Monda\' in 1916 to lead the Easler Rising, an Irish rc,·olLagainst 
British ·occupation. Pearse dreamed of b:ing a hero to his country 
a,,d wanted his dczds to live 0:1 after him. 
Patrick (f'adrnic) Pearse was born on No,·cmber IO, 1&79, 0:1 
Grca\ Brunswick Strecl, now Pearse Street, in Dublin. His fother 
W'1s Janics Pearse, n English sculptor. Politically, James was a 
proponent of Home Ruic.. a proposed through which Ireland 
would rcmnin a part of the British Empire but with sclf-
govemment. His fathers one liternry work \\'ilS n pamphlet 
entitled England's duty 10 Ireland as ii appears to an 
1Dcsmo1)(f \\!Rian~ 1111: fris/1 Swggll' 19 12· 1?:?6 (London~ 1967)~ 1. 
The Treaty of Versailles in the Senate 
Gregory Aydt 
Greg Aydr is nJur.ior in Ju:rrory and wrote nn nnalysls of 
a passage ji'Ol11 (1 snmdnrd hi;·tory textbook M an 
assignnwnr for Historical Sources and Techniques {l /is 
2500) under Professor Christopher Waldr<:p. A ver.<1on 
of 1/iis essay won the uniwrsity-wide Socinl Science 
Wri1i11g Award far 1996-1997. 
The United Slates Senntc hns debated many imporlnnt topics, but one of the most legendary battles was the fight O\'cr the raiification of the Treaty of Versailles. 
Associated with this debate was not only the treaty, but ~Isa 
Woodrow Wilson's dream of a League of Nntions. In a 
discussion about the debate's lasting fame, author Herbert 
Margulies \\Tote th<.t "the story of the League's rejection has 
entered folklore and become almost m)1hological, "ilh President 
Woodrow Wilson and Senator Hem)' Cabot Lodge the 
larger-Lhan·lifc protagonists."' The ramifications of the Scnai~'s 
defont of the treat;' were both immediate and far-reaching. 
Instead of becoming hea,·ily invoh·cd in Euro;>ean affairs, the 
United States shied away from o prominent position in European 
polit ic~. 
At the time of Lhc debate, prominent voices of public opin ion 
held Lodze responsible for the treaty's defeat. Afler the Sciintc 
rejected the treaty for the second lime in the spring of 1920, a 
New York 'l'ime.f editorial staled tliat " IV!r. Lodge might al any 
time ha,·e secured raiilication with resen·ntions sufficient for 
C\'el)' reasonable purpose ... , and upo11 him, as the leader of ihc 
Republican majority, the actunl responsibility I for the trcal)'s 
rejection] falls and will rcsl."2 Since lhat time, however, 
historians ha,·e rcc1·aluated the roles played by both Lodge and 
Wilson. Current history textbooks reflect this change. In the 
standard textbook Nation of Nations, the nuthors charge both 
1H:rbdt F. r...tatJu,es.- n1« /./ild R~.r;:rvatlu11ists c11d lh~ Lit.agu~ <>f]v·a1l0Jtt 
Con/r'rJ\'(U"S) ' iu 1h'I! S t.•fl'J/':! (Columbi3, l 989), ix. 
:,Vew ro-·k Tinu:s.20 /'.1:\n:h 1920. 
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Lodge :iml Wilson wil11 some responsibility for the defont of the 
treaty." Lodge .loved the Republican party more than world peace 
and ccrtamly did not wnnl the Democrats lo win votes by takin" 
d. • ti "1 I "' crt 1t 1or 1e treaty. T 1e nulhors consider this to be one of the 
m:irn reasons for Lodge's opposition to tJ1e treaty. As for Wilson, 
tl\cy \'.Tile that "temperamentally the president could not abide 
compromise: •·• This foilure Lo reach a compromise with Lod<>c 
ar>d the Republicans, despite se,·cral opportunities Lo do s~, 
eventually led IO the defeat of the trnaty. UltimMcly, Nalion of 
N1111ons credits the Democrats i.n Lhc Senate with killing the 
trcnty, staling Lhnt "loyal Dcmocrnts had been forced lo deliver 
the ki!lir1g bloll'. "' 
At first glance, it appears that the Treaty of Vers:iiltes, and 
with it the l..eai,•ue of Nations, should have been easilv ratified. 
While the ari,~1mcnt in the Senate might appear to t;ave been 
between pro-treaty, pro-League intenmtionalists led by President 
Wtfson and anti-trc~ty, anti-League isolationists under the 
lcadcrshi() of Lodge, this wiis not the case at all. ~.!though Lhev 
had ,·cry different ideas as lo the role which tlie United Stnl.; 
should assume in what Wilson called the "new world order." both 
~'.lgc ~nd ~':.ilson subscribed to internationalist doctrines .. Ledge 
bd1c,·ea \<Ilson hnd gone too far towards complete 
1111cm~licnalisrn by allo\\'ing the League of )/ations to assume 
po\l'crs which should only be claimed by the Congress, but he 
was not opposed to the conccpl of a league. of nations. As 
'.rofcssor Da,·id Fromkin writes, it misleads to suggest t.hat the 
issue was isolntionism versus in1crnaLionalism. For most 
SCo•.tors, the issue w:is \\nether they shared President Wilso:i's 
par11cula1· brand of intcmalionalist vision or held one of several 
nval internationalist ,·isicns.6 
, Of co11rsc, l\\O·lh'.rds of 1hc Senate wns required to approve 
the treaty m order for it Lo ukc force. \\'hilc this number is more 
than a simple majority, il was cenainly within the reach of Wilson 
'JJ:1ni:3 \Vest O;t\idson and othe:s. Ji.~r.lion of Ji,'atrons: 1i lV"arran'"' j{fsl()')' 
~~~I:·.: Aaa:rlc.-.n l?epub!iC', Jlaf1une 11: S;nc(r 1865. 2d e<I. (Ne'v Yo~k. 1994). 
1lbid. 
'Ibid .. 903. 
R ' J):..•;j,j FrornJ..in, "P..iv~I Inti:m11tiomllis1:1: Lod,c, \\.ifs.on, end chc Two 
-.OOllC-\. :.-tts," H'orld r"fic;,.Ju1fl'1tcl l3(Sum1n¢r1994); 78. 
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and his supporters. Within lhc Senalc, bcl\\'een 75 and 80 percent 
of the senators favored joining the Lc3g>.tc. The American public 
was just as favorable in joining of the Lcngue, with perhaps as 
man;• as 80 percent of the people in agrccmenL Y ct Americans 
chose to make the ratification ,·ote n referendum on whetlter the 
United States should pursue Wilson's League, or a milder league 
proposed by Lodge and the RepubliC.1ns. This mild;;r league 
would delegate less authority to tl1e League of Nations and leave 
more control over foreign affairs in tl1e hands of Congress. 
Lodee's decision shaped the debate from the beginning. 
Other factors alro affected tl1e tone of the debate. E\·cn 
before the ucatv had been completely finalized, Senate 
Republicans felt that Wilson had ignored tl1eir opinions and views 
on how the League of Nations should be constituted. Wl1en 
choosing a Republic~:\ to be a member of the peace delegation 
which went to Paris to \\Tile the lrc:ny, Wilson chose not lo pick 
a member of the Scnotc. Instead he chose Hcniy White, who was 
not a strong Republican, and did nol even li\"C in the Uni ted 
States.' This displeased the Scnnlc Republicans, and it was only 
the first of several political blunders which Wilson wou ld make 
to irritate them. These \'Cry same senators would cast the crucial 
votes which decided the fotc o(thc treaty, a treaty which they had 
verv liulc input in \'.Tiling. Since the Republicans had gnincd 
co~trol of tl1c Senate in the Congressional elections of 1918, lhey 
would be a very impo11ant faclor in the treaty fight. Although 
holding only a s:im Corty-nine lO fony-sevcn majority, 
Republican votes would be necessary to rnti fy the tre3ty. 
After returning to the United States from his initial 
negotiating trip to Europe, several members of the Senate 
informed Wilson that some chnngcs would be nccessal)' in order 
Cor the trcatv to be approved by the Senate. ScvcrJI senators 
suggested, i~ fact, that the proposal for the !..<:ague of Nations 
should be separated from the rest of the trcnty and dealt with as 
a scparat.~ entity. 13y doing tliis, the treaty "ould be assured of 
ea;;\' ratification, and nny changes to the Covcn:mt of the leai,'Ue 
\\"hlch the Senate deemed neccssal)' could be made without 
scuuling the entire peace treaty. The President, howe\'cr, chose 
net onlv to disre•ard these suggestions, but to defy them openly. - ~ 
~tdMgut~.\fi/d R~rvtH/011/su, 8. 
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ln n speech in New York prior to his rctum to Europe to finnlizc 
the treaty, Wilson bragged that ""11cn thnt treaty comes back, 
gentlemen on tl1is side will find the cO\'cMnt nOL only in it, but so 
many thrcnds of the treaty tied to the covenant tl1at you cmmot 
dissect the co\'ena11t from the treaty \\itl1out destroying the whole 
Yitai stn1cture."8 In the end, that is precisely what happened, and 
the treaty was destroyed. 
Wilson's unwillingness to allow tl1e Senate to play even a 
snull part in the \\Tiling of the treaty resulted in much bittcmcss, 
especially on the Republican side of the aisle; howe,·ec, 
disappo!ntm:nt with Wilson's handling of the situation was not 
c.."'Ofined only lo Republicans. Thomas J. Walsh was a loyal 
Democratic se.>.ator from Montana; nevertheless, he felt that "the 
President ha;; handled the thing most maladroitly and has 
evidcn:cd a disposition to e.-:clude the Senate from any real, 
a:ti\·c participation in the making of the trcnty."• 
\Vilson's actions during this time created considecable 
animosity b:twcen himself and the leading Republican senators. 
This nni1no>ity, in addition to the partisanship naturally present 
between the two politica l parties, \•irtually assured tliat 
Republicans would subject the Treaty oi Versailles to more 
scrutiny than might otherwise be directed toward a similar treaty 
under diffcrcnl circwnstanccs. These events set the stage for tl1e 
heated battle which \\'ould occur in the Scnntc. 
President Wilson did not present the treaty to the Senate 1mtil 
J ul:c ID, 1919, when he asked the Senate for its approval, as 
prescribed in the Constitution. The senators expected Wilson lo 
present a defense of lhc treaty, with particular attention being 
given to the Co,•eirnnL Wilson, however, already considered the 
Republicans 10 be hopelessly ngninst the treaty. \v11ilc he did 
discuss the League during the address, he ne\'Cr referred to the 
spc<:iftc issues opponents of 1he league had criticized. He instead 
dcli"cred a speech in which he dwellcd on "lofiy generalities,"'~ 
ns th·~ Chicago Tribune disgustedly reported. The President 
seemed to be unwilling to respond to Republican complaints. 
The New York Tunes \\Tote that "from tl1c outset he !Wilson) 
'llM<l '9. 
'llMJ 
1-Ci!icago Tt-fb1r11e~ 11July 1919. 
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scc:ncd 10 SC."1.<;e !he hostilitv on lhc Republic:in side of the 
Chamber and to foci the \'irtuai fu1ili1y of ;;Jl. ~PJ)Ca! lo 1hcm.''11 
Wilson implored the senators to rcali ?.c thnl 1hc time h~d 
come lor a world organizJtion such us the League of Nations to 
be Conned. He made an impnssioncd plea for adoption of the 
League: 
They [statesmen) saw it (the League( as lhc main object 
of !he peace, as the only thing that could complete it or 
mnke it worth \\nile. They saw it as lhe hope of the 
wo~ld, nnd that hope they did nol dara to disappoint 
Shall we or any other free people hesilatc to nccept this 
greut duty? Dare "e reject it and break the hcnrt of the 
world'?': 
While Wilson prcserJcd to the Senate an eloquent case for a 
league of one son or another, he did nol show clearly why this 
particular League of Nations proposal was better lhnn other 
proposals that the Senate would consider. 
\\iilson's failure ;o respond directly to his senatorial critics 
fueled the opposilion. According to the Chicago Tribune, a 
Hronsly Republican newspnpcr lllld a grcl t anrngonist of Wilson, 
"senators, generally, had supposed Mr. Wilson would cndea\·or 
to demolish the opposition by explaining the mysteries of the 
covenant." The article continued: "Wl1~n tvfr. Wi lson touched 
upon none of these concrete objections, but continued lo dwell 011 
the beauties of self-sacrifice, national unselfishness, and the new 
order of intcmationai sm, interest on the noor began to wane."" 
The sennlors were in no mood for idcali~tic rhc.1oric; they wanted 
to hear a cold, factual ~ccount of the trcaly's P'O\isions. Herny 
Fountain Ashurst. a Democratic scnalor from ,\ri7ona, sununcd 
up the situation .acutely when he wrote in his diary that "his 
[Wilson's] audience wanted raw meat, he fed them cold tumips."14 
Wilson's speech changed few, if any, votes in the Scnote. 
11A'eu• }'nrl: J"i111e..s.111uly 1919. 
1:1\J\huJ S. Lint~ ed. Th~ fa,m-s o{n·cocfrr:r ... 117L~"'' (l'rincctoo, 1$91). 
6t :43'1. 
"Cfu,t1;:,o TrfhJut~, 11 Jul}' I? l 9. 
1'Link, ed., Pcpo:rs<.{1Vil.$1>Jt, 61 ;.il.45·6. 
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The trca:y wcm first to the Foreign Relations Commillec, 
where senators dcbalcd it for t\\O month5. As chairman of this 
commillcc, Lodge controlled the entire process. He assumed the 
di rlicull t3sk of attempting lo adopt some slrate1,•y which could 
g~mc1· the \'Oles of two-thirds of a seriously divided Senate. 
Vvl1ile less than two-thirds of ll1e Senate would have been 
suflicicnt LO kill Wilson's treaty, this did nol satisfy Lodge. He 
wanted the Senate to ratify a Republican version to be sent to L'te 
President, forcing Wilson either to sign a Republican treaty or to 
be directly responsible for rej ecting the treaty himself. Lodge 
co1:sidcrcd two possible approaches. The commiltee could either 
offer a111cndments or reservations. \Vhilc the distinction between 
these two policies was sometimes confused c1·cn by the 
participants in the debate, the difference proved \'cry importan~ 
An amendment added to the Lrcaly during ratification required 
renegotiation. This meant that all parties to the treaty would have 
to formally agree to the ch:inge by sii,'lling the treaty again. A 
reservation, on the other hand, did not change ll1c actual text of 
the treaty, allowing the other signatories to agree to it "without 
fom1al ocknowlcdgmem" of the alteration." 
The Senate, by this time, had broken into SC\'Cral fairly 
wdl-dclincd factions. A smlll, bul unwa\'ering group of senators 
w1!re against the League in any fonn. M O\\n as irroconcilables, 
this group could be counted on 10 ~ole against Ilic treaty with or 
without amendments or reservations. Composed of fourteen 
Rcpublicntls and two Democrats, this group did noL play an 
inllucnlinl role in the debate. Their minds were already made up, 
and nothing could change their stance. The remainder of the 
Republicans fa\'ored ratification, but harbored rescr\'ntions of one 
type or anolhcr. 15 Mild rescrv~tionists fa\'orcd interpreri,·c 
amendments or reservations, \\i1ich would only more clearly 
dclin~ what had originally been intended by ll1e \\Tilers of the 
lrcaty. Stro11g reservalionists, led by Lodge, wnnlcd to define 
certain parts of the treaty more clearly, but not necessarily with 
lhc same meani ng which had been intended by the framers of the 
trc~ty. The strong rcscrvationists outnumbered the mild 
"luolxrt H. F=U. Woodrow Oi/W11 and World liar!, 1917-1921 (Now 
Yoik, l9SS), t76. 
1
'Ahhough this grou? is no-. .. · c.nUcd rcscrvtllior.ist~. ~Onie of these scnaton. 
<i ls>J tU vo1c.J 1mcndn1cnl:; ::l lhc-ti rn~. 
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reservationists, but treaty supporters needed to win both groups 
to rotify the treaty.n 
All of the Scnnle Democrats supported the Wilsonian position 
of no reservations or amendments, with the exception of two 
irreconcilables. In several cases, Democrats gave the support 
only out of party loyalty. Senaror Gilben Hitchcock led Lhc 
Democrats. Not actually the minority leader, he lilied in for 
Senator Thom:1s Martin, suffering from a tenninal illness. TI1is 
change in leadership hurt the Democrats, not by ii\jl1ring party 
unity, but by 'Cw1ailing their ability to devise a policy to woo 
Republican support. Hitchcock's lack of experience as minority 
leader limited his inOuenee among both Democrats and 
Republicans. About twenty Republican votes would be needed 
in orqcr to provide a twO·thirds majority when combined with 
Joyal Dcmocrnls. Compromise would probably be necessary, but 
despite his att~mpts, Hitchcock failed lo convince Wilson d1a< th is 
'''as so.111 
One of the major stumbling blocks for rat.ilication was Art.iele 
I 0 of the Covenai;t or the League of Nat.ions, which said: 
The Members or the L<iaguc undertake lo respect and 
preserve as against external aggression the territorial 
integrity and c:<isting political independence of nil 
Members of the League. In case of any such aggression 
or in case of any threat or danger of such ag&'!'ession the 
Cow1cil shnll advise upon the means by which this 
obligalion shall be fulfillcd.19 
This article expressed \.Vilson's view of collective security. It 
authorized league n:embers to respond to any attack ogainst 
;mother member nation. Rc.scrvationists thought that this article 
ga\'e too much power to the Lea!,'lte and took away the 
Con!,'l'Cssional right to decbrc war. President \Vilson, however, 
PMargulics, ft,fild Rese~ot/ouist~. ix-x. 
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considered Anicle I 0 to be "the heart of !he Covemmto'.''° because 
in his opinion, it embodied the major theme of the .entire Lcag11e. 
Jn a conference with members of the Foreign Rclauons 
Commiucc, Wilson staled that "Article 10 seems l~. me to 
constitute 1l1e vcrv backbone of the whole covenant. Without it 
Ilic Jcn~ue would be hardly more than an iniluenlial debating 
society:;-,,. Since Wilson saw this urticle as one of the basic tenets 
upon wltich the League was founded, he did not want any 
rcsen:ations attached to it. 
In tJ1e ForciQn Re.Jations Committee, Republican senators 
introduced d iffc:ent amendments and reservations to be 
discussed. The committee approved several amendm~nts, 
sending them to the full Senate for debate. The conunittec also 
adopted four rcsen-alions which came to becaine known ~s. the 
Lodge reservations. These reservations became the basts for 
several different sets of reservations subsequently proposed b~" 
Republicans for inclusion in the resolution of rati~c.ation. Th~ 
first of the Lodge Reservations protected the Umted Suites 
"unconditional right to withdraw from the league." The second 
rcsc1\'ation stipulated that the United States would not assume 
an•t obligations under Article 10, or ony other article, except witJ1 
Congres~ionnl approval. Lodge's third rcscrv.ation aiiin;1;d the 
United States' right to determine "what quesltons are w1tl1m 11s 
domestic jurisdiction," imd therefore outside of tl1c League's 
jnrisdic!ion. The founh reservation removed th': Monro~ 
Doctrine from the League's domain. This left the Umtcd Stales 
free to enforce the Monroe Doctrine as she saw !ii, without 
obtaining ~ppro\•al from lhe Lcague.z: . . 
In the full Senate, voting began on the Foreign Rcfattons 
Committe~'s amendments. As expected, the Democra(s stuck 
together ;md generally voted against the amendments. On the 
Republican side though, there was no such unanimity. The strong 
rcscrvationists voted in fo\'or of some amendments, b1tt agamst 
others. !\inc of the mild rescrvationists \'Oted against all of the 
amendments. and as a result of this, all of the amendments were 
rejected. \\~1ili: tJ1is might have seemed to be good news for 
~,_i 1lk. ed .• Papers of iFil.~on, 63:452. 
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Wilson and the Democrats, a closer look ut Lhe •:otc totals 
re,'ealcd that it rc<1lly was not. The combination of loyal 
Democrats and mild reservationists was enough lo provide the 
simple majority necesmy to defeat amendments lo the rreaty, but 
it was well sho1t of the two-thirds necessary to approve the trcmy. 
Q,·er one-third of the senators, more thnn enough to kill the 
treatv. voted for almost every amendment. This should have 
indi;~ted lo \\iilson and the Demo:ratic leadership that 
acconunod~1ting the strong reservationists would be a necessity if 
the treaty was to have a good chance of being approved.;; 
'Wilson's next n">)ve demonstrated his idealism in action·. 
Instead of looking for compromise at this point, he chose to take 
his case for the League of Nations directly to the people. On 
AU!,'llSl 25, Wilson decided to deliver his message to the people 
th.rough the Middle West and WcsL Prior to leaving for the tour, 
Wilson sent a secret mcmorwdwu to Senalor Hitchcock, dated 
September 3 ;ind titled "Suggestion." In this memornndurn, 
Wilson outlined in his O\m words four reservations dealing with 
t11e same topics as the Lodge reservations. Wilson apparently 
inlcndcd the reservations to be proposed h~· Hitchcock, bur not 
until Wilson hims.elf gave him the order. If and when Wilson 
gave Hitchcock permission to propose the reservations, he was 
not to admit that tl1ey had actually been composed by the 
Presidcnt.2·1 
If Hitchcock had proposed the rcsen-ations at this point, a 
.compromise might have been reached. Wilson, howc.vcr, wanted 
to \\in ratification on his own terms. Consequently, he departed 
on his speaking tour on the. same day that he gave the 
memorandum to Hitchcock. The potential rescrvmions would 
have lo wait until Wilson gave Hitchcock permission to propose 
them, which would likely be upon Wilson's return from his trip. 
By tlrnt time, though, the situation would be drastically different. 
Wilson had wanlcd to launch his campaign as early as July 
20. but at tlrnt time his advisers opposed the trip. Wilson hoped 
10 demonstrmc during the tour that the public at large favored the 
treaty, but his advisers pointed out tlmt the Senate was fairly 
~1L1oyd E. Arr,brosius) H·Codroiv IVi!snn and tlu: An:<ric.:>n Diplonul!ic 
Tr.,dir.;nu: The. Tr~ary Figltt in l-'crspt:Clil>'IJ (Nc»v '{ e,nk, 19S7), 198. 
-:-i\Voo::lro\v \Vil!>OJ\, "Sugg¢stion," p,~pers "f 1i~ifson, Link, ed. G2:();? i . 
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insulated from any pressure which could be applied by public 
opinion.z; The Seventeenth Amendment had just been ratified in 
1913, ~o the populace laeke.d experience with electing senators 
directly. By lute AU!,'l1sl, however, Wilson felt that an appeal to 
the people wus the only oplion !ell that could 111m the tide against 
reservations, so accordingly, the President left Washington by 
train on September 3. By the middle of September, the public 
was becoming ,·ery responsive at every stop, and the speeches 
drew large crowds. After a speech at Pueblo, Colorado on 
September 25, however, Wilson ·showed signs of an impending 
stroke. According to Dr. Cary Grayson,. Wilson's personal 
physician saw t11is and informed the President that the remainder 
of the trip must be canceled. And Wilson gmdgingly consented 
and returned to 'N ashington.26 
On Octob:r 2, only a few days after rctW11ing from the 
western trip, \Vilson suffered a major stroke that paralyzed the 
left side or liis body. The long-tem1 political effects of this 
medical problem were almost as damaging. At the time, those 
individuals "ho were very close lo the President employed a 
great deal of dcc~ption so that the American people would not 
find out how greatly the stroke had impaired Wilson's ability to 
hold the onice. Irwin Hood Hoover was Head Usher of the \Vliite 
House during Wilson's entire term of office and was de\'oted to 
\.Vilson, bul in his rncn1oirs he \•:rites lhat "never ";as a conspiracy 
so poimediy and so artistically fanned."" A news report dated 
10:00 p.m. October 3 stated that "the President's illness is 
diagnosed as 'nervous exhaustion,' but the danger is that the 
present attack ... may develop into nervous prostration.""' The fact 
thm Wibon had suffe.rcd ii stroke was not announced to the 
public. 
According m Dr. Bert Park, a medical doctor who has studied 
Wilson's c;isc considerably, "that Wilson was disabled for at least 
the first month of his illness in the constitutional sense, such that 
h;;. was unable to carry out t11e duties of the office, the docwnents 
! 5Clcincnts! J-'rc.•s;d.:!ic)' ofll'iison, 192-3. 




... make clear."~ lrnin Hoover was a bit more dcscripti\'C when 
he wrote that "this original [sic] stroke or whatever it was simply 
pul the President oul of business, mentally & physically for at 
leas! n month. "30 Even when recovery fin~lly did begin to l>ccome 
cvidc11l, 1t was painful!)' obvious to anyone \\i10 had kn0\\11 him 
prior to the stroke that Wilson wns not tl1e man he had once been. 
Hoover \\Tale lhal "!here \\-:IS no comparison " ith the President 
thal went lo Paris and before. He could not talk plain, mumbled 
more than he aniculated, was helpless and looked awful. "" 
Wilson would ne\•er fully rcco,·er from tl1~ trauma which he 
suffered during the stroke. 
The relationship between Wilson's illness and the treaty 
d~bate is of great importance, because lit a critical time during 
which some compromises might have been made, Wilson, the. 
lender of lhe pro-trcnty delegation, could not give nny direction 
lo liitchcock in Lhe Senate. Even after he regained enough 
streni.>th to begin raking a limited interest in political affairs ~g.ain, 
the long-tenn cC!Ccts of his stroke still took tlteir toll. Although 
it W:IS not kno"11 in Wilson's day, strokes also hJvc an effect on 
an individual's psychologic~l well -being. These effects include 
disorders of emolion, impaired impulse control, and defective 
judgment. Fur'J1ennore, a stroke victim's underlying pcrsomtlily 
trnits are greatly magnified and become plainly ob,ious. For 
Wilson, these 1raits included intransigence. Usually hiddm by 
Wilson's sense of pr•)pet and prudent behavior, it cnrrn: lo the 
forefront after his Slroke and became evident in his actions 
pertaining 10 the trear1.12 
\Vnile Wilson's recovery continued slowly, action continued 
in the Senalc. On No,·ember 6, Lodge introduced fourteen 
reservations whicl1 he hoped to aU:ICh to the trcmy prior lo 
ratification. Some ofthcsc were similar to the original four Lodg~ 
reservations which the Foreign Relations Commiltcc had 
proposed, but there were several additional rescrv111ions as well. 
The list of resen>ations stmc<l: that the United States would nol 
enforce sanctions \\~thout tl1e consent of Congress; that only the 
1' lbid., 63:644. 
10lbid., 63:636. 
111bid. 
n lhid. , 64:525. 
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US woul<l decide if it had fulfille.d its obligmions m the La1!,'UC 
if it withdrew; thnt mnadatcs would only be ncccp1cd \\ith 
Congressional approval; that only the US would detennine wlrnt 
qualified as a "domestic" issue; that no issues pertaining to the 
Monroe Doctrine would be submiucd to the Lcnguc; that 
arms-limitnlicn agr=cnts would be binding only if 1.hey were 
gi,·cn Congressional approval; wd !hat the covenant of the 
League must be amended to equalize the voting power of the US 
and Great Britain in combination with its dominions . There were 
ether reservations included, but these were the most important 
ones. 
Senator Hicchcock realiz.cd lhc situation lookc.d bleak. On 
~o,·cmb:r 13, Hitchcock \>Tate to Wilson so that he might be 
kept abreast of the la lest developments. He in[ormed Wilson thnt 
the Republicans were solid in their support of !he Lodge 
reservations, und 1h1t the Democrats offered substitute 
rcscn-;llions, similar lo those suggested by Wilson prior to his 
speaking trip. These substitute rcscn>ations drew !he support of 
all but three or four Democrats. Hitchcock also spelled out the 
Democrat's plan for voting on resolutions of ratification. They 
intended lo oITcr a rcsolulion of unqualified ratificntion to rival 
Lodge's resolution of ratification \\itl1 reservations, knowing full 
well that their resolution would be defeated. Thcv would then 
offer intcrprcti,·c reservations in place of the Lodge .Rcsen·ations, 
ngnm e.xpectmg defC:lt. The purpose of this wiis to "make the 
dcmocrntic record clcnr."1) 
1 litchcock proposed to Wilson thnt the Dcmocrnts vote 
against the resolution of ratification containing !he Lodge 
rescrv:i1ions \\·hen it came lo a vole. This would assure its failure. 
There was, however, another possibility. Hitchcock \\TOtc: 
"This plan is subject to modification, however, in cnsc when lhe 
time arrives we shall determine, or the Presidenl shall advise us 
to vote for the Lodge resolution."" With this slnlcmcnl, 
Hitchcock intended to give \Nilson an opportunity lo clrnnge his 
st?nce on reservations, since the trC:lty would apparently not pass 
"1lhou1 the Lodge re$Crvations :1rtached. Hitchcock followed up 
this correspondence to Wilson \\llh a pcrson:il visit on ~o,ember 
1'1hid .• 64:29. 
>'Ibid. 
58 
J 7. Hitchcock hoped that the spirit of comp;omisc which Wilson 
had displayed brieny, prior to his ill-fated westem trip, \\'OUld 
again be manifested in Wilson's behavior.;' 
Upon asking the President if he had any1hing to suggest nbout 
the Lodge resolution. Hitchcock soon disco,·cred that any 
disposition which Wilson might have had toward compromise 
bad been deslro~'Cd. The President responded "l consider it n 
nullification of the Treaty and utter])' impossible." ScMIOr 
Hitchcock tl1e11 noted that lhc Senate had made some changes to 
Article 10 of the Lca~~·c covenant, and proceeded to describe the 
changes. Wilson \\'US not impressed, and staled: "Th:tl cuts the 
very heart out of the Treaty; I could not stand for those changes 
for a moment because it would humoiate the United Stntcs before 
all of 01e allied countries." Wilson's bitterness toward the 
Republicans was clear when he told Hitchcock lhat "I " i ll get 
their [Republicans] poliLical scalps when the truth is kno\\'n to the 
people.... Mind you, ScnaLOr, I have no hostility towards these 
gentlemen bul an utter contempt. • )6 
Hitchcock wanted to mnke certain compromises with the 
Republic.'UIS, but Wilson was set against it. The Presitk:nt 
considered e\·erything except interpretive reservations, which did 
not change the substnnce of the treaty, as being loo 
compromising. Aficr his conference wilh Prcsidenl Wilson, 
Hitchcock spoke to the press about his discussion with the chief 
executive. He inforrr.ed them that "President Wilson will pocket 
the treaty if 1he Lodge pro1,'Tam of reservations is carried 0111 in 
1he ratifying resolution."17 ltl olher words, even if the Lodge 
resolution passed wiih a veto-proof two-thirds majority in lhc 
Senate, Wilson would refuse to comple1c the rotification process. 
This action would send the Lrealy back to the Senate at the 
begiJUiing or the next session to start the entire process o,·cr 
again. 
By No,·ember 19, the Scn3te was fmally ready to vole on lhe 
difterent resolutions of ratificalion. Before any votes were cast, 
howe,·cr, there was one finnl bit of political wrangling. Before the 





D:mocrats in 1hc Senate a letter from President Wilson 
discussing 1hc Lodge rcsolulion in which he \\TOLe: "In my 
opinion, 1hc resolution in that form do:s not provide for 
ra1ificatioa bul, rather, fo~ the nulli fication of the 1rcaty. I 
sino:rely hope that ll1e friends and supporters of the treaty will 
, ·0 tc against 1hc Lodge resolution of ratification." Senator Lodge, 
sensing a chance to mJke Wilson look foolish for urging the 
Sennlc to \'Ole ngainst a resolution califying his O\m treaty, read 
the kllcr to the entire Senate. Finally, debate was closed, and the 
YOting began-" 
The scnalors firs1 voted on the resolution of ratificmion with 
the Lodge rcscrvmions nlloched. This resolution received 
thirtv-ninc \'Otes in favor of ratification and fifty-five votes 
o~ai;1st ntti fication. A motion was nrndc to reconsider, so the 
s;me resolution co nle up for a second vote. This time the measure 
was defeated forty-one to fifty. Consequently, the Lodge 
resolution went down to d·~ fca t. Then, as plaJUied by Hitchcock 
and the Democrats, the Senate voted on a resolution of 
ratification "ill1 no reservations at all The resolution rccei\·cd 
thirty-eight votes in fa\•or of ratification, versus fi11y-three \'Otes 
a2ainsl ratifiC3tion. Similar margins decided all three votes. 
None of 1l1em came close lo lhe necessary two-thirds majority. 
The Trcatv or Versailles was dead, at least in this session or 
Congress.'• 
When the nexl session of Congress began in Januruy of 1920, 
Viilson ugJin sent the treaty to the Senate for rali !icaiion. 
Unfortunnicly for the supporters of the treaty, he hnd not altered 
his stance in the least since the previous Senate's actions. In the 
Presidcnl's traditional Jackson Day message to Democral.S, he 
stood bv his earlier posilion; namely, thal interprelh·c 
rcscrYnti~ns were acceptable, but no1hing else. Me wrote, "We 
c:i:mot rc\\Titz this treaty. We must take it wilhout changes which 
al:cr its mcanmg, or lca\-e it.'""' Only compromise could have 
saved the treat\' in the Senate, bul Wilson le[! no room fOf 
maneuvcrins. TI1e treaty came up for another vote on ~farch. 19. 
The resolution of ratification including the Lodge reser\'ahons 
~P.Cong.-cssionRI Rccord,, 661h Cong.. l s1 se."s. (1919), 8"i6l\. 
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was defeated, with r~rty-nine senators voting in favor of Lhc 
rcsclutioa and thirty-five voting against it. Despite the foci thnt 
twenty-one Democrn1s broke ranks lo join with Republican 
supponcrs of the Lodge resolution, it fell seven votes short of 
being approved by two-thirds of the Scnate.'1 
This S<:COnd defeat ended Woodrow Wilson's dream of 
American participation in the League of Nations, but ullimatelv, 
Wilson himself was r!sponsible for !cadin!! lhe Democrats to ~n 
ignominious defeat. By refusing e\'cry attempt at compromise, 
Wilson ignored U1c political realities of the situation. Even 
several members of his own party believed llu\L some reservations 
were necessnry, but Wilson stubbornly clung to the idea U1nt the 
treaty could somehow be approved without reservations. I le 
repenL~dly refused 10 accept opportunities to reach some sort of 
agreement with his adversaries, and even with SenaLor Hitchcock, 
his own pany's lcndtr in the Senate. By asking Dcmocrnl.S to 
rcjccl his o"n treaty, Wilson left them with no good altcrn3tives. 
They could either ,·ot~ for the treaty and humiliate the President, 
or vote against the treaty and kill it In the final analysis, nearly 
half of the Senate Democmts did vote again5t Wilson's \\ishes, 
but this was not enough lo save the treaty. for these reasons, the 
D~mocrats were responsible for defo<1tin!! the Tre:itv of 
Versailles. This ended nn unfortunate clrn1;ter in the storied 
history of Consressio~al debates. 
The Life of l\1ary J. Booth 
lJrnntlie E. Banks 
llranclic B<ml::s, an Eru1em Illinois undergraduate, wrote 
this biography for Historical Sources and Techniques 
fl fis 2500) 1111der l'rofessor Christopher Waldrep as a 
regulnr weekly nssfgnmcr.t req1li1·i11g use of t!te 
Uni>·ers·ity Archives a1 Boofii Library i11 Fall 1996. 
(i I 
M
ary Josephine Booth, librarian at Eastern Illinois Stace 
College from 1904-1945, was instrumenul in the 
. acqu isition of the current library facility in use todny. 
Had it not been for Booth's persistence and dedication to her 
profession, the building of Booth librarv \\'ould hnve been 
delayed ccnsidcrnbly. Mary Booth \\'a; a truly rem11rkablc 
woman whom e\·eryone respected and ndmired for her 
~ommiuncnt to the University. She fought for funding of a new 
hb~ary ~nusc she bclie'-cd it would be an integral part of the 
UruYcrsny. Only by Booth's insislcntc was the need for a new 
libr3_'): ns~csscd by the Illinois State Legislature. By trneing Mary 
Boo,h s lustOI)'. one can see more clearlv her moti\'ation. 
Booth lived from J 87G to 1965. Booth was bom in Beloit 
~'iisconsin: to ~ohn Jnd Mi_nerva (Leonard) Booth. She graduated 
lrom Beloit High School m 1893, alt~ndcd Beloit College, and 
then the Uni\'crsity of Illinois Librarv School where she 
grJduatcd in 1904. She immediately , ;as hired bv President 
Li'·ingston C. Lord nnd started work ihat fall at Easiern Illinois 
S tatc Coll~gc. Booth wns the third 1 ibrarian at East em where she 
stayed w1til she rctircd in 1945, except for a brief but important 
•~tcrludc when she served as a Red Cross relief worker during the 
First World War.1 Booth was state treasurer and later Prcsid:nt 
of the Illinois Library Association, as well as a member of the 
Daughters of U1e American Revolution Women's Overseas 
Service Lcaf,'UC, and the American As~iation of l:ni,·crsity 
Women. 
.'rvt.uy I. Booth, 1~04-19-15, r...1ary J. Booth Collc"Ction. Universilv 
Arduvcs. Booth L1bn'll)'• EJ\s:1cm U!innis tJniv~rsily, CharleHoo, Ulinois. · 
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was defeated, wilh forty-nine senators voling in favor or the 
resolution and thirty-five \'oting against it Despite the face that 
twenty-one Democrats broke ranks ro join wilh Republican 
supporters of the Lodge resolution, it fell seven ,·otcs short of 
being appro,·cd by two-thirds of the Senate. • i 
This second defeat ended Woodrow Wilson's dream of 
American participation in the League of Nations. but uhimatel\', 
Wilson himself wns responsible for leading the Democrats co ~n 
ignominious defeat By refusing every auempt at compromise. 
Wilson ignored the political realities of tl1e situation. C:vcn 
se\•ernl members of his O\\il party beLleved that some rcser•ations 
were necessary, but Wilson stubbornly clung to the idea thnc the 
treaty could somehow be approved without reservations. J!c 
repeatedly refused to i1cccpl opportunities lo reach some so1t of 
ai,>rcement with his adversa ries, and even \\ilh Senator Hitchcock, 
his own party's leader in the Senate. By <isking Dcmocrnls 10 
reject his 0\\11 lm\ly, Wilson left them \\ilh no good alicmatives. 
They could either \'Ote for Ille trcatv ;md humiliate the l'rcsidcnl . , 
or vote against the treaty and kill it. In the final analvsis ne11tl\' 
half of the Senate Democrats did vote against Wilson's ~vishc5, 
but this was nol enough to save the u-....ary. For iliese reasons, the 
Democrats were responsible for defeating the Treaty of 
Versailles. This ended an unfortunaic chapter in tl1e storied 
history of Congressional debates. 
I 
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The Life of.1.\-tary J. Booth 
Brandie E. Banks 
/lrandie Hanks. QJ1 l!iutem 11/inois undergraduate, wrote 
this brogr"phy for Historical Sources and Technlque.f 
(His 2500) under I'rofeuor O;ristopher Jfo/clrep as a 
regulnr "·eel:ly assignment requiring use of the 
University Arc·hives at Booth Li/Jrary in Fall 1996. 
G 1 
Mary Josephine Booth, librarian at Eastern Illinois Stale College from 1904-1945, was inslr\.unencal in the . ncquisit ion of the current library facility in use today. 
Had 1t not been for Booth's persistence and dcdicJtion to her 
profession, 1hc building of Booth libraf\' would ha\'C been 
delayed considerably. Mary Boo!h was· n truly remarkable 
woman whom everyone respected and admired for her 
commilnlcnt to the University. She foul!ht for fw1di112 of a new 
li~~ary ~=use she believed it would ~ an integral part of the 
Llnffers1ty. Only by Booth's insistence w<1s the need for a new 
libra~: assessed by the Illinois St~tc Legislature. By tracing Mary 
Booths l11story, one can see more clearly her moli\'ation. 
13oolh lived from 1876 lo 1965. Booth was born in Beloit 
\~iscon.~in: to ~ohn and Minerva (Leonard) Bootl1. She grnduatcd 
trom Bclo11 High School in 1893, attended Beloit College and 
then the \;ni,·crsity of Illinois Library School where' she 
graduated iii 1904. She immcdiatelv was hired bv President 
Li\'rngston C. Lord and started work ihat fall ut Eastern Illinois 
Stale College. Booth wns the tl1ird librarian at Easlem where she 
stayed w1lil she retired in 1945, except for a brief but important 
inlerluJ c when she served as a Red Cross relief worker durin• the 
F
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•rsl World War. Booth wns state treasurer and later President 
of the Ulinois Library Associ~tion, as well as a member of the 
Dau~htcrs of the American Revolution, Women's Overseas 
Service l..cJ!,'llC, and the American Associatioa of University 
Women. 
~Mary J. Bcx;lil, t80•-t945, Mary J. ilooD1 Collection, Univcrsily 
J\r<1h1\•.;s, Booth Library. EaS1ern Illinois Uni·:ersity, Ch~rle.ston, i11inoh;, 
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During her tenure at Eastem, Booth nindc rnJn,· 
contributions. Her ll"ork meant so much to her t11n1 often sh~ 
would sacrifice her O\\n health for the job. In n correspondence 
from the secretary of the Illinois State Historical Library, Jessie 
Weber stntcs: "I heard from some of the librnI\' ladies tlm ,·our 
hc.~lth hod not been good and I was \'Cf)' so~; to hear it, but I 
musi confess that I was noL much surprised, for you know that I 
had told you when we were in Mackinaw together that you were 
working too hard and using up too much nervous encrgy."l This 
kucr prOl'CS that Gooth was extreme!\' dcl'otcd to the Univcrsitv 
and to her profess ion. - · 
Booth wns nlso very acti\•e \\'ith the Red Cross. She bccmnc 
in\'ol\'cd by scrYing as lhc head of the Red Cross relief \\'Ork 
when a cyclone hit Mattoon and Charleston in I 916. After this 
incident, when the call for ll"Orkers for tl1e First World War 
sprallg up, Booth jumped nl the chance. She was the only faculty 
member nt Eastern lo sen·cd overseas. Bootl1 \'Olwitccrcd in the 
fall of 1917 and arrived in France on No\·cmbcr 27. She served. 
as a Red Cross Canteen worker in the aviation trnining center m 
lsoudum until Mny 191 &. Her library experience caused her to~ 
transferred to the American LibraJY Association for the rcmnindcr 
of hcr stay. She wns posted to do militnry camp library work in 
P:iris, Chaumont, and Gievres, France, and also in Coblcnz, 
Germany. Booth classified the library al General Pcrshi1g's 
hcndqunrcers and was in charge of the library in the Fcstha lle. 
Coblen7.. Booth returned lo the United Stntcs on Julv 17 19 I 9 . . ' 
and lo Enstcm lhnl Fall.' Booth later conuncmcd on 1J1c n~1iona l 
effort lo send books O\'Crseas in a speech to the Daughters of the 
.American Revolution: 
From one of my letters: One hundred and cichtv-nine 
cases of book-s came into the library tl1is last \~k. and 
we ha\'C all buc about fony unpacked and soncd. Man" 
ca~es have been packed and sent out. I know they uill be 
?Jessie Palmer \\'cbcr, Springficl<f, llli:1cis., to ~.iary J. Booth. Ch:trl:$tOn. 
Jllino:s, 1 7 ()(;1ober 191 1, ?vlary J. Uooth Colfce(k1n. Lro;'.~niity J\r::hi'.'c!I, 8CJO\h 
Library. Et1.stcm lllinoi.s Univetsity? Cha.rlcsto1l Illin{li.li 
'Clvirl-cs H. Colcn1:i.n. £1.r.rf~rn /Hinois Stale College: Fifty ru<trs 0/1'1.blr~ 
Sen•;ce (Sprincflcld, 11., 19;0). l 7 l. 
opprcciotod, for the boys like good American books and 
these nre lhnl kind.' 
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Baoth worked very hard to provide books for the troops She 
sll!l:med up her \'Olwiteer c:qiericncc: "[cJarly in July we n:;ich.xl 
l\<.·w York and the experiences overseas became a memo!)', 
happy in part, sad in part, mingled with a feeling or 1h3nkfulncss 
1hnl I had been permitted to be over there."' Perhaps Booth's 
librarian experience in the war prompted her lacer in her career to 
r~alizc tl1e need for a new library at Eastern. TI1e library 
S)ntboli?.cd n necessary part of the school jusl as it hod been n 
necessary part of the soldier's lives which gave them hope. 
Booth's contributions to the University are another example 
of how dedicmcd she wns in promoting learning amongst the 
sludcnls. Booth published many of her own. works including 
records of books in her library, geoyaphy matcrfol indexes 
()ow'ill1i of Geography), and her Index to Material 011 Plc111re 
Swdy (an index to children's books). She scn1 library information 
booklets out to other uni•'Cl'Sities and correspondence from 
Phineas L Windsor of llte Unh'enity of Illinois Library School 
shows 1hat Mory Booth often sent her publications to other 
schools without charge.• Booth's work was truly her passion. 
Mary Gooth elso contracted to work outside tl1e Uni\'~rsity 
compiling indexes for other organizations and for the Index 
oillcc, a nationnl library categorizing orgnnization. Booth spent 
a month organizing the librnry at the Southwescem Louisiana 
Institute in Lnfoycllc, Louisiana, which increased from 4,000 to 
I 0,000 books to gain membership to the Southern Association of 
Colleges.' During Se\'eral summers, Booth worked as n volunceer 
wilhoul pay al the New York Public Library. Booth gained 
\'alu:1blc cxpcrionce and knowledge of the variety or books 
nvnilable. There is much com:spondcncc of Booth rcqucsliug 
libnL'' materials, sending books back lo tl!eir original schools, 
:Ind discussing the Dewer Decimal system. Her correspondence 
4Mitry J. Booth, •Doot.:s O\'tr Tbcrc,w s:pc:eh lo lht: Oij\JShlm o!' lt( 
Arr.crlca;11 Rt\'Olution, S February l936? t.iary J. Boo!h Collection. 
j!bid. 
\;ok1n11:i~ F!PY >'.:ors o/Sc.,TV;c~. 359~ Phin::a-; L. \\'indsar, Urb:tntt, lHinois 
IC r"ttl~ J. Booth. Chw-lestoa. Illinois, 14 /\pril 1925, f\.1:iry J. Oooth Collc~tio11. 
'.·I111 ,<:1::~da111 I:\'t11lug Rt•r:otdCJr (Nc:'v York). 19 April 1923. 
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shows Booth was in high demand. She was asked to compi le n 
bibliography of poems written about Abe Lincoln for the 
centennial of Lincoln's birth in 1908.1 Booth was, in foci, so well 
kno\\n in the library community that she felt conr.dcnt enough 10 
apply for !he editorship at the 11.W. \Vindsor co~1pany, 3 
prestigious publishing house in New York. 
Among oil 1l1csc examples of Booth's persistence, the biggest 
accomplishment in her life was 01c building of the Mary J. Booth 
Library on Eas1ern's campus. From 1900 lo 1948, the library nt 
Eastern Illinois Stale College increased from 2,500 books to O\'Cr 
67,000 books. The libr~· was localed in Old Main and sprawled 
over six classrooms before the new library was built Books were 
stored in the "tower" which made them highly inaccessible. 
Reading space was also inadequale as the student population rose 
year nflcr year. Jn 1933, limited spnce and a growing student 
body caused 1hc srncks to be closed to sludcncs.~ In the 1930 
Warbler yearbook, Miss Booth ouclincd the type of building that 
was nccdcd.1° Finally, after much insistence on the mnLtcr of 1he 
new librnry, the Illino is Gcncml Assembly appropriated 
$2,0 L0,092 for th~ building and another $80,000 to [urnish it in 
October 1947.11 The hbrary building, named after Booth, \\as 1hc 
first major building erected at Eastern since 1940. An article in 
the Illinois Stale Register said about Booth: "She has 1hc 
distinction of being one of the first li\•in2 wcman academic 
lenders in Illinois for whom n college building was named. "12 
This was quite rm accomplisluuent for a \\'Oman at that rime. 
Mary Booth recei\'cd an honorary Doctor of Literature degree 
from Beloit College on June 5 of the same year as the grand 
opening of the new librnry. When Booth died on January 2, I %5 
at !he age of Sll, the local newspaper produced a lcn£thy tributc.u 
Mory Boo!h's cr:rly contributions 10 the Uni\'crsitv and her 
persistence and dedication were the inspimtion for and prompted 
construction of 01e muc.'1 n::cdcd library facility in use today. 
11lllinoi~ S1:11c J--listt"rical Libra1y1 Springf'itld) Jllinoi~ tt1 ~.1r1ry J. Booth, 
CharlCS:t()l'1, :lliuois, 5 D::cembi:r 1908. f\.Ury J. 13oolh Collection. 
'Co!i:tnttn, Fij:y J"e,rrsq/Serw·c,·, 279. 
"!biol., 28 I 
11Jhid., 277. 
•=11tb1o(J Suire Reg/ster (Spririgfi~ld), 2"2 M1y 1950. 
11Cl:nrl~.rtou c-:1>:trie?r 'i'.'e•'$. 2 JanUJ.t)' 1965. 
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n No\·cmbcr 1954, John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, nod 
se"crnl 01hcr ad\•isors approached President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower aboul proceedini; with a progrnm for a special 
high-performance aircraft possibly t~ be used for reconnaissance. 
They wanted to produce about thirty pl~nes for around . $35 
million. Lockheed had developed, under tight security, a light-
weight plane called the U-2, which could maintain altitude_s over 
60,000 feel for a long period of time. Eisenhower later said i.11ot 
"any le~k of information either al home of abroad could compel 
ab;ndonmcn1 of the c:itirc idea of such a reconnaissance planc."
1 
Th; nnme L:-2 or a utility plnnc, ctooked its reconnaissance 
capabilities. Since the govcmmenl could not deny Ll~e exis_tencc 
of the plnnc, it was said to be used for gathe.nng clunntc 
infonnntion armmd the world. The President approved lhe plan 
bccnuse of 1hc need for intelligence information about the Sovie! 
Union, nnd, consequently Jlights began in 19.56. Pilots from the 
Air Force, including Francis Gary Powers, were chosen based on 
their experience and rigorously trained. 
On I :0-.fay 1960, Powers's plane crashed near Sverdlovsk, 
ncar!y 1,500 mile.s imo the heart or Russ~a, spa.rking a ~sible 
intcmaJionot crisis. TI1e President was mformcd when 1l Wl'.S 
cc11ai11 thnt 1h~ plane was missing. The President was also 1old 
that lhe possibility th~t the pilot li\'Cd was slim to n~nc. I le had 
bcm "nssmcd thal if a plane were to go down 11 \\'ould be 
~u .. , ~st- 1 0 . F.iscriJw-.\·.e;-. The J:1rite HuitJd fc.11'.c tYagiug Pooc-e., J9J6-
/96/ (N.,.,, Yo·~. 1965), 544. 
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shows Booth was in hi~h demand. She was :;sked to compile a 
bibliogrnphy of poem; mitten about Abe Lincoln for the 
centennial of Lincoln's birth in 1908.1 Booth w:is, in foci, so well 
kilo"n in the libra;y cotnmunity thnt she felr confident enough to 
apply for the editorship at the H.W. Windsor company, a 
prestigious publishing h:msc in New York. 
Among all these examples of Booth's persistence, !he biggest 
accomplishment in her life was the building of the Mory J. Booth 
Library on E:islcm's campus. From 1900 to 1948, the librnry nt 
Eas tern Illinois Stme Col!C!,'C incrca.sed from 2,500 books ro O\'cr 
67 ,000 books. The library was located in Old Main and sprawled 
O\•cr six classrooms before the new library was built. Books were 
ste<cd in the "tower• which made tl1cm highly inaccessible. 
Reading space was also inadequate as tl1e student population rose 
year nflcr year. In 19;.3, limited sp~ce and a growing student 
body caused the swcks 10 be closed to s tudcnts.9 In the 1930 
W"rblcr yearbook, Miss Booth outlined !he type of building th3l 
was necdcd.'° Finally, .:fier much ins istence on the matter of the 
new librn.ry, the Illinois General Assembly appropriated 
52,0 I 0,092 for the building and another $S0,000 ro furnish it in 
October 1947.11 The library building, named after Booth, was the 
first major building erected at Eastern since 1940. An article in 
the Illinois St:1tc Register said abouL Booth: "She has the 
dislinction of being one of !he first li\'ing woman academic 
leaders in Illinois for ,·chom a college building was named."" 
This was quite an nccomplishmcnl for a wonrnn at that time. 
Mnry Booth rccci,·cd on honorary Docror or litcrnturc degree 
from Beloit College on June 5 of the same year as the grand 
opening or the new librn:y. '\'hen Booth dic<l on January 2, I 9G5 
nt the age of 88, the local newspaper produced a k n1'lhy tribute." 
Mary Booth's car:y contributions to the Uni,·crsi!y and her 
persistence and dedication wcre the inspirnticn for and prompted 
construction of the much needed library faci lity in use today. 
4Jlliuois S1;a1e H.islorical l ibrary, Sp.ringfii:!d, Illinois 10 f\.1.:;S')· J. Booth, 
Char?cston, Jlliuois, 5 J)~c::nt~r 1908, Mnry J. I kl<Jlh Collection. 
~Cok1nun, f<l[ty }';rr.r.s o/Ser,~ice. 2i9. 
1~biu., 2R I. 
"(hid., 277. 
1t1//11mu Sur:~ Regis1o:r (Sprinsficld), 22 f\iay 1950. 
0 (
0
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n J\O\'Cmbcr 1954, John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and 
sc\'cral other advisors appro3chcd President D\\ight D. 
EiscnhO\\'Cr aboul proceeding \\i th a program for a special 
high-performance aircraft possibly to be used for reconnaissance. 
Thcv wonted to produce about tl1irty planes for aroU11d $35 
million. L-Ockheed had developed, under tight security, a light· 
wcighl plane cnllcd the U:2, wh i~h could maintain a!ritudes over 
60,000 feet for a long period of umc. Eisenhower later said that 
"any ]cal: of information either at home of abroad could compel 
abwdoMlcnl of the entire idea o f such a reconnaissance plane."' 
The mime U-2 or a u\i\ity plane, cloaked its reconnaissance 
capabilities. Since the government could not deny the exis.tence 
of the plane, ir was said lo be used for gathenng clunale 
infom1mio11 armuid the world. The President approved the plan 
because of the need for intelligence infonnalion about the Sov iet 
Union, r.nd, consequently flights began in 1956. Pilots from the 
Air Force, including Francis Gary Powers, were cl1oscn based on 
their experience and rigorously trained. 
On 1 May 1960, Powcrs's pl:uic crashed near Sverdlovsk, 
ncarlv I 500 miles into the hem of Russiti, sparking a possible - ' . 
intcmntional crisis. TI1e President was infonncd when 1t was 
•cnain that the plane was missing . The President was also told 
that the possibility that the pilot lived was slim to none. He had 
been "nssurcd that if a phmc were to go down •t would be 
10 ..... ishl o. F.isc:HhO\\l:C, The fl'11ilc H<r.•Jt r~ar.$; IVi1gt11g P.:a«. 19.54· 
iY6/ (N::w York, 1965), 544. 
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destroyed either in the air or on impact, that proof of e.~pionagc 
would be lacking.'0 
On May 3 NASA issued a s!a!emzn! saying thnt a U-2 
rcs;:~rch plane flying o\·cr Turk-~· on a Air Weather Scr\"icc 
mission had gone do'rn in the Lake Van, Turkey area on Sunday, 
May I. NASA was told to issue this statement, Md really did not 
know about the U-2 p~ogram or what had happened on May I. 
The Soviets did not issue a statement 1m1il May 5, bonsling lhat 
they has shot down a United States reconnaissance plane. At this 
point, !he Presidcnc, upon IJ1e recommendation of his advisors, 
decided to continue lo maintain the co,·cr story sngscsting that 
the pilot had difficulty with his oxygen equipment and moy have 
suayed into So,·iec air space, and that this was the r lnne chat 
Klirushchev an!law1eed hod been shot do\\n. They felt it was 
irnponant to issue a stn'.cmcnt in response to Khrushche\• in order 
to in::iiut:iin the '1cl'edibil i~·" oft11e "explrination."! 
Then, on May 6, Khrushehe\' allllounccd thal the pilot, 
Fr:incis G~ry Powers, was "afi,·e and kicking.• A Stale 
Dcpnrtment stalement acknowledged lhe need for "intclligencc-
collccting acti•itics," b~t more or less still clung to the false cover 
story. The next morning, the President, again upo!I the ad\'ice of 
his aides, issued a Slntcmcnt "ncbnitting the essentia l tnith or lhc 
So,·iet allcgalio11s," :ind accepling full rcsponsibilily~ 
At the Pnris Summit on May 16, Khmshch~v dem:u1ded an 
apology, nn end to all U-2 flights, nnd punishmcnl of the 
respm1siblc pa1tics. Eisenhower hod n!readv said that the Oi i:thts 
would be ended, bm he \\'Otild not apologi~. He did not fc~I it 
wos. ncccssory to "permanently tic 1hc hands of the United Slates 
g0\'en11nen1 for tlie s ngle purpose of sal'ing a conference.• 
Khrushchev refused lo believe that th~ Prcsidcnl w~s behind the 
nights, nnd w~ntcd someone, Dulles or Nixon prcfcrnbly, 
punished for sending 1he U-2 O\-er So\'ict airspace. Khrushchev 
was also dissatisfied \\ith Eisen_~ower's word that the flights 
would not be resumed. De Gnullc, Macmillian, and Eisenhower 
made several nttcmptS to get Khrushche1· lo con:e lo lhc meelings, 
~Ibid,. ~47. 
3Jbid., S49. 
~ Ibid., SSO. 
'Ibid .. 554. 
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but he continued to insist lhal Eisenhower npologiz.c. The 
Summil concluded before it ever re~lly started. 
The U-2 episode poses se\•eral important qucslions: first, 
1111S the decision to slnrt the U-2 program the besl wu~· 10 
O\'Ctcome the problems created by the secrcty of the Sol'ict 
Union? Second, was a night over the Soviet Union so close to 
1hc Paris Summit necessary? Third, was the inilinl co1·cr-up the 
best way to deal with the incident? And founh, could something 
ha1·e been done lo save the Paris Summit? To es1oblish a case, 
this paper \\'ill make use of Eisenhower's memoirs and papers, but 
will also consider Khrushchev's, Powers's, and the mcdi•1's role in 
1hc U-2 incident. 
-{-
\'ins tl1c decision to start the U-2 program the best ahcrnnti\'C 
to cracking 1hc secrecy of the Sol'iet Union? President 
Eisenl1owcr hesitated to have American pilots fly over Soviet 
territory. He knew he had to re5pond to So•ict secrecy. Border 
pilots and spy balloons had been used in the past "iU1 little 
success. Of course, the Americo:is also had spies in the Sovkt 
Cnion. Ycl, informntion from these spies took a long time to 
reach the United States, and invol ved great risks. Eisenliower and 
his advisors snw tl1e need to develop some olhcr way 10 extract 
infonnation from the Sovicl Union. The President was e~tremely 
"intelligence-minded," so the idea of the U-2 appealed to him 
C\'cn though he had serious doubts.6 Eisenhower's advisors noted 
tha1 the Soviets spied from !heir s~tellite, and tl1at technically 
lh ·~rc were no intemational laws against sending planes over other 
countries. Besides, the advisors said, the Soviets would tnkc 
~d,•amagc of this technology if 1hcy had it. T11c President 
approved lite program, but there was always the matter of 
continuing the flights, and tl1e President's ad•isors were quick 
\\ilh reasons why the U-2 htld the best rctom1aissancc 
capabilities. 
Eisenhower felt that a viable altemalivc to the overflights was 
a satell ite. The Soviets had their own satellite which could take 
pie1urcs of the United States. In 1959, aboul lhr~'C years <1ft.cr lhc 
"h.1n.:hncl R. l3cscl1los:1, lvltr,.wlo~v, (N,.":-.•: 't'c-rk. 1986), 3G3. 
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beginning of lhc o,·crllights, Eisenhower sugge.~tcd in a mc~l ing 
that 1he U-2 overfligh11 should be curbed and more nd,·an-:cd 
technology developed to replncc them. One of his nd\'isors 
"poinlcd out that the new equipment will not be a\'ailablc for 
eighteen months to two years."' Thus, the President bclic\'c<l that 
U-2 ovcrflighls were his only option for probably the nc't two 
years. Eisenhower lllso srud that he was hcsilant lo OUlhoriz.e 
more !lights because nothing would make him "declare war mere 
quickly than ' ' iolation of our air space by Soviet nircraft."8 It was 
for those reasons lhat lie President was againsl nn extcnsi"e U-2 
progrnm. Reconnaissance satellites would not 'iolatc anrnne's 
airspace, so Eisenhower felt that "lhe SJtellite rcprcsc1;ts 1hc 
grca1est future in this reconnaissance area.''9 E\·en thoueh 
Eisenhower c~pressed this opinion, his ad\'isors kept insisting ~n 
the importnnce of ca;r:ing out U-2 missions immcdiatclv. 
Eisenhower's ad,·isors took the role of salesmen. To kc,:;p 
business going, 1l1ey htd lo conduce their boss that ii " ·as the 
best course of action. The President could dc,·elop all the 
s~tellites that he wantc:I, as long as he kept approdng the U-2 
flights. 
The President was also hesitant to use the U-2 during Ilic 
continuing Berlin crisis Eisenhower said that "it would be most 
unwise to have world tensions e:rnccrbutcd by our pursuit of a 
prof,'11lm of cxtcnsi\'e reco1maissnnce (lights o\'cr ll1e territory of 
lhe So,ic~ Un ion.'"0 The President had clear concerns about h:)\\ 
1he U-2 would effect international relations in the e\'cnt of a 
mishap. \Vhy "~ th.s not a m~jor concern 10 his nd\'isors? 
Again, they seem only lo be interested in keeping the progrnm 
and lhc information pro\'ided alive. In another meeting 1he 
President worried '"o,-.:r the terrible propaganda imp:1: t that 
would be occasioned if n reconnaissance pfone were to foil."" 
'Mc1ucrandcm For the Kc:ord> 12 FcbrUi!tV 1959. in Gk'lln '·'·' LoFarat::stc, 
ct al., eds .. Forr.·1·~1u Rclati1J11s 0;,,r 1/1~ (in;t.:d Stnt~s. (FRl.IS). Vol X! Pan t, 
f:a:.·t;:n, Eurc>pt! Ri:~fou; So1·i1tl liuion: CJipr11s (\\'us\1in_g:o11, D .C.: U1li1ed S1:1h:S 
Gv•on111><ol P:intins Ollie< 199'.'). 261. 
•1bid., 26 1. 
'lbid., 262. 
''lb<d. 
ttf\1ernot:\ndum ofCon(cn::n::c ''i~ President EiscnhO\\cr, 7 A;r.d 195'>. 
in FRUS, X, I, 2GS. 
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His advisors responded by tell ing the President of 1hc im(lortant 
~ites thnt might ha\-C long-range missile capabilities. Once again, 
1l1e advisors pushed the President's concerns aside. 
The President also considered the Soviet perception of Ilic V-
2 progr:im. The So\icls had detected the O\•ert1ights Vet)' early on 
in the program, and knew about each one even though they could 
do nothing about 1l1em. Each time the Americans sent a U-2 o\-cr 
Sodct territory it led the Soviet leaders to be "more inclined to 
distnist the Americans."" The Soviets felt that the Americans 
surely knew !lie kinds of problems they were causing by sending 
the U-2's over the Soviet Union, but "So\'ict secrecy was so grc~l 
Lhat lhe President, State Department and CfA could not precisely 
gauge the imp~ct of the lli£hts on internal Kremlin politics."" 
\Vhen laboring over the decision of whether to ~ulhorizc 
more nighls, he said thnt the United Slates was "gelling lo the 
point where we must decide if we arc trying to prepare to fight a 
war, or to pre.vcm one."'• In this case, the President decided to go 
ahead with this llight since his advisors provided him with an 
"unanimous recommendation." The advisors once again had 
powerful influence over the President's better judgement. 
Al1J1ough several of tl1csc examples did not dcul specifically 
with the vc1y beginnings of the U-2 progra.m, they were iniportant 
facto~s when considering the continuance of the program. In each 
case the President's advisors played nn important role in the 
decision making process. 
-!I-
Wns a flight over the Soviet Union so close to the Paris 
Summit ncccss!lry? The United Staces and the Soviet lJnioa had 
b~n cnjO)ing what had been dubbed the '"Spirit of Camp Oa\'id." 
In 1959, Khrushchev hod visited the United States and had made 
some serious progress in negotinling with President Eisenhower. 
It "as during this visit that Khrushchev agrc..>d to a Summit to be 
held lhc following sprini:; in Paris to be attended by the SO\~et 
JOI. 
1 :BC$Chloss. l11/nyd:Jy. 36S. 
"Ibid. 
"J..,!cntotmdu1n ofConfcreucc "i:h Piesid'<1t1 Ets.-:100,1.1tr. i.:i FRt:S.X. J. 
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Unicn, lhc United Stai.cs, Frallce, and Great Britain. Both 
Eisenho\\·er and Khrushd1c\• hod been looking forward to funhcr 
negotiations in Paris. The "Spiril of Camp Dal'id" ended wi(h the 
dom1ing of the U-2 en I May I 960, just before the Summil 
opened. 
U-2 missions had been canceled when Eisenhower felt the 
international situation too lcnsc. He had previously considered 
"whether t}1c intelligence which we re.ceive from this source is 
worth tl1e e.xt1ccrbation of international tension that results."" For 
example, the President had cnncc!cd flights >Vhcn 1hcre was 
problems with the Suez Canul ond Berlin bcGausc he was afra id 
thut the flights would ch'.ll the Cold War. 
Another example of this policy of canceling nights when the 
international situation was tcnsc was a meeting b.:twccn the 
President and his advisors on 7 April 1959. He had scheduled the 
meeting to 1cll them ihat he was not going to appro\'c ccrtnin 
01·erfiigh1s. Eisc11ho\\'er ga\'c several rcosons for this decision: 
first, we now ha\'e the power lo dcslrov the Soi ic1s 
1"ithout need for dctailc<l targedng; second, as the world 
is going now, there seems no hope for the future unless 
we can make some proi,'Tcss in negotiation; 1.hird, we 
cannot in the present circumstances afford the re\'Ulsion 
of world opinion zgainsl the United Stales thJI might 
occur- the U.S. being the only nation that could conduce 
this acti\'ity; and fourth , we are pulling sc1·ernl hundred 
million dollors imo proi,'mnlS for more advnnccd 
copabilities.16 
Overall, the President folt that the U-2 program could potcntin lly 
be a poli1ical problem worldwide. 
Aud yet he rcYcrscd his decision and outhori7.ed the M av 
flights. Secretary of State Herter, Secretary of Defense Gntc;, 
CIA Director Dulles, and Chainnon of the Joint Chiefs T11inin2 
" all argued th:11 the flights were important; information on a first 
Soviet IC13M and other targets might be impossible to get until 
" lks<hloss.MoJdcy, :)&S. 
1°"1'.1.¢1T10T:!ndu1n or (()nfCrcrtcc \Vilh PresiJ~nt 1!1sc1,hO\\'tf1? A1wil 1959. 
in l"!WS. X, I, 26~. 
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n1011ths after May 1960."" The advisors pointed to "technical 
fnctors" for the timing of the flight such as the nnglc of the sun's 
rays and the \\'Cather." They pointed 0111 that the intelligence 
infonnation the flights provided was invaluable, and without this 
infornmtion the military would ha'-c lO be put on alert since the 
United Stoles ll'OUld have to be ready for a surprise attack m all 
1in1cs, something which the U-2 flights could warn against. 
Besides, one advisor asserted. "the intelligence objective i11 bis 
,-icw ou1weighs the danger of getting trapped."" The President 
c1·en fell confident .. wit.Ji a record of many successful flights 
behind us," and perhaps because of th~ success of other missions 
1hcv hml become careless in proposing future Oights.20 Besides, 
Eiscnho,\··c.r felt no reason to go against his advisors who were so 
confident in Lhe program. Bui. his advisors foiled to mention the 
U-2 Oight over J:ipan tlialhad crash landed in Scptcmlxr of 1959. 
There were al>o problems with other planes in Japan, one of 
which, mUllbcr 360, was transferred Lo Turkey just in time for 
Powers's May l flight." 
This pIO\'CS historian Michael Beschloss 's argument that 
Ll1erc was a "fatnl weakness in the system Eisenhower had created 
to monag,~. the U-2 program." Eisenhower had taken the main 
role in assessing the importance of each flight and the possible 
consequences in the event of a mishap. Almost all of 
Eisenhower· s advisors ~had a stake in prcssins for flights." In 
olmosl all c:iscs, Eisenhower was the only one to discuss the 
down side lo c:rch flight, willi his advisors assuring him that he 
had nothing to \\'Oil)' about. The advisors feared that if the 
Prcsidcm 3nd Khrushchev come to some sort of agreement at 
Paris thar Eisenhower "might not approve a flight into tlw So\·ict 
Union again, causing an intelligence blackout until spy satellites 
were in full opera1ion." Thus, the President's advisors had other 
"llcschloss .. llay:fay, 370. 
11~.1t:1norandJJ 1 1t of Dis.eussion flt the 445111 !vlcc:ting of the Niu101i.al 
Security Co1Jacil, 24 f\111y 1960, in FROS, X: 1 ~ 525. 
1'1'.1e1n<lratl<h11n orcont'Crcncc wi1h Prcsi:lent EisenhO\\'Cr. 8 July 14J.S9. in 
F?.US, X, l, 306. 
~isi:nh~~'tr. Ul;ire H<r.1.1t Y~ars, S47. 
11 Francis G:'i··y Po\\'\:rl, Opera1;on Ch·eef!i"ghl: 7/t~ U·1 Spy />;fo,• Tt1ll.t Hi's 
Srn,:•1,/i;r t;'ri: Jo''i'rsi Tnuc. (NC\.V 'lo1ic, 1970)~ 7G. 
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priorities, namely saving lhcir belo,·cd U-2 progrnm, and because 
of this their recommcnc!a!ions were not alwa\'s sound'-' 
As for lhc liming of the U-2 flights in the-spring of l 960, "the 
Prcsiden l said that !here was no good lime for foilurc:•:l This 
was a differenl nltiludc than Lhe vcnr bei'ore when the Presiden1 
questioned !he liming of Oighls in-relation to inlcmnlional e\'cnts. 
Also, !here had been a flight in April 1960, so another flight that 
spring seemed out of place."' The Prcsidcnl's advisors were so 
enthusiastic aboul the flight lhat !he President fell he hnd no 
choice but lo agree. But Eisenhower had !he final say, and he had 
refused lo nuthori7.e Oights in the past. 
\i,11at if Eisenhower bad consulted olhcr ad\'isors? Would Lhe 
fligl11s have been rcswned? The President could ha,·e consuhcd 
seYcrnl specialists in So,ict affairs, and they might ha .... e ~d,•iscd 
him that "resuming lhc U-2 fl ighls in the spring of 1960 mighl 
send \1oscow;; hostile signal he did not mean." Bui lhc Prcsidcn1 
could only consul! lhc sdect fc" who h~d knO\m of the program 
frcm the vc1y beginning. TI1e secrecy of the progrruu might h:l\·c 
been lhc problem whe11 mnkinr; the decision nbout the spring 
1960 nights.~ The So\'icls had kuo\\n about the fliehts for some 
tii:ie, and they had, as Nikita Khrushd1c\' once pul it, •protested 
its violations of our airspace, bul each time th~ U.S. brushed our 
protesl nside, snying 110ne of their plJncs were overflying our 
tcrrito1y."" The President look pride in lhe way he handled his 
foreign policy, his ''institulionnl dccision-m:1ki11g, understanding 
his rivals' poinl of \'icw and relating wctics to strntci,,')'o" bul lhcsc 
policies "foiled him in his decision to resume the U-2 flights."" 
- 111-
Was the initial cover-up the best w:iy to deal witl1 Ilic 
incident? The President said that !he 'big error we made was, of 
:13esc.:11!0:1s, .'t..fayday, 370. 
?l:..fcmor,..ildum of Cc11f::;:.!ncx \\ilh President l:tSCtlJlO\\'Cf, 8 It1I~ 1959, 
FRt:S~ X, I, S2J. 
i-IBe~<.:hk-..~s , A11ryday, 370. 
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course, in the issuance of n premature and erroneous CO\'er story." 
Allowing himself to be persuaded on 1his issue was his "principal 
pcrsond rcgrel~xccpl for the U-2 failure ilSClf-rcgarding the 
whole affair. ""' The Presidcnl had voiced his opinion that he did 
nol wan! to issue 1he immediate cover story. 
Eisenhower's advisors had told him, however, over and over 
1hal if a plane went dO\\U the United States had nothing to worry 
about because the Soviets would not admil chat it had happened. 
KJ1rushchc\' might be "unwilling lo admil that United Stales 
planes had been for years penetrating deep into his territory," and 
"suppress the focls. "" The !'resident's ad\'iSors assured him thnt 
it would embarrass !11e Soviets for loo much to reveal lhat a plane 
had gone down. 
Eis~nhower had also been told lhal the plane would be 
destroyed if it we~.t do\\n, and the dcstruclivc ch:irgc would 
eliminate proof of espionage. Based on tl1esc two assumptions 
from his advisors, Eisenhower agreed to issue the NASA 
statement without knowing of any reaction from " itl1in the Soviet 
Uruon. Mis advisors had been \\TOng on bolh accounts, though, 
because on May 5 Khrushchev announced that they hoid downed 
a plane over Soviet tcrrito1y. The Prcsidem's advisors wanted to 
issue an immediate stalemenl, but the President himself "voiced 
serious doubts." His suggestion was to "remain silem unlil we 
knew what Khrushchev's follow-up was to be. "30 His aides 
a:gued that !hey must make an immediaic Statement so !hat the 
initinl cover story did nol lose credibility. IL was upon this 
uuani rnous reconuncndntion of his advisors lhat Eisenhower 
agreed lo issue !he nc.xt cover story. This once again proves the 
innucnec that the Presidenl's advisors had on dictating policy. 
Eisenhower was astonished when Khmshchev nnnounced on 
Moy G that the pilol was alive. Eisenhower had "no system lo 
show him Lie full range of options and contingencies," and 
because of this he had "hastily approved the false CO\'er slory" 
lhat caused so nHUJ)' problems.l1 The President and his advisors 
now had no choice but to admil to engaging in espionage 
:.iEiscnhO\\'cr, lf-11i!;r /(011s;; l'ears. SSH. 
'~!:id .. 547. 
»ciscnho\\-.:r. lf1dr.e /focue Ytt:rs. S49. 
11lle?>Chloss, ~1nya'3y1 372. 
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actil'l[ies and reveal the essenti al truth. Had the o~iginal co,·cr 
story nol bc<:n issued, the President nnd his advisors could ha\'c 
dealt with the s ituntion in a much more infom1cd manner. 
The.fatal wenki1ess in the process for which the U-2 proi,'Tnm 
\l'llS managed comes out again \li1en dealing with the co•·cr ston·. 
The President suffered "from the c:->clusi»e, ad hoc procedure l~e 
had fashioned to run fac U-2 progrnm."" If the Prcsidcm had 
been able to consult with ad\·isors other than those "ho were so 
close to the U-2 progrnm, such as an e:->pert on the Soviet Union, 
he might ha\·e acted di ffcrcmly in the davs immcdint~lv followin2 
the do"ning of the plane. The secrecy o"r the program· would not 
allow Eisenhower to ccnsult outside sources, tl1ough, so he was 
forced to act upon the unanimous rccommcndutio~s of his 
advisors even if that meant ignoring his own instincts. Powers 
wns astonished when sho\\·n the cover ston• in n United Stntes 
newspaper. He was held in a Soviet prison ~nd being questioned 
rigorously. He said that he bad bocn given no formal training 0:1 
what to do if captured, or any infom1ation on whm kind of a oo•·cr 
story would be issued. Eisenhower's advisors said that Powers 
hnd been "told to reveal whatever he himself knew, includine the 
foct that he worked for the CJA."'l -
The President could have "cut his losses a~d told 1hc world 
the truth" afler tl1e initial NASA slaten:cnt and before 
Khrushchev a1U1ounccd that the pilot wns alive. This would ha,·e 
restored his cred ibility, und he hnd reason to belic1·e that this \Yas 
the right thing to do. On Mny 5, after the NASA stmcmcm nnd 
nOcr Khrushchev had announced thot o plane hod been downed 
over Soviet territory, the President rcceh•ed a telcgr~m from the 
United States Ambass3:1or in Moscow, LlcwcUyn E Thompson. 
Thompson hnd m·erhea-d Deputy Foreign Minister Jncob Ma lik 
te ll someone nl a function thnt night that ''tltcv were still 
questioning the pilot who had parnchutcd to snfclv. :,,., Herc the 
I'r.csidcnt bad evidence that there "as a possibility ll•c pilot was 
nl11·e, and yet he still agrrod to continue with the CO\'cr storv. 
Eisenhower had the ch;i.nce to tnkc ad•i~-c from n so11rc: oth~r 
'!ibid. 
''Mr1norandum or Cor.t<:rcll~C \\'itli l>rt.illidi:nt Ei.s~nh0\\1et, 8 JUl\I 1959, 
FRUS.X, l, 5:?5. " 
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QttQIC(f from tcfe~1n 2715 fro:n Art'l~s.s~dor Thomp,;cir. 10 Dcp11rt1ncoc 
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than his close ad,isors and he chose to ignore it. Thompson's 
telegram should have been the red Oas when considering what 
n1o•'C 10 make, but il was not. This mistnke was by f.1r Ilic most 
critical in the whole affair. 
Even afrer Khrushch~-v had revealed that the pilot was olive, 
the ad•·isors d<:eidcd tl1ot it would not be best to involve tl:e 
President in the program directly. The statement gave a more 
truthful version than the previous two statements, but only said 
that the "pilot hnd 'probably' invaded Sovicl airspace but thm the 
I1.ighl had not been oulhori7.ed by Washington.'"; This Stotement 
shocked Powc,-s since he waited in his plane for nearly thirty 
minu1es for "approval from the White House."" By not admitting 
that Eisenhower hnd control over the flight "ignited dte 
international scare that some Americnn ofticer could start a war 
without the President's knowledge."" Now Eisenhower had put 
himself in the position where he had to accept responsibility for 
the night. 
This finsco with the cover stories led the Americnn people 
mid press to be incrcasinglr distrustful of their goYemment 
Some Americans were proud that their country could handle such 
n secret operntion for so long without being discovered, but others 
feared that this might start a war.'• Eisenhower made a prime-
time s~h on television several d~ys after the tmth came out in 
order lO infomt the Amcric;in people about the U-2 proi,'Tam and 
talk about the events of the previous days. \!.'hat if the American 
people had been told about the program back when it started? 
Ce1tainly the Soviets hnd known about it for almost tl1nt long, and 
if they already knew about it then there was no renson why the 
American people could not have known about it as well. If this 
had been the case, if the Eisenhower administration hnd been 
truthCul from the very beginning, tl1en the false cover story would 
not have been needed. The people knew that the U-2 w:is used 
for gathering weather infommtion, and being good Cold Warriors, 
they might have ovcn,hclmingly approved of the flights over 
Russia. The American people would ha\'e been disappointed that 
J>acselt!oss,.\·la.rd,-,y, 373. 
141)0\\'el'S, 6per1t:lo,1, 7$. 
''Bcschloss., ."1-fuyd".''• 373. 
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the plane had been sh ~t down, but al least thcv would have 
kno1111 that ihcir govemmcnt had been hone~t with ihcm. 
- IV-
Could something have been done lo save the Pnris Su11UTiil? 
Khrushchev had gone to Paris corly hopi ng that Eisenhower 
would do the snmc so they could talk privately. Eisenhower did 
not come until the day before the meetings were supposed to start, 
and by thnl time Kluushchcv had decided lo make three demands: 
the U.S. must public!~, apo!ogizc, promise r~,·er to send nights 
0\'Cr the So\·icl l!nio~ again, and pLU1ish those rt:Sponsib!c. 
Eisenhower had already stopped the tlights, but refused lo 
apolosi1.e. 
Eisenhower wondered why KJ1rushchev had no'. said an~thing 
about the fiigh~s at Camp David the year before \\i1cn relations 
were good. What Khrushchev did sav was that he was cuttino •. . :;:i 
back his o"n espionage against the United States, and he 
presumed that whcn lhe flighlS Slopped for a time after the CUmp 
Dnvid meetings that 1he Americans had curtailed their espionage 
as well. So when the flightnvcrc resumed in the spring of 1960, 
Klut1shchcv thought this was a sign that relations " ere turning for 
1hc worse. Khru~hcl1c,· now felt that Americans were "followin~ 
o two-faced policy" sin:e they were so friendly al C11mp D1wid 
but were now sending more U-2's over Russia." 
Khrushcl1C\' might ha\•e been C.'<ploiting the U-2 nffoir for his 
om1 reasons. In a telcb'Tam, Ambassador Thompson said that 
"Khrushchev is ha,i ng some intcmcl difficulties and this incident 
affords him a com·enient di\·ersion.'"'0 Eisenhower's add sors 
mention several rcnsons why Khrushchev would wanl to cxploil 
the incident: 
Hrst, deep com·1cuon, which appears common among 
So'iet leaders, 1J1atsecrecy is a major asset of the USSR: 
second, anxiety with respecl to any violation of Soviet 
''Khru.shcht''.', Klu·u:rl1ckcl' i lNuenrbcrs, SI J. 
" Telegram fm1n the 1!1111'.lssy in the SO\'icl Un)on ~o thi: Ocpartm: nl of 
~"41C, 7 ~i.ty 1960, in FRIJS,X. 1: 515. 
tcrrilO<Y; third, the possibility Lhat the Soviet military 
hierarchy was unh3ppy over the demobilization measures 
recently announced by Khrushchev nnd hns conscq11ently 
insisted that Kl1rushchev taken strong stand in the pl:ine 
case: and fourth, a possible desire to embarrass the 
Prcsiccnt :?t tlte outset of the Summit Conference. 41 
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Economic diflicultics, opposition to Khrushchev's policy of 
rcloxn1ion, and 1\ poli tical power struggle were also influences on 
1he Soviets at this time. 
Klirushchev himself did not feel these factors inOucne<:d his 
dc<isions in Paris. He hoped that there would be an agreement 
reached al Paris up to the time the U-2 was dO\med. Khrushchev 
said that he decided on the plane Paris there could be no 
agreement at the Summit because the "Americans had 
deliberately tried to place a lime bomb under the meeting," and 
hence the ronference "was doomed before it began."'' 
Khmshchc\' points to U1e role of Eisenhower's advisors. 
Khrushchev notes that the President wanted to apologize, but thar 
one of his advisors said no "in such a way, with such a grimace 
on his foce, that he lcfl no room for argument on the issue.""' 
Khrushchc,· even said that the President "let himself be pushed 
arocnd by his Secretaries of State, first Dulles and now Herter.•••' 
The British n:id the French supported the Cniled Stales at 
Paris rin<l were e\·en somcwh3l disgusted al the way Khrushchev 
lrnndlcd C\'Cills. Both dclegadons, I.hough, admiuing the U-2 
flight was ill-timed, noted that President Eisenhower ndmiucd 
that he had made a mistake. Charles de Gaulle informed the 
Soviets on May 16, that, considering that the U-2 was shot dO\m 
on May I, they had time lo make amends wi~1 the United States 
or they should have "let il be known that he [Khrushchev) would 
110 1 be coming to the conference."45 Both the British and the 
F rcnch nsreed thnt the Soviets needed to come to terms with what 
11Mcnau:,;r.cfu1n o( the .Discussion a1 the 44-41h ).fec1in~ of Ilic N:1ionotl 
Scouri1y Cooncil. 9 May t960, in FRUS, X, 1. S 18. • 
•:Khru.shche\', J:lrrttslrcltl!I! R~ntenrbers, 4S 1. 
''lb :~ . .'15-1. 
4 11bid .. 455. 
•:cha1lcs d~ Geulle. /.fc.,11(1f"rs a)- Hop~: R~.n•nrn! and Ent!~a\'01' (Ncvv 
Y""-, IY70), J51. 
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had happened . • LI.Cler all, espionage was not unique to the U11it~<l 
Stales, so in th:ol se.nse the Soviets had nothing to compl;1in about. 
The American public reacted badly to the events in f'nris. 
After the President retuned from Paris, he went on a lour of the 
Pacific, nnd found the 01·ersc<1S reaction to his recent foreign 
policy was also negative. Thus, Eisenhower left office on a sour 
note. Had he not been so distrustful of pub!lc opinion, he could 
hnYc p:c1•ented the cycnts in May 1960 from heightening the 
Cold War. Eisenhower did not want the American public's hope 
for peace nt Paris to inOucnce his decisions there so [,'!"Cally that 
he would ha1·e appeared "to ha1•e been taken in by the Russians." 
This wa~ J flaw of his "hidden-hand leadership.• Without 
inl'oh·ing the public, his foreign policy seemed weak. 
Eisenhower could hnvc prevented this perception by ha\·ing the 
backing of Arucric~n public opinion integrated in his policy:• 
Eisenhower's decision-making process before nnd after the U-2 incident wns not entirely cffccti\'e. Tbcre are n number of 
e.xamplcs that show his advisors' opinions !~king precedence. Nol 
only is this not th<: best way to make deci.sions about any policy, 
it certainly is not the best way to mnkc decisions nbout a \'ital 
security and diplomatic issue. The President himself seemed to 
ha1·e the right idea about what should ha,·c been done: dc\'clop 
other methods of infonnation gathering, curb !lights during 
critical imcn1ational periods, wait for a respon.sc from the Sovicls 
before issuing n false cover story, and apologize to the Soviets 10 
Sa\'c the Paris Sununit. His advisors frowned upon these idcns, 
and tossed them aside. The role of tloc An~:rican public was also 
marginalized, but this 11as the President's fault for no: trnsting in 
the people he was leading. This U-2 incident wns a tuming point 
in the way the Amcricou people and media Yicwcd the President 
of U1e United States. Am::ricans were incr~singly distrustful of 
presidents, staning \\i t!: lhc false t.:-2 story and continuing with 
events like \Vntcrgnte and Vietnam. 
Eisenhower on!y regret that the false corer stoiy had been 
issued, but ns far as Inc U-2 progrnm was concerned he did not 
think that he would make any <kcisions diifercnUy, "gi1·cn the 
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5a111~ set of facts as the}' confronted us at th: time ."" The 
information gathered from the !lights had pr·ovcd invaluable. 
Eisenhower, looking back, thought tlrnt U1e Pnris Summit 
probobly would have been a failure e\·cn if it had nol been for the 
U-2 because nothing would haYc been acccmplished except 
bringing the world "further disill usionrnent."'8 Besides, 
Khn1shcbcv had known about the nights for some time and only 
now had made a fuss about them. This led Ei senhower to belic1·c 
that KJ1rushchc\ was only using this as an excuse to \'.Teck the 
Summit bcc11usc he had other issues prcssiI1g nt homc.'9 
0Ycrilll, it was the President who had U1e fimol say in Ilic 
course or e\·e~ts. He may ha,·c been inOuenced by his ad1isors, 
bui he still could have halted events. The problem was that he did 
not. He !cl his advisors intluencc his final decision, and his 
excuse was that since they ai,>rccd unanimously thnL he would go 
~loni,: "ith it. T11is decision showed bad judgement on 
Eisenhower's p~rt. lf Eisenhower had the backbone to st~nd up 
for whm he thought was right, then the U-2 incident might noL 
lm\'C been "n supreme hwuilinlion for Eisenhowcr.''10 
1 E~hO\\~f, 111:ito: Fto11.u Yirar.t, 558. 
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Wilh the capture of control of the United Stnlcs Congress. Republicans made history in 1994. f'or the first time in more than forty years the Rcpublicnn~ had 
control of bo1h houses of Congress. The new Republicnn 
ConL'TCSS had a decis ivclv comcrvalivc fl avor. \\ilh auacks on 1hc 
lib:;.;l social progrnms ~nd calls for limiting. federal power over 
the stales. But 1he conservatism that climbed into Cong.rcssional 
leadership did not always possess such influence. In fnct, there 
wa.5 a time when conscr,·atism was thought lo be inlcllccrually 
dead, or at least catalonic. Between 1946 and 1996 Am~-rican 
co1t5cn•atism rose from a beleaguered remnant 10 1hc holls of 
Congress and widcsrread popularity. The rise of this 
conscr\'atism can be laid al the feet of Ilic changes in American 
society thm hn\'c lnkcn place in 1he last fifiy yo:irs 011d on the 
heads of n liberalism that failed to respond adequately to the 
conOicts and complexities created by these socin l and ceonomic 
changes. 
Arri,·ing al a definition of conservatism is not an cnsy iosk, 
for 1he word mcnns mnny different lhings to different people. In 
man\• books and nrtielcs. conscr•:ath·es and others ha,·c tried to 
dcfi~c the 1cm1 and themse lves. Ddinilions varied rc1e< 
Wilonski, Ill his "lnlrod'uclion to the Wisdom of Conscr,·oti\'cs," 
~greed lhal conscn mism did not ha,·e a fixed mc:ining, but added 
to the confusion by insisting that conse.n atism was not an 
ideology but inslcad a "style of 1hinkiug."1 G1.-orgc Nnsh 
1Pctcr \Vitonski, ~ntroJuc.tinn lo the \Visdo1n of Cor.~1vu1is.-n:· in 
l··iewpoi11ti: 111tt CC,t$ef'v<Hiv .. ~ A !1e.n111.'i\'e, c:d. Ou\'iJ U.n.1dnoy (Y1inoc~JpOl is. 
1973), 15. 
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presented the simrlcst definition. Ile identified post-World War 
Two conservatism "ns rcs isrnnce to certain forces per.;;c1vc:l to be 
!cf1ist, rcvolutionnry, and profotmdly subversive of what 
cons;:rvati,·cs nl 1he time deemed \\-Orth cherishing, defending, 
and perhaps dying for.'" . . .. 
Although American conservatism shared many sm11l:1r11u:s 
and idc~s \\ith European conservatism, the two were not the 
same. In Co11scrva1/.w1 in Amerk'a. historian Clinton Rossiter 
slated 1hat there were three general difierences between American 
and European conservatism. TI1e former was clearly more 
optimistic about the nature of man, the uses of reason, lhc 
possibilities of pro(,'!CSS, and the prospects of dcmo~racy. Also, 
American conservatism was clearly more matenahslic because 
much more of it is based on economics instead of ethics or 
politics. Finally, the kind of conservmism extant in the United 
States was clearly more i11dividualistic because it relied less on 
1hc primacy of society nnd the state.' 
Nash described lhc slate of conservatism in 19<15 as such: "In 
1945 uo articulate, coordi.nated, self-consciously conservative 
intellectual force ~cd in the United States... In 1945 
'c;:msCT\·atism' was nol a popular word in America, and its 
spokesmen were without much influence in their native land."' 
There were scverJI reasons for the weakness of conservatism 
during this time period. The chief rcaso•l was thnl there \\11s no 
ck;;r bod\' of co!lsen•alive doctrine. Its detraclors saw 
conscrva1i;m as almost cxclusi\'cly a reaction against Roosel'clt 
and the New Dcnl. s These were the very programs nnd lenders 
which were seen as victorious over the Depression und the 
Second World War. During the Depression and the war, the 
l<!deral gO\'cmment increased its role in the economy and society 
so that by 1945 the reactions and cries of conscrrntism sccmod 
out of place and out of step with the times to the m~jori ty of 
A . - .mcncans. 
;(icorgc H. NI.Sh. Tit~ l""'u~n:ative buelle..-tual .\(owtn~ul h1 A111erico 
Sinev1 i 945 (N::\\' York, 1976}. xii. 
!Cltn1on Ros$ilcr, C(;n.<oer.-a/1".J·ru in A,Hi?rfca; 11;~ Tltc11Hlc.u ParSlllJ.'flOn, 
2d ed. (New Yo:~. t962), 20!. 
•Ni:t$h, Curt:i-''nrt1i'h •<• }11t\•ilect!1nl ,\·!0·1,·~nwnr~ xii-vx. 
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lf conserv~usm was in such low reg.ird :md seemingly \ 'Cl)' 
unpopular. what happ-:ncd in the course of fifty years to resurrect 
lhc movement? ~spite the bleak outlook in l945, there were 
people who committed themselves to rallying the conservati,·e 
cause, but they \\'Crc isolated nnd Jacked an inte.llectual voice in 
societv. h is ironic that one of the first ,-oiccs to sneak oul for the 
conse;....ati\·e cause in America was Friedrich ;.on Jfo1·ck an . ' 
Austrian professor who had immigrated 1.0 Britain in the 1930's 
nnd was an early antifascist. In his 1944 book The Road 10 
Se~fi:lom, Hayek argued that "the rise of f.1scis111 and Nazism was 
not a reaction against the socialist trends or the preceding period 
but a n·:ccssa1y outcome or those tendencics."6 1l1is connection 
bctwocn Nazism nnd socialism was importnnl because it sa\'e 
American conscrYati\·es a clcnr response to the charge that 
fascism ~nd N:izism bnd been brou,ght imo power by the 
frishtcned business class. The book allo\\cd the conservative 
mo\'ement to escape from the charge that it had much in common 
with fascism and Nnzism, and the book ~a\'c 11 strono - "' philoscphicnl basis for their support. of the \\'nr.' 
The Road IO Sc1fdom became \'cry popular in the United 
States. Hayck's thesis for the book was simple: "[p]lannins leads 
to diclntorship," and "the direction of economic acti,·itY" would 
incvilnbly neccssitntc the "suppression of freedom. "" The book 
bccJrne a conlrO\'c.rsial bestseller in Amcricu. It offered the 
cousen ·ati\'cs a vibrant new weapon to auack the New D.:ul r.nd 
the planning structures of the war effort. Liberals stronolv 
"'· opposed the book since it nttacked the 1·cn· successes and 
triumphs which they had achieved in the prcl'iou; twel\'C years. 
Hayck's book fit into the first of three categories of 
conservatism established by Nash: "libcrtnriun" or "frcc·m~rket" 
conscn·atism. TI1is branch was mainly concerned 11i1h limiting 
the role of the stale in the cconomv and sociclv. These 
conservati,·cs were especially concem~d with the .growth of 
iQuut:J in >:cast., Cous-..J""Mtf,·e /ru~u~~.'lta! .'.·fm"n,1rn1
1 
6. 
'Dlonni::.11 11y Arnerf,(lns l/a!~ Polilic.<o, I 52-3. 
'Na$h, (~011$('1'\'Y) tb>e b1rel!ec:unl Afcn'L•nienl, S. 
po"·cr in the exccuti"e branch an<l thc gr:o111h of slntism, which 
1hcv connected lO socialism and communism. Though Ha1·ck , . 
him~clr did not agree with the total free-market or the pure 
faissc?.·foirc idea, his book gave much intellectual force to the 
tNlicf.~ of the libertarian braoch of conscr\'atism. Other examples 
or early libertarian writers were Hayek's mentors, Ludwig von 
\1iscs and Albert Jay Nock, whose best known book was Our 
Enemy, the S;me. Libertarian and individualistic thought wns 
also sprc.ad through joum:ils such as The Freeman and A11alysis 
and by organizations such as the Foundation for Economic 
EducJtion and the Intercollq,>iatc Society of Individualists. 
The rcvi•:al of conservatism i;lid not limit itself to the 
indil'idualists and libertarians. The postwar period also witnessed 
the b'l'O\\th of two other branches: traditionalism and anti· 
Communism. The "new eonscrvati•·e" or traditional br~nch of 
conservntism looked bock at the destruction and d~solation 
caused by the war and questioned the modem society. Richard 
Wca1·er and Russel Kirk were two early proponents of this fom1 
of c-0nscn-atism. Both looked into history to explain the 
problems of mnn. Kirk argued that America did indeed ha1·e a 
consCITa!ivc tradition und that it defined the American 
experience. Kirk enhanced the philosophy of non-American 
Ed.rmu1d Burke, but also traced conservatism through fi&'l1rcs such 
as John Randolph, John Adams, John C. Calhoun, and Henry 
Adams. Both Weaver and Kirk argued that there were 
fundnmcntnl, unch~ngeable truths or principles in the world. 
They saw modernism and ethical relativism as dangers 10 
r i1·ilization a:id were even wicomfortable 11ith democracy and 
to:ally free markets. The traditionalists emphasized l'altRs, 
communit;, and self-discipline over profits, pure individualism, 
and constunerism. Mnny viewed capitalism as n possible threat 
lo the community. 
The third ~chool of eonscn·ati\•e thought-anti-Communism-
was main\y made up of people who had in early years been 
rn t1uenccd by or involved in lefiist organizations and had come 
to repudiate those earlv beliefs ru1d associations. TI1e anti· 
Comniunisls fa\'orcd an ir1ten ,entio11ist type of foreign policy nnd 
>poke about rolling back Ilic gains made by Communism. 111csc 
co~scrvati•:es allackcd Harty Tnmrnn's containment policy as 
coslly and cowardly. Their crusading spirit c;i111c from c.x· 
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communists, who supplied much energy and %Cal and hcl pc<l the 
Right to acquire a forvcnl mass following for !he first lime in 
years.? 
The diffcrwc::s among !he lhrcc schools were obvious lo both 
liberals and conse£Valivcs, and in the l 950:; a mo,·cmcnt started 
to bring the three togclber. This mo,·emcnt searched for a 
~ing journal that would be able to spread the conservalive 
m:ssage lo new converts and establish a sense of unitv or 
community among the three schools or conservatism. F~r n 
while, many hoped that J7ie Freemmr could be lite unifying voice 
of ccnscrvntism lml "hen it was sold and the cdilorship iumcd 
over to F rnnk Chodoro,·, a near an arch isl, the call for a new 
jounrnl increased. 
Into this qcuum moved William F. Buckley, Jr., who 
four.dcd the Na:iona! Uevlew in 1955. The !1'01!0110! Review was 
w.::ekly nml aimed at a wide audience. Buckley saw the purpose 
of this nc\\' journal ns not only to renew the allnck ngainst the Left 
but to consolidote the R.ight. Although the ediLol'ial board was 
made up n wide range of conser,·ative thinkers. the new joumal 
was stridently nnli-Commw1ist 111e new journal nllowcd for !he 
discussion of ideas while cmphnsiiing the unity of the movement 
Sine~ the joumal was the only weekly a\'0\1'cd conservati ve 
magazine for a long time lo come, it became indispcnsablc co the 
Rii;!:l. Without such a similar journal, there would 1101 hn\'c b::cn 
a coh·:sive inlcllecllrnl force on the Righi in the J %Os and 
1970s.'0 
Nol ouly did the National Review promote conservali,·c unity, 
ii also acted as a lester of onl1odoi.y. Through ics ericieism of 
arch indi,·idualist Peter Viereck, J\,11 Rand. and the radical 
libmarians, the journal tried co cst;blish a ~ohcrcnl vision of 
conscr•atism. The fusionist consensus built bv the Nc.1/01wl 
l<eview !)rO\'Cd durable and lasted through 10 the 1990s. ' ' 
"N~sh, Cans;:n•,11f1•e /nt~l/l{c/ual ,\fo11enu•ut, 129~ 
'"lb:d. , I ;3, 
0 Dionrc:, llatot Po.'ilic.s, 166. 
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If the 1950s, howcvcr, began the molding of new 
conS(.·rvati,·c thought, it did no! appear to be the beginning of new 
conservatism practice. In 1947, historian Arthur Schlesinger 
called for i1 new policies of freedom in his book The Vital Center. 
Schlesinger su·css;d his belief in liberalism and Ke:-11esian 
&oncmics. A liberal consensus seemed secure. Even "hen 
Republicans were elected to high public offices, the New Deal 
and wclforc slate pol icies did nol under go significanL re\·ision. 
TI1c Eisenhower presidency, 100, did not prove n chance to 
implement the Right' s ideas nnd beliefs. Ahl1ough Eisenhower 
wa; economically conservative, he did not agree "ilh socinl 
conservatism. The Right stnrtcd to realize that it needed to gain 
more influence in the Republican party before its \'iews could 
gam more widespread political support. Yel, America was 
undergoing a dramnlic 1.ransformalion. The very success of the 
" cl fare slate and liberalism planced the seeds of a counter-~unck. 
Mainstream Liberalism would be gravely \\"cakcncd under 
concerted nuncks from both lbe Left and the RighL 
The I %Os saw the gro" th of the conscn·ati\'e movement in 
both the intdlccLual world and the political. Re1rospcc1ively, the 
1940s and 1950s could be seen as a lime of rebuilding and 
prcpJratioa for the changes that would shake Am~rica's belief in 
lit-crnlism. Tiie ad:ninistrations of President Kennedy and 
President Johnson rnised hopes in the general population Lhat 
poverty, racism, and chronic w1employment would disappcnr 
through libcrnl legislation and Supreme Court decisions. Some 
groups "ere not satisfied with the progress of govcmmcnt action 
and resoned to street protests and even viokm confrontations. 
The 1960s " ere a lime of great political and social change but 
that chang: caused a backlash by lhose who did not agree with 
the way tlley snw American society to be prog~essing. This 
backlash also caught up ll!fge nmnbcrs of less a mucm, or 
" orking class l\'hilcs, who fell that tl1eir interests had been 
forgollen by the eli1ism of liberalism. This, combined with the 
increased power of middle-class intcllcccuals and reformers in the 
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Democratic Pany, caused Lhc New Deal libcrnl conlit;on to stnrl 
Lo fr;icturc.12 
The fracturing of the libcrnl coalition hccmuc noticeable in 
tJi.~ I 964 Prcsidcnlinl elcciions. Although Bany Goldwater lost 
in a landslide, L11e election scr\'ed notice that there was n growing 
number of conscn-ati\'e voters in both the Republican and 
Democratic Parties. Fuwre Republican presidential candic alcs 
swncd to sec this realignment and lo use conscrvaci\'e messages 
and themes lo draw the support of tbcse voters. The conservati ve 
Republicans realized the potential power of illCSC ,·01~ and the 
cmnpaigns or Nixon, Reagan, and Bush were successful in 
couiting social conscrvatl\'e working-class and loll'cr-middlc 
class rnte." Through this process the oon~rvati,·e ,·oicC$ gained 
a wiJcr audience and increas·:d their crcdibiliry. 
The great changes that took pl;1ce in the I % Os also caused 
some li~rals of the day to reacl. It \\'OS a mo,·emenl made up of 
liberals "who had been mugged by rcalily."14 These people were 
concerned with what they saw as idcologicnl rigidity in liberal 
p:ograms. The belief !hat libcralis.-.i no longer knew what ii was 
lalking nbout became a ecnlr:tl theme for the neoconscrvalivc 
mo\'cment. Nccconscrvalivcs :dso perceived liberals ns soft on 
CommWlism. 
Several erstwhile liberals became very critical of libcrnl 
programs. The writers and journalists or the lllO\'C!llCnl became 
increasingly skeptical of th~ liberal 'icw of r:llionally analy7.ed 
social problems "ith quasi-scientific solutions. The 
ncoconservmi,·cs doubted thal im;:ierfcct and unpredictable man 
could be organized socially on lhe basis on 'sciemilic' kr.owlcdgc 
alcne.l> Their criticisms of the liberal programs were more 
ac;:~led by the mainStream press, which saw them as credible 
since they were seen as urbane intellectuals ai~d nOI pcnny-
pinching busincssrncn or rac.isLs.16 
As the neoconSCl'\'.1ti,·c mo\•e.mcnt progressed, i1 became 
increasingly conscrvatl\'c. The atrncks on libcrnl progrnms were 
notonne,. Hott.! PolilicJ', 5 J. 80-3. 
" lbi<l., 180-9 l. 
1•1_rving K1·isic.t. "Neoi:o1lSCr\'ali vc Guru lo Atlltric3's Ne\\' ( )rdi:r,'' 
i\lcC.teou'.l· 'J4 (Januy,ry: 1981};9. 
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~'tci:dcd until just about cvccy gaYemmcnt program was called 
in:o question. The ncoconservati\'CS did noL just criticize. One 
of the main strengths of the mO\'cmem ond one o( its great 
co1wibutions lo American consc1'Vatism, was its 1'bility to set uo 
foundations, journals, :md think tanks. These instituti~s helped 
to formulate positiYc counter proposals to liberal pro&•n1rns. 
Instead of just criticism, tl1e neoconservativcs were able to offer 
alwr.:ativcs to the liberal programs. The ncoconscrvatives wanted 
la reverse the agenda of govcrnmc11t, turn the government nw(ly 
from grand schemes, and reform America by relying upon the 
prh'ate s:ctor, market mechanisms, and traditional instirutions 
such i1s the family and !ocnl conummity. 
Aoolh>:r group of Americans who became active in the 
process of political encl social thought due lo the changes taking 
place in the 1960s, was the religious conservatives. Prior to the 
1962 Supreme Court d:cision agninsl school prayer and the 
Court's subsequent mlings on abonion and pornography, most on 
the rdigious right did not ncti,·cly participate in the political, 
intellectual, and social discussions of America. In fact, 
fundamentalists prided thcmseh·cs on being apoliti cnl if not anti-
po!itical. The !,'!'Owing permissiveness of sociely and the mass 
mdia concerned tlte religious conscn•ativcs. These concerns 
causcJ lhc religious right la reexamine their separatism; in tl1e 
la!e InOs righl·wing C\'angclieols organized themselves to 
dcicnd the Judco-Christian tradition and the cultural values tl1m 
they bclicl'cd in and ll'hich they felt to be under ~ttack." 
Organizations such as the Moral M~jority and tJ1e Christiun 
Coalition sprang up lo ad\'ocale and \'oice the concerns of the 
religious conservatives. TI1ese organizations were successful in 
motivating and mobili1ing large blocks of religious conservatiYcs 
in support of the conservali\'c cause. 
Despite the ' 'nrianccs and diITcrcnces within the conservali\'e 
ntO\'cment, many were able to find common ground and bring tl1e 
ntO\'CtnClll together. The anti-Communists found conuuon cnusc 
with the rcliaious eonscr\'ati,·es who were concerned about the 
atheism of ;ommunism. The t.raditionalists and the religious 
co~scl'\·ativ~'S had common groWlds in their beliefs and in eternal 
ll'lilh$ and principles. Withoul lhe groundwork of the 1940s nnd 
1 ~Uunn, C:aus~rwr!itic Tn.ullrlou, 8-10. 
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1950s, there may not ha,·c been a coiiscrntism lo tum to whm 
the 1960s caused a great reaction in many p·:oµlc . 
But the conservative revival must not bo! seen as just a 
reaction to the 1960s. Because of Commenwry, Nalional 
Review. 3nd Russell Kirk's Modem Age, along \•,ith oth.:r 
conservative journals, the conservative movcmcm was able to 
offer altcrnati\'CS co the policies and beliefs of liberalism. As 
conscrvnti' cs became more adept at formulJting ;ind presenting 
these nltcrnati\·cs to I.he American people, they became more 
readily accepted. This process was £really h:lpcd by the 
emergence or the ncoconsen•ntives, whose criticisms or the 
libernl programs and policies were accepted os much more 
crc.:liblc by the main;tre~m media. The neoco~scrYnlh cs also 
signilicantly helped the conscrvuti,•e cm1sc by establishing 
fowidations and other groups thnt were nble to posili,•ely present 
conscrvatiYe policies for goYemmcmal and soci~I reform. Thus, 
modern conscn'atism was able to offer full altemalivc.s to the 
people nnd \'Otcrs who tw·ned away from modem liberalism in the 
second half of this century. 
People mrned nwny from modem liberalism for mnny 
different reasons. Blue collar :u1d less affiuent \\fates twi1cd 
away from libcrnlism because or whnt th<.'y perceived as an 
abandonment c ( their interests by modem liberalism and the 
Dcmocralic Party. The radical Left also turned awa,· from 
libernlism becnus-~ of their concern over the f;1ck of social 
progress. Some of these radicals, interestingly enough would 
later st;irt to identify \\ith the libertarian school of conscrva1isn1. 
M aybc some or the success of conservatism wns due to the ,·ery 
fact that it contained so many divergent and different aims and 
beliefs. If Witonski was right nnd conscn-atism was not :u1 
ideology that would also help c)<plain its rise. The conservative 
movement \ms open to rnrious beliefs nnd people. The same 
people \\110 ,·otcd for F.D.R in the 1930s could feel at heme \\ith 
conservativism in !he 1980s and 1990s because it allowed 1hem 
lo keep and express their traditional social and cultural beliefs. 
Modem CC·mcrvatism was open to 1he 1dc.~s of the 
ncoconservalivcs and the religious conscrvnth cs. Though 
conscrvalism wns not open to everyone, it did allow in groups 
that had become alienated and discnch;:ntcd with modem 
liberalism. 
lS9 
Die conservative movement was ulLimatelv successful 
becau;c it was able to o(fer alternatives to the libC'ral !JrD6'fams 
3nd policies which had increasingly been critici7.ed ~ml called 
into question. This ability lo offer an allcnrntive Lo liberalism 
cn~blcd cons::n·a:ism to attract new and diYerse groups to i1s 
ranks. 
l\.1iethcr the conservative revival will sec continued growth 
is a question th~t has yet to be adequately answered. The 1996 
elections snw a conservntivc Republican majority rctum to the 
hllls of Congress; but their nwnbcrs are fewer and President 
Clinton was reelected. But perhaps the reelection or President 
Clinton bodes well for American conservatism. The President did 
pledge support for a balanced budget and sigucd into law tl1e 
welfare refonn bill, both of which were widely s11pp-0rted. 
Perhnps America is not as conscrvath•e as the conservu1ives wish 
to think it is, and tl1e reaction to some of the 1994 ConL'fCSS's 
;ictions on the enYironmcnt and Mcdic:ire arc examples of this; 
support for welfare repeal, however, and other rcfom1s of the 
welfare stale suggest that America has mo\·ed percepiiblv to the 
~~L . 
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L ocal history has been tm anoninly-n stepchild- in (he acaccmic discipline of history. In the Europcln and Am:riean hisloric:il traditions of the nineteenth century, 
history was wrillcn to highlight important people and en:nls in 
Ilic dominant nation-slates of the western hc111ispherc within a 
national framework. A paradigm shill occurred in historical 
profession in the 1950s and 1960s that emphasized study of the 
general population or specific groups nt various periods cf 
history, i.e., sQcinl history. The sh.ifl underscored the potentially 
\'aluablc use of local history as case studies of national trends. 
Local history began to tnkc on a broader meaning. 
Th~ public J-Jstory mo,·cmcnt of the Inst 1wc111y years has 
gi\'cn funhcr impetus to th e study o[ local history. While in 
Europe public history, or applied history as Europeans arc apl to 
call ii, is exclusi\'cly equated with the fonnmion of public policy, 
the Unoted States \'icws public history as that which is applied for 
the use of the public.' American historians sec 1hc ad\'cnl of 
public history ns the link between local and academic history, 
gi\'ing both l,'l'Catcr use and validation by the general population 
nt IJrge. Public history is also the arcno in which museum and 
historical agency professionals ply their craft and serve ns n link 
between local history, historical mi:thodolog\', and public 
audiences.: In Great Uri1ai11, the link between local history, 
1 /\nlhvny Su1:tiffe. "Gl=atn:s end Ec:hocs of Public Hi.storv in \Vestcrn 
Europ:: Bct(;rc .... -w After ~he Rotterdam Cot11Ctc1,:c," Th~ PuCh; llistt'lna11, 6 
cr.u 193-l): s, n. 
1John AJ ... ~ndcr \Villian1s, .. P\1hlic Hi:-\h1.:y 0i11:! Local l h~tory: /\.:·1 
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omscurn~ nnd academic history is comparatively weaker, arid the 
Amc1ica11 ideas of public history have not forged as slroni:; a 
bond ' 
Local history has a long respectable p:i.~t. In the United 
Stnt~, ns in Oilier nnlional traditions, 1he past has been fascinating 
and oflen sacred to its citizens. This led lo the cstablishmcnl of 
ninny local historical societies charged with saving b0Ll1 the 
mnlcrial culture and documentary heritage of the commwtity's 
histo1y. Historical societies are as old as the United States. Some 
of tJ1c firs\ historical societies, such as the Massachusetts and 
!\cw York Historical Societies, were founded soon after thi s 
count.rv \\'as established. They initially sought lo save maleriiils 
from liie people in\'olvcd will1 the Revolution.• These slates were 
fom1ed on the basis or colonial boundaries and fornting societies 
on the basis of slates seemed reasonable. The inclinaticn for 
Americans lo dil'idc themselves into regiorL~ is deeply cmbcc!dcd 
in 1he colonial past nnd the tendency for historians to create 
societies base.d on the different regions is a natural one.' It was 
only logical for early historical studies in the l.:nitcd Stales to 
center on localities. In iB early incarnations, local histories and 
historical societies were handled by "patrician historians," 
intcl'estcd in preserving ll1e past of the elite, to honor the 
\'cncrublc pioneers, and to tench the yow1gcr generation the great 
!eats tlt:it their nnccstors had performed before tl1ey wcxe lost 10 
the past• After the Ci,·il War, as W.B. Hesschine notes, the 
United Stat-zs nntional govcmment was sl10ngcr, which 
i110m:nced studies in politics, culture, economics and h!stoiy to 
be nntion~l in their focus.' Odes 10 local foundel's and hcnrty 
pioneer$ continued, but a national conception of histoiy bcgari lo 
emerge in the Inst quarter of the nineteenth century. 
1G. \VeS;ley John$on Jt'.? .. ,\_n .o\111cric:in hnzl!cssion of Public Histo1y ln 
EuroJ'C." History Today 3-l (Fall 1984). S7-97. 
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His1orians in Great Britain also followed the his1orioi,>rophical 
tr<1dition of focusing on prominent people and events in their 
early n;itional histories. \V.G. Hosk ins, tt promin·~nl pioneer in 
bringing local histo1y to academia in England, noted that parish 
noblemen were some of 1he fim historians to mile local histories 
in Enghmd, appcnring ns early as the ]ale fiftccnlh ccnlury. These 
types of \\Titers concentrated on 1hc pooplc :ind the ocii,·itics !hat 
occurred in the nrnnor ins1ead of the \'ill ngc. AlthousJi there were 
m~ny such histories \\Titten, by the ninctcc1ith centu~" historians 
in academic d~pnrtme:1ts were oorn:cnlrating on national social 
and c'onomic issues, \\'hich rose out of the culmrnl nationalism 
thut prevailed in Llic Western world during 1J1e ninclccmh 
ccntul}'.1 Carol Knmmen, an Amcrici!ll l~I historian and author, 
has nolcd thal the hislory or the cnrly \\Ti iings on local history in 
England and tlle Unilcd Stntcs are similar. She beliC\·cd it is 
b..><:ausc the upper clJsses had Che lime to \\lite Justori~ " ith thal 
related stories of U1e successful and wealthy people like 
lhemscl,·cs.9 
The nature of local hiscory scans to be J difficuh subject for 
many auU1ors lo define. The most comprehensive dcfini1ions 
have been put forth by Cnrol K:i.nun~n for the United States nnd 
W. G. Hoskins for England. In The P11rsui1 of low! History: 
Readings on 11:cory and Prnclfce, Knmmcn charges nuthors of 
AmcricJn locnl history to focus on the ordinary people of a 
specific cornn1unity. She also slrcsses lhJl local hiscorians should 
not work in a \'acuum nnd need to be nworc or broad liistorical 
Jlersjl<:Cti\'es.'0 She is adamant Iha! ma1crial culture is an 
imponanc pan of writing good local history, and Uiat n local 
uudiencc is often the primmy target for locnl histories." Prc.-ious 
local histories in the United Stales were molivatcd by an 
nltachnicnt 10 lhe local community ~ml a curiosity to trncc the 
history of tire nrcn in \\'hich the historian lived. The subjects of 
10"1] history ha• e included educ:icion, poor relief, rcligio11, and 
!\\'.G. 1 loskin,;, /~ucal lliJt01}' ,j, E11~.'nud 2d ed. {Loi\don. 1972). 1 i·26. 
'K.2mn~11. 011 DviJ1g l~td f/i$lory. 11 
"'C<"tcl Ka1n1nen cd» Tlr" Pr:rsr.1'.r r~l Loco/ /ii:ttory: Rc.1d1i1gs c ,: 11u.•O!j' 
ouJ 1?ract!cr. ('Nolnut Cr¢cJ.::, Cl!.I, I 996), J 5...0. 
11Dl\'id RU$50, "Soule • ~npit.."SMons or lhC Non A~dco\:C LocaJ) l1S:ori1tnS 
•u:d Th~ir \\'nti:1g.'" in The P1:r1tdt n..f / ,fJ<al /.'istnry, ed. K.::1111111:a, 3S. Si.-~ 3fso 
Tbid., 31.i::. 
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n~riculcure, Ionics that often were left untouched bv ocadcmie 
h~torians before the 1%Os.11 • 
Dcspilc i1s apparent popularily \\'ith the public al lnrgc in the 
United Stales, locnl hislory has had a difficult scrngglc 10 become 
a pnri of profcrsionnl hislory. This w~s becaus~ the people who 
" ere heading local socielics and wri1i112 countv histories were 
oficn not tr:1incd academic historians. ii mnde their work seem 
suspect. Indeed oficn ther~ were good reasons for these low 
opinions. 1 lowcvcr, there were many avocational historians who 
ccntribu(cd distinguished works. Th~')' analyzed their locales ns 
case studies for trends in national events. They wccc already 
performing the ll'ork that Kanu11cn was promoting. 
W.G. Hoskins took an integrated :1pproach to the subjecl in 
focnl flistory,• m Englan,/. Like Kammen, Hoskins noles thm 
people intcrcs1cd in doing local hi sto~· cherished and were 
interested in Uieir O\\n local commw1ity. Hoskins instructs his 
renders that a local historian needs to have a good general 
knowledge of English hislory to be able to put Lhe. local history in 
perspc~i\'e, a scn1irncnt shared by Kammen. He is also 
concerned that loe~I historians seem to concentrate ouly on 
documents nnd suggests the use of fieldwork to add depth." 
Cullural geography, or cult=! hislory broadly defined, is a 
hallmark of Hoskins school of English local hiscory. 
Since lhc second edition of Hoskins' book, several nrLiclcs in 
British historical ioumals ha\·c rc,·isited local historv. As in lhe 
Unilcd States, local history enjoyed a rebirth beginning \\ith 
Hoskins first cdi1ion of his book in 1959. which continued into 
the 1960s and 1970s as acndcmic historia~ becan to delve into 
1hc "new" sociu.l history. Local history provided more details 
abo111 Lhc deep structure of communities and "common" 
occuraures, as oµposcd to tlie national over\'iew of policies end 
economics. There was a parnllcl resurgence in lhe ch~ use of local 
history in locnl schools. Sc\'eral authors believed Uiat Joc~I 
his1ory, including \•isils 10 museums, can be used as ;1 way 10 
1110\ e away from the 1raditional 1cx1book histories and towards o 
multi-culturnl ;1ppr0Jch. As in 1he U.S.A .• Great Britain has been 
s1:11ggling \\i th its O\\lt debate about the use or history in schools 
~-K .. -:nmcn, T,.,o! P'ul"nlil t>i'l.,occ/ lrl.SIOI), 27-S, :s. 
''Ho:::;tins, l .ocal Hil'f<)ry ;u 1~r1s.'uua: 6, ff, l23. 
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an<l lhe question of ins1illing nn1 ional patrioli~m through history. 
Some 1hat an introduction to to\\1\ elders and their knowledge of 
its hi~lory \\'ould give children a sense of pride and place. 1'1 
Part of lhc problem in lhc dclinino local his101v and ils \'aluc ~ . 
lo the general public and the hisiorical profession comes from 1hc 
difficulty of pinpointing who exactly can be or is a local historian. 
TI1c s1ruggle is similar in 1he United Stales and Engk nd.. Both 
Hoskins and Kammcn, and other \\Titcrs on local historv. 
conceded 1hat some. local history was wrillcn bv anmtcL;J:~ 
unt.raincd in his1oricnl metl~ods and \\Tiiing for · their o\\n 
J,'Tali licalion, which produced histories 1hat were innccuratc, non-
unalytical, :1nd often lnckcd documentary and l.>ibliogrnphical 
refcrcnccs.'- At the same time, I.hey rccogni1.ed that there were 
local his1orians \\Tili ng al a scholnrly b\'el. The books thev hm·c 
wril!C!l nrc models for local historians lo emulate. • 
Tensions ha\·c sometimes de,·dopcd bot\\-ecn local historians 
who arc sent imentally lied to the communitv nnd omsidc 
academics using histories of localilies rcmo,·cd j·,·om their 0\\11 
e11p~ricncc as case Sl\!dies. In the Cnitcd States, historians such 
ns Herbert. G. Gutman in Wo,.k. C11/(11re, mul Society, h;J\·c 
work;:d wilhin the realm of local history 10 flesh out their theses. 
England has created a Chair of Local liistorv at lhc Uni,·ersilv of 
Lciceslcr. But local his1oiy is still sepnr~lcd from the gc~cral 
s1udy of histo11·. In the United Stales and England, local historv 
is also considered ll1e realm of most muscom profcssionais, 
although Hoski11S docs noL include museum staff in local 
histo1y.16 local museums could benefit from Ilic advice on local 
history given in Kammen's works. Museum professionals nnd 
local historians in lhc United Stales come together in the 
Am~riean Associa1ion for State nnd Local Historv but often .> 
0 D.-in,·cn Grl!gory~ •Jh:~ds -0: l.enc.a:shirc Hi~lcxv;//r..rto...., To.i.'1.- 39 
(Ocrobcr 1989): 4·5; "Edirorial; Hi:sto~v Todoy 39 {Oclobor t~S?): 2. · 
J:K2n11ne1t Tiu: Pursuil <J/ f,,,o~al 1-/istuiy: 24.Q, 38-9~ K11 111tncn
1 
On /)ojng 
Local Huto1')\ 14-33, l t-Oski'.ns.L«c/ lli410"}'iri £11glan!-~ 27. 
1'G(CQOry, ... Thr:itds," ·1-S·, Willianls. "Public E-ri .::(ory," 1 4~ l iar\.'ey (i rccn, 
"The Ro1c of Jle:sctueh in Publie Hisloric1\ Ase1dcs:' The. Puhl!c f /is1c,.if111 5 
(F•ll 1983~ 71-6: M•rl< IU>\\bkh, Sandro Mctzl:h~milb. tnd Ka1hkcn Kane. 
t'ltoo1, Ho£!.. or Dic,'' llisl-of'}• A'cws(.Acgust 1982): 8. Also sec Hoskin~, !~uet:I 
.'fist(HJ' in E11g!~1ud, pas-.Yi•u. 
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professional academic historians do not fully recognize this 
or2anitmion ·s contributions lo historical know!cd2c. 
- In Engl and locnl historians and museun~ professionals 
cm1linuc work s·~p~rate from those doing history in universities. 
llic rifi in England sccws lo be greater, because 1here is wry little 
dialogue between 1hc two in professional journals, whereas the 
t.:nited Stoics has nctivc discussion on lhe role of museum 
profcssionJls and other public historians in both nca<!cmin and the 
general public." llislorians in boll1 countries sec a rift beiwecn 
the many fncets of history and there is a great clamor for 
coo~ration between all branches of history, whether 
professional, amateur, student, professor, historians and laymen." 
In 1hc United States, museum professionals arc still oflcn 
lilbclcd am:lleurs as m;ll, even though academia has crca1cd 
trnining programs promoting better historical methods and 
c.~pct1isc in run.;ing historical agencies, and techniques for 
presenting histoiy to the public.'9 In Great Britain, the gap still 
remains wide. The few museum studies proi,>Tams offered in 
England arc oflcn separated from history depnrlments and placed 
in the realm of art hisloiy, as museums professionals are oflcn 
thought of as people who work in nrl galleries. Again, the 
Uni\•crsity of Leicester is a leader in museum studies programs 
that emphasize history in museums, and that relates museum 
"ork to Ilic broader di~ciplinc of history . 
Local his1ory and academic rustory arc Slruggling lo find 
common ground in th.c Unired Stnles and Great Bri 1~in. Doth 
Kammcn and Hoskins charge local his1orians in their respective 
e01uuries lo follow acad<:mic standards, e\·en if tl1ey ha,·e nc,·cr 
had fom1al training. Local hi.story continues to .hDve a poor 
rcput~tion in some quarters, because the earlier histories were 
oficn based upon legends and were biased as to "~'ar they 
' R.i~rd Ca'"·a1di1h1 ' 'British Asx..~"tion for Loe.cl HiS1~1.'' !iistnry 
Tr.duy41 (S::iit~1 : 1t:-cr l9?1): 62-3, Dennis t.i1l:s1 .. Local His.to~· M1 lhcC~uncil 
f>.gcndnt .1-fist~,.>' Tod.1y .1J (Dcccmb(.:r i993): 10-2. 
1'JOCil11 \\'clllna:l, "Local l !is1orians and Thc[r Aeli\ities.· in Tlrt! Pursuit 
o/ lo<ci llhtuy. ed. Kamoncn. 46-SO. 
11vfy1on A t.1arty. ''The Place of t.ocal H i:;toiy in the r rrtinin~ of Public 
~i!.10ri ::.ns~" The Public /}i$tori.111 S (Fall 191:!3): 77-lj7; Pt..-ti:r J. Beck. 
"'Fof\\'llr.f v.ith H~<>ry:: Sludyi11~ the Past rOr Careers in the FuiUrc, ~· Tl~ •0 ubll: 
llfs,·u1·1<rir 6 (f'!~ l! i$S4): -10 -64 . 
included and excluded. The reputation also follows museum 
professionnls, C'l'Cn after many of them arc being trained in 
uni'l'crsit ies. :-01:u1,- histori:ms, <!Cadcmic and otherwise, find \•nluc 
in 1hc use of local history in academic studies and in publishing 
it for the public. Increasingly historiMS, ncadcmic and oth~.,..., ise, 
hn..-c cnllcd for all to work together rather than to critici7.c each 
other from separate cnmps. 13ccause this is echoed so many tim~s 
on both sides of the Atlantic, it is S\1rprising that so lilllc has been 
done lo bridge that gap. England r.ml the United States could 
learn much from each other by dc,·cloping an exchange between 
local historical org;,niz:nions, since the problems associated with 
local history :ire oficn quite similar."' A fuller recognition of the 
museum profession in iocal historical studies in Engla~d, could, 
for example, create new Jllianccs and collaboration sen·ing all 
who work in the field. 
~'1e11dish. "British .'tssoci~1ion," 62·3~ Lacy E. Tise, .._S1stc and Loc~I 
liistory: A ;:Jl i.;.rc frorn the Past."' 111c Public l!iJtOl'i<Jn 1(Sonm1er 197Y): 1.:. 
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lconocla!Sm: A Historiographical Essay 
Lois A. Dickenson 
Lnis Di,·k~nson is a gradualc s111de111 nr Easter/! filfnois. 
71;iy rtv'/eu1 r.:SStJ)' 1'11t.'1S ,,..n·uan for a .'lraduate se1ninnr on 
the Ren(1issance and Reformation for Professor Joy 
Kommcrling during Fall 1996. It examines 1/ie 




istorinns hn,·e long acknowledged thaL Lhc rejection of !he 
,·nlidity of image worship, of\cn followed by outbursts of 
ico11oclasm, was the hallmark of the Protestiml 
Rcform;11ion i11 many communities. Interpretations of the 
changes in lh~ popular perception of religious images differ 
widely. Some historians have noled on nbnipt, rapid, ~nd 
"id..--sprc~d change in imasc perception, while others argue c.'lat 
it occurred slo\\'ly and reluctantly on the part of the common 
population. The bnsis for iconoclastic acts has also been debated. 
Was iconoclasm n natural product of ProlcSlanl theology, or was 
iL an expression of local/regional socio-economic or political 
factors'/ Alternatively, was iconoclasm an expression of 
ritualistic S)111bolism traditional among Lhe general population? 
This cssny reviews the scholarly debate on these questions. 
Because of tlie multi-faceted dimensions of the problem of 
i111ages and iconoclasm during the Reformation, the theses and 
arguments examined h<::rcin are dra\\n from several schools of 
histori~~I thought-art hisloty, social history. intellooual 
history-with the belief that these di ffering approaches contribute 
unique i1isigl11s. Like"isc, the broad geographic r:u1ge of 
iconoclnstic e,•cnts has prompted the inclusion of ar!,•umcnls 
based on incid~nls scattered from France lo Russin. The variance 
in loco! bockgrmmd provides not only o basis for exami ning 
similnrities and di fferences in Lhe arguments conoeming the basis 
for iconocl:l~m. but also provides an opportunity lo examine the 
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Gendering Franklin And Eleanor: a Review 
lforbara Bur/;e 
M.A. in History smdent Barbaro B11rke wrote this rel"/cw 
/or l'rofess()r L)nne C11rry's Historiography of Women 
n11d Gend~r History Seminar in Spring 1997. 
N o Ordinary Time, by Doris Keams Good\\'in, is n biography of Franklin and Eleanor Rooscvch> which looks :111his incredible husband nnd wife tcnm from !heir 
early li•:es, through a disease and an affair \\'hich almost ruined 
their lives, to c\·cnlunlly how they managed to rebuild their 
relationship on the most 11nus11:1l terms. How 1l1c Rooscrelt's 
redefined their rclatio11ship was paralleled by the cfCccls of the 
war on the Amcncan heme front and how the country lried to 
i-Wcfmc itself in the war's aficrmath. This rc,·icw shows the role 
gender played in Good\\in's analysis of the liycs of Franklin and 
Elea:ior and compaml her findings \\ith thoS<: of Qlhcc hislorians 
looking at eender roles. 
A; Do;is Kcnms Goodwin frequently points oul in her book, 
Eleanor Roosc,•clL was not lhc 1raditional wife Clf her tim:s. In 
foci, she let her husband's secretary, Margu·~ritc "Missy" 
LeHand, hnndlc thnl position freeing her to pursue h~r ow11 goals. 
Vvbilc Missy pla)•cd the pnrt of FDR' s hostess at parties nnd kcpL 
the president company, Eleanor traYeled and visited the American 
people. Elcnnor fell ralhcr out of place as hostess lo her 
husband's cockta il hour, or filling the social duties of n wom:1n or 
her class. She preferred to keep busy doing "ork that was 
meaningfu l to her rnthcr lhnn play a merely social role. However, 
Eleanor did believe in her right to be the mistress of the \vbite 
House and did not liken if others im!X>Sed upon her position.' 
Since F111nklin's fight with polio lcfl him paraly7.ed, Eleanor 
became instnuncnta! in her husband's political life. Due to his 
paralysis, Frnnklin could not mo,·e freely around lhc coun11y as 
he would like, so he scnl the !irsl lady in his place to act ns his 
eyes and c:1rs. Even before his election to the or!icc oi the 
;Doris Kcttrn! Good''-'!n, .Vo Or;iinar:i: tirirc tt~c-.v YC1rl..: 19911). R2, 300. 
All par<:nlhi::l.ieal IMQi:: r(fercoccs 111c 10 Jl>id. 
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prcs1denl, Eleanor wns important. A year after FDR contrnctcd 
polio, his wdb mnintnincd n busy schedule of appointments and 
poliLical meetings in her husband's name so that he would noi be 
forgotten He taught her to inspect Slate institutions while he "as 
go,·cmor, looking for human clements, so lhal be could bcucr 
understand the pccpb. Someone else probably could h:l\-C filled 
this position, but Franklin chose Eleanor. 
Dw-ing FDR's presidency, she continued in her_ role .as 
in specter and advisor. Her opinior1s earned a lol of wc1sh1 \\1th 
her husband nnd she used this position to urge Franklin to fight 
for ci\'il righls, foir labor practices, and the mobilization of 
women in the 111ili1nrv. Frequently, she pushed her husband LO the 
breaking point and fii:hts ensued. Through it all, Fran~lin l~l 
Eleanor speak her mind and tried not to control her. Frnnkhn 
e\'cn allowed Eleonor to influence policy. Trude Pratt Lnsh sovc 
the flfsl lady credit [or the ideas behind hN husband ·s four 
freedoms, which included the civil rights for which Eleanor hnd 
long fought. Perhaps, her f,'TCatesl contribution to ~1er husband:s 
presidcm .. -y was her appearance at the pany convenbon for F~R s 
third nomination. Eleanor did not want to make a sp~h, SlllC¢ 
a first lady hnd never spoken at a convention before. Ycl he 
speech helped to ensure the nomination. 
Allhough she broke some traditional roles, Eleanor for the 
most part stayed in her sphere. America bCGame Eleanor' Shouse 
nnd il's people her children, both of which she had lo watch o:cr 
like a eood wiCe and mother. Her inspections primarily dealL w1lh 
the si;k, the poor, the working class, and children. She was 
dedicntcd to abolishing child labor, improving h1bor laws for 
women and esinblishing minimum wages. 
Wl;cn the w:ir crunc, Eleanor's main concern was still 
domestic affairs. A !rip to the Pacific illuscrated her role nnd 
ima«e in the mind of the American people. One soldier who met 
El::.;nor saw her nO! as a diplomat for the \\'hilc !louse but os "an 
American mother" (464). Elc~nor's O\\TI words reveal how she 
tried to confonn 10 traditional ideas of )>'Ol1l:111hood: "ll1e nmction 
of a woman is Lo use tl1ings along: smooth them over." 
Anolhcr i11tcrcsting aspecl of Eleanor's life was her 
rclalionship with her female friends. As a worker for the Lcnguc 
of Women Volcrs, Eleanor came into contact with other 
politically oriented women, with some of whom she dc\'cloped 
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close relationships. Se,·eral of 1he women lvfrs. Roose"clt 
befriended, according lo Goc'<h,in. were lesbians. Good\\in 
suggests that she was jealous of 1hcsc \\.Qltten's close, caring 
relationships. One woman in particular, Lorena Hickok (Hick), 
dc,dopcd n special relationship with the First Ladv und even fell 
in lo1·c with her. The two women wro1c mnov letters about their 
love nnd their longing lo sec one another· 11·hcn apru1. The 
relationshi1' Inter faded as the first lady became increasingly 
active in politics. 
Good11 in addresses Eleanor's romance in tcnns of her 
Victorian backgrowid and refers to Carroll Smith Rosenberg's 
study Ros1:nb~rg in "The Female World of Lo"c ~nd Ritual: 
Rela1ions Between Women in Nineteenth Century Arncrica," 
srudied correspondence of women of that era in an altempt 10 
exami1c female relations in the proper culmrnl and social con1cxt. 
M~ny of the le11crs Rosenberg presented show similar 
dcc!arntious of lo\'e and the need 10 be together. According 10 
Rosenberg, lhis type of desire was nol indicalivc of 
homosexuality as much as emo1ional 1ies l;ctwccn women. 
Rosenberg \\Tiles, "these female friendships ser\'cd a number of 
emotional functions. Within this secure nnd empathetic world 
women could share sorrows, anxieties, and joys, confident that 
oth:r women had experienced sin1il:ir emotions."1 [).~spite the 
fact that !lick fell in 101·c with Elcnnor, Good\\'i n appears to agree 
with Rosenberg that, for Eleanor, this relationship filled an 
emotional need that coming from n Victorian l1pbringing, only 
ano1hcr woman could have fulfilled. 
E\·cn though .Elearnr's success was contin!!cnt on her 
husbnnd, she w;is nccomplishcd in her 01111 right. A Gallup poll 
rnkcn in 1940 re"calcd a 67% apprO\'al rating (higher than her 
husband's), \\ilh r.1ost of Uie American people accepting her work 
as a part of the national life. This raling e\·cntually dropp.:d as 
the First Lady continued 10 fight for the rights of blacks and 
labor. The N<11ion honored her at a banquet fer her work in c ivil 
rights and for th·: poor, one speaker referred LO her as an 
insrilution. She was among the highest paid lecturers in the 
counlry and in 1940, before her husband was nomino1.cd for a 
·Curotl S;nith-Roscnb:.rg:. ;.The Ftn1.il: \~'otld of'""'"":: ::ind Rilu11J." Slf;'•S 
I (t97S)< 6~ 
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third term, sh: rccci\'cd a five ycrrr c.xLCr!Sion on ber newspaper 
column Gooch\in suggests that such success coming from a 
woman of Mrs. Roosc\'clt' s position nnd era was rare. \l.l'hile she 
docs show that other women, such ns Eleanor's friend Hick. hoo 
a career and were respected, no other women held quite a position 
of authority and popularity as Eleanor Roosevelt. 
Eleanor Roosevelt became the archetype for American 
women during the war era. Like many '"°men circumstances 
pushed her out of the house and into Uic public sphc.re. Mimy 
wome11 took jobs in factories. AL the beginning of the war, the 
govemm::ot and other institutions discouraged women wlto 
entered the work foroc, such as the Catholic Church, for they 
were viewed n threat to the American home and traditional family 
values. When the war look it's toU on the male labor force, 
however, women were called in ns substitutes. Al the end of the 
war women would be expected lo return home. 
Howe1·cr, as the author poinlS out, lhcf'e was resistance for a 
change of status al the end of tl1e war. Goodwin found that many 
women \\'elcomcd Uicir new jobs and responsibilities, with 79% 
of women snying tliat they enjoyed working more than sta)~ng at 
home. ~l~nor was the model of the change in women's roles at 
1his Lime. Ltke many women she was happy out in the work force 
and did not care lo lea"e. As Goo<h1in points out '~1e agitation 
tl1e sixty-year-old Eleanor felt in not knowing what to do was 
echoed in the hearts of millions of American women for whom 
the war hnd been a major turning point, creating new 
cxpcctntions, new adjuslJllents, new problems" {555). 
Eleanor even worked al I.be cosl of her maniage. In 1942 
FDR implored his wife to stay at home more, acl as his hostess, 
and accompany him on trips. "But over the past decade, " as 
Good\\'in obscn·cs, "the e:qiericncc of becoming a political force 
in her 0\\11 right had brought with it n profowidly different sense 
of self-of independence, competence, and confidence. II joining 
her husband now meant gi"ing up the life she had built for 
hcrscl!: it sccmcxl a great deal 10 ask" (3 72). 
There were women who fell differently. For example 
Eleanor's daughlcr Arme lo"ed her new job and rcspo11sibili1ics 
for awhile, but after a time she encouraged her husband lo come 
home for she could 110 longer handle the problems without him. 
This seems more in line with Drew Gilpin Faust's findings in 
!lG 
Mothers of ln•'f:nlinn. In this book F;111s1 looks nt wcalthv 
south-::m women in the Ciril War and how thcv dealt 111th th~ 
changes that the war hnd on gender roles. These.women grew U(l 
in a world of protection and privilege unable to d~al \\ith the new 
rol es nml responsibilities the war brought. Al times, the "o:ncn 
broke gender roles by verbally assaulting enemy soldiers, by 
playing the spy, or by wearing mzn's clothes, ya they always 
retreated behind their gender.' Faust claims that the women 
question " the desirnbility of female independence or 
emancipation.•·• But she points out, much like Good11i11, tlrnt 
circumstances had changed and not everything could go back 10 
the way it wns. 
As stated abo\·e, Good\\in also addressed tl1e hcsitancv of 
allowing women into traditional male roles such a.~ !.he \~-Ork 
force. A woman's mnin function was to sc.e to their homes and 
th; r.1ising of their children. Good\,;n \\Tote of pcopk's concerns 
nbout the b1·cakdown of family values if women entered the work 
force. These same issues arc addressed in Christine Stansell's 
article "Women., Child:cn, and lhc Uses of lhc St=ts: Class and 
Gender Contlict in New York City. 1850-1 860." Due to the 
number of women working, children ran loose on the slrecls. 
Some yout hs tum~d towards picking up bc1tlcs and garbage for 
money, others lo se!li11g themselves on the streets. Stansell finds 
lhal New York's middle class was 1•cry upscl al 1hc prescucc of 
such children on the streets and tried to rc;iffinn tl1eir domestic 
idenls upon the wqrking class. They encouraged women to erealc 
a good home cm·ironmc.11., which included keeping a clean home 
and wntching o\·cr their children.' Goodwin found that c,·cn in 
the 1940's the same ideals hold true. As the war came ended 
women's joumals and 010\·ies encouraged females to leave their 
jobs nnd return to their place as caretakers or Ilic hearth. 
\\>llile Eleanor' s break from traditional female roles is 
implied throughout the book, Franklin's masculinity is hardly 
mentioned. This appears to be a silent sta1c111enl that while 
11)t'C\\. Gil?.Jl fau>t •. '. /"'1oers Qf bnwuioti (Ch::.pct Hill, 1996). 196·24~. 
11bid .• 2S6. 
~Chustini= ~haascll. " \\10 1nen, Children, antl lhe Usc:s of the Stri:ets.: Class 
mJ Ocndc:r ConOicl in Ne\~ York Chy, 1850-1 860," in tru~qual Sisters: A 
,'.(ultit:rdtrtrcl n~..,<fer iH {/.S. Ji"OJJtrn ·s /fi:story. ed. El:cn Ciual Dubois 311d 
\ 'ic'ki l.. Ruiz. (1\c.:\v York~ 1?90), 92. 1oa. 
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Eleanor did somclhing tumsual by going outside her lraditioual 
sphete and entering into politics, Franklin's life in politics was 
perfectly natural. Fr~nklin Rooscrclt was presented by Goo<h1in 
as a slrong leader, \\·ho was forced to deal with U1e problems of 
tl1e United Swtcs :ind the world He had to constantly balance 
public opinion witl1 his policy. Goodwin often r~ferred to the 
pr~sidcnl's inabi lity to have deep personal relationships. 
FDR, along with his friend Winston Churchill, took a certain 
omounl. of pleasure in mobilizing nnd waging war. Upon seeing 
Churchill's m~p room, Roose\'ell ordered one made for himself. 
He took pride in seeing the gro"lh of the military and re\·ie1,ing 
the troops. Upon visiting the men in Africa, Goodwin reports 
" the sight of so many young Americans in good health and high 
spirirs wns n tonic for the soul" (405). £1.::anor described lhe 
President and the Prime Minister making war plans like two boys 
playing soldier. Such idc:1lized male views of wnr arc also found 
in The Grcm Adventure by Michael C.C. Adams. In his piece 
Adams writes how men traditionally found joy and cleansing in 
war, not to mention the fact that war was viewed as an honorable 
way 10 die. Furthennore, m<:n in the trenches, much like 
Rooscvcll and Churchill in the mnp room, found male 
companionship during war.• According to Goodwin, Roosevelt 
nlso held this romantici7.cd view of war. 
Because the President faced the troubles of the nm ion nnd the 
war all day long, it was important for him to come home and 
rcl5x. Eleanor could nol be the type of companion Franklin 
i'olmd in Missy. Missy looked up al Franklin witl1 adoring eyes, 
sh~ repeatedly listened lO his stories, hosted his parties, and made 
his life more comfortab le: a trnd ilional wifely role. In facl, 
Missy "ns referred tons FDR' s other wiCc. Home was to be the 
plaoc where Franklin could escape !lie outside world, and 
lhrouglloul his li fe he fow1d women to make this place for him. 
Although F rnnklin Roosevelt contracted polio DI a young age, 
he remained aClive in sports. He tried hard al nn e.-.rly age to 
excel in school nnd ad,•ance his positio11 in socictv. While his 
father I aught him " how to row and sail, and skate ·nnd sled" his 
moth~r focused more on his moral leaching, taking him \\ilh her 
while she visited the sick and the poor (75-80). 111 "The habit of 
6.'vl i..:h::-.;l C.C. Ad.a1ns. Tit' Gn:c:l 1JJvcuu1u•-t (Bloorning1on: 1990). 
llS 
''iclorf: the American military and the cult o[manlin~ss," Donald 
J. Mro7.ck examines three different masculine models. Mrozek 
points out how fathers lend IO emphasize tl1e Masculine Achiever, 
an idc:i based on a strong, active, aggcssive mdc stereotype, 
"hile mothers tend to emphasize the Christian Gcntkman a~ idea 
based on right actions, compossion and restraint. RooseYclt 's 
parents appeared lo fit this pallcrn. 
Fr.inklin himself seems to fit into the third cntcgory, the 
Masculine Primiti,·c model, in which n man slrivcs 10 ncl1ie,·e the 
strength of body and personality of th e Masculine Achiever but 
relics on his primiliN instincts for sur\'ival. Although Donnld 
Mrozek studies middle-class boys, Franklin seems to fi t in since 
he was comp~t iti, ·e in college and ~t sports. Mrozek states that 
"competition and physical challenge were important tests of 
manhood."' Good\\in orten shows Franklin 's fight "ilh polio as 
an importnnl chnlknge which changed his life, for he wos able 10 
conquer it and continue. 
hen though FDR contracted polio long before he ran for 
president, most people did nol know that Ilic leader of the world's 
most powerful country was crippled. He was proof thnt being 
crippled did nol make. one less o[ a rnnn, This compJrc to the 
findings in Sonya Michel's "Danger On The Home Front: 
Motherhood, S;xuality, :lrld Disabled Vclcrans in American 
Postwar Films.~ In three of !he mo,·ies c.~amined hy Michel, 
disubili1ics suffered from the war, esp!cially amputmions were 
viewed as cm11sculating, for a mr:n wns expected to be the 
)lrO\·ider nnd protector. If he were crippled he would be tumble 
to fulfill this role. F urthcnnorc, !he man then became d~pcndcnt 
on his \\i'.e or i;irlfricnd. 
FDR was nn example of how a mnn with a major disability 
could overcome and go on l.O succeed in the world of politics, ~ 
traditional nrnlc sphere. Michel also finds in her sludy !hat in t\\'o 
of tl1e post-World War II films lhc womcn of the injured \'Clerans 
"were not onl~· lo surrender their jobs, but also to subordinme 
!heir o\•ns dreams, ambilions, and desires to those of the 
7.Don3Jd J. >.i·cv.ct, "TI1e habi1 of \ict.OJ)': the A.71~n mili1.ary •rd the 
cult of m::utliness," in Afn11lin~ss attd ,\.forality: .lt.fldd!tt.Ciass ·"'l11Jn1!inity 1:" 
f!tiluir1 and An .. .:ri'i·a, lS/)0~19·10, ed. J.A. ~fang.:n !tnd Jernc:s \VoJvcn 
(Ma;,..-:hcs:cr. 19~7): 220-35. 
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\'Clcrnns."' This did not npply lo the relationship between 
Franklin and Eleanor. Eleanor's power was increased nr1cr her 
husband's pamlysis, and furthermore Franklin encourngcd iL by 
teaching her how to become an inspeclor and sending her out in 
his nrunc. Eleanor doesn't subordinate herself to her husband just 
beer.use he was in a wheelchair. 
Good11-in understands gender better frpm a woman's point of 
view. She covers Eleanor's personal gT0\\1h and break from 
iradilional gender roles in f,'fCaL detail. She compares Eleanor's 
e."pcricncc to thal of American women as a whole during the war. 
She clearly showed that women enjoyed !heir new found 
freedoms nnd mnny refused to give them up nl the cod of the w(tr, 
much like the first l;:dy herself. On the other lrnnd, Goodwin is 
ratl:cr "ague when it comes to men and their ge.'lde.r roles. Her 
silence on such issues is a s1rong statement. Men were made for 
wnr, it w<is their job to play politics and fight on the front l in~s. 
Howc\'cr, she misses two important aspects. How did men feel 
about the roles they were assi(;ncd? Moreover, how docs the 
ordinary m~n feel about the world of gend::r turned up;;ide dom1? 
NQ Ordinary Tima is an appropriate title for this book, and 
Goodwin \\rites more than just an ordinary biography. She docs 
an excellent job of paralleling !he lives of Franklin and Eleanor 
Roosc,·clt to this remarkable time in American history. Just as 
the rclaliooship between this husband and wife would undergo 
major changes during a time of crisis, so would the American 
home front Nei 01cr would ever be the same. 
1Soaya ~Aichel, .. Danger on the Horn: Fro:lt: ti.bhcfh.,.-sJ, &:::.\."UAlit" aand 
Disabled '·/etcrnr.s in American Posf\vnr Films," in Ge,tdt>!rtng 1'(1,. Tali: 
{P1'i11cclon, l993}. 261. 
